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Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum 
on the Holocaust
e members of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance are 
committed to the Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on 
the Holocaust, which reads as follows:
1. e Holocaust (Shoah) fundamentally challenged the foundations of 
civilization. e unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always 
hold universal meaning. Aer half a century, it remains an event close 
enough in time that survivors can still bear witness to the horrors that 
engulfed the Jewish people. e terrible suering of the many millions 
of other victims of the Nazis has le an indelible scar across Europe as 
well.
2. e magnitude of the Holocaust, planned and carried out by the Nazis, 
must be forever seared in our collective memory. e seless sacrices 
of those who deed the Nazis, and sometimes gave their own lives to 
protect or rescue the Holocaust's victims, must also be inscribed in our 
hearts. e depths of that horror, and the heights of their heroism, can 
be touchstones in our understanding of the human capacity for evil 
and for good.
3. With humanity still scarred by genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, 
antisemitism and xenophobia, the international community shares 
a solemn responsibility to ght those evils. Together we must uphold 
the terrible truth of the Holocaust against those who deny it. We must 
strengthen the moral commitment of our peoples, and the polit-
ical commitment of our governments, to ensure that future genera-
tions can understand the causes of the Holocaust and reect upon its 
consequences.
4. We pledge to strengthen our eorts to promote education, remem-
brance and research about the Holocaust, both in those of our coun-
tries that have already done much and those that choose to join this 
eort.
5. We share a commitment to encourage the study of the Holocaust in all 
its dimensions. We will promote education about the Holocaust in our 
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schools and universities, in our communities and encourage it in other 
institutions.
6. We share a commitment to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust 
and to honour those who stood against it. We will encourage appro-
priate forms of Holocaust remembrance, including an annual Day of 
Holocaust Remembrance, in our countries.
7. We share a commitment to throw light on the still obscured shadows of 
the Holocaust. We will take all necessary steps to facilitate the opening 
of archives in order to ensure that all documents bearing on the Holo-
caust are available to researchers.
8. It is appropriate that this, the rst major international conference of the 
new millennium, declares its commitment to plant the seeds of a better 
future amidst the soil of a bitter past. We empathize with the victims' 
suering and draw inspiration from their struggle. Our commitment 
must be to remember the victims who perished, respect the survivors 
still with us, and rearm humanity's common aspiration for mutual 
understanding and justice.
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About the International Holocaust Remembrance 
Alliance (IHRA)
e International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) unites 
governments and experts to strengthen, advance and promote Holo-
caust education, remembrance and research worldwide and to uphold the 
commitments of the 2000 Stockholm Declaration.
e IHRA (formerly the Task Force for International Cooperation on 
Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, or ITF) was initiated in 
1998 by former Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson. Persson decided 
to establish an international organization that would expand Holocaust 
education worldwide, and asked President Bill Clinton and former British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair to join him in this eort. Persson also developed 
the idea of an international forum of governments interested in discussing 
Holocaust education, which took place in Stockholm between 27 and 28 
January 2000. e Forum was attended by twenty-three Heads of State or 
Prime Ministers and fourteen Deputy Prime Ministers or Ministers from 
forty-six governments. e Declaration of the Stockholm International 
Forum on the Holocaust was the outcome of the Forum’s deliberations and 
is the foundation of the IHRA. 
IHRA is comprised of 31 Member Countries, nine Observer Coun-
tries, two Liaison Countries and seven Permanent International Partners, 
including the United Nations and UNESCO. Delegates are appointed as 
members of IHRA’s four working groups: Academic, Communication, 
Education, and Museum and Memorials, and to advance the work of three 
thematic committees on the Genocide of the Roma, antisemitism and 
Holocaust denial, and comparative approaches to Genocide studies. 
Across national delegations, experts share knowledge, best practices 
and points of concern, and make recommendations to political repre-
sentatives from ministries of Education, Foreign Aairs and Culture, to 
directly shape policy-making. rough its Grant Programme the IHRA 
fosters international dialogue and the exchange of expertise. e IHRA has 
funded 410 projects across 48 countries.
e IHRA chairmanship rotates annually on a voluntary basis with 
bi-annual gatherings consisting of a four-day programme of meetings, 
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discussions and presentations culminating in a day-long Plenary. e 
Heads of Delegation of member countries comprise the decision-making 
body of IHRA, which operates on a consensus basis.
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Preface
A major international conference such as the one whose content is reected 
in this volume results from a great deal of work by many dedicated individ-
uals. erefore, rst and foremost, I must thank those whose eorts were 
central to transforming this conference from idea to reality.
I must, of course, begin with His Holiness Pope Francis, whose support 
made this event possible.
Secondly, Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin and his 
departmental colleagues were crucial to this successful realization of the 
original vision. In particular, I want to publicly thank Archbishop Paul 
R. Gallagher, who became the central senior contact with the Holy See as 
the planning for this event progressed. And it is a pleasure to also publicly 
acknowledge the consistent support and help of Monsignor Antoine Camil-
lari, Under-Secretary for the Oce of Relations with States of the Holy See.
A deep debt of gratitude is owed to Father Norbert Hofmann. Father 
Hofmann, whose work usually takes place within the Commission of the 
Holy See for Religious Relations with the Jews, was assigned to be the 
main liaison between the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance 
(IHRA) and the Vatican, and thus has been the primary day-to-day contact 
for everything to do with this event. He has fullled his role eectively and 
with great courtesy. 
In addition, I want to thank Archbishop Silvano Maria Tomasi and His 
Eminence Archbishop Paul R. Gallagher for agreeing to be our opening 
speakers. Archbishop Tomasi has served as a member of the Dicastery 
for Promoting Integral Human Development since 2016, and was previ-
ously the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations and 
other international organizations in Geneva. Archbishop Gallagher is 
the Secretary of the Holy See’s Relations with States. e presence of two 
such eminent senior members of the Vatican community speaks volumes 
regarding the support that the conference organizers received from the 
Holy See. 
On the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance side of the 
ledger thanks must go, rst of all, to Ambassador Mihnea Constanti-
nescu, who served as IHRA Chair in 2016, representing the Romanian 
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14 PREFACE
Chairmanship. He was closely associated with every phase of the concep-
tion and planning of this program and took all his responsibilities with 
great seriousness and dedication. He met all of his weighty obligations with 
a light touch, great good humor, and exceptional diplomatic skill.
en, too, a great debt is owed to Dr. Kathrin Meyer, Executive Secre-
tary of the IHRA. Dr. Meyer played a central role in translating this project 
into reality. She oversaw all the complex details with her usual thorough-
ness and concern. And she made meeting the many and diverse needs of 
the Conference Committee a priority in the operation of the main IHRA 
oce in Berlin.
In this connection several Berlin colleagues at the IHRA headquar-
ters who worked tirelessly to help must be publicly acknowledged: Laura 
Robertson, Rosvita Krajinovic, Lennart Aldick and, most especially, Ezgi 
Akarsu, all made major contributions. Ms. Akarsu took on the main 
responsibility for coordinating all the endless correspondence and saw to 
it that all the practical necessities were dealt with satisfactorily. She was a 
marvel of eciency, responsibility, and generosity.
It is also a great pleasure to thank my academic colleagues, drawn from 
IHRA’s Working Groups, who eventually made up two “Conference Plan-
ning Committees.” e rst of these included Dr. Cecile Banke (Denmark), 
Dr. Robert Williams (USA), Dr. Mark Weitzman (USA), Dr. David Silber-
klang (Israel), and Dr. Wolf Kaiser (Germany). e second committee was 
comprised of Ambassador Michael Baier (Austria), Dr. Veerle Vanden 
Daelen (Belgium), and Dr. Robert Williams (USA). e quality of the nal 
conference program is a testament to their good judgment, erudition, and 
tireless eorts.
And last but not least, I must oer a profound thank you to all of our 
speakers who graciously accepted our invitation to participate in this 
meeting.
I.
Having served as the program chairman of the conference I would like to 
convey, as clearly as I can, what the organizers of this conference hoped it 
would accomplish. It was created in response to a deep concern, shared by 
the Holy See and the IHRA, regarding one of the most signicant political 
and humanitarian problems of our time: the refugee crisis in contemporary 
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Europe. ough the conference gave a good deal of attention to providing 
important information about what had been done in the past in response to 
prior crises of this sort, especially the massive human emergency created by 
the Holocaust and the Second World War, its primary concern was with the 
problems of today. Which is to say, its participants critically reviewed the 
past in order to learn about both the successes and failures that occurred, 
so that we can hopefully do better, both functionally and ethically.
Today’s very dicult circumstances have generally been met with 
confusion and uncertainty by governmental and non-governmental actors 
who have been called upon, willingly or not, to play a meaningful role. But 
that said, the conversation that began in Rome and that is now embodied in 
the contents of the present volume is not concerned with recriminations or 
allocating blame. Instead, it is meant to start a substantive and utilitarian 
dialogue—among all the interested parties with a stake in resolving the 
present emergency—about what might be wisely and eectively done now. 
is necessarily involves the churches as well as the main organs of civil 
society, including the press and all the relevant NGOs that can make mean-
ingful contributions in this context. And the conversation must include the 
countries of Africa and the Middle East from which the refugees come. e 
concern is to nd common ground, dicult as this may be, so as to begin 
to ameliorate the present situation. 
It is transparently evident that the subject of asylum seekers and refu-
gees creates intense passions and has stirred a variety of actions—and 
rhetorical excesses—across the political spectrum. Against this torrent of 
emotion, of accusations and counter-accusations, of epithets and verbal 
abuse, it was the aim of the organizers of this conference to create a calm, 
open environment where these passions could be tamed and a space 
created in which a civil—and productive—dialogue about fair and respon-
sible programs to address this highly problematic circumstance could take 
place. 
e organizers of this conference aspired to move beyond talk and to 
generate concrete proposals that would assist both those in need of refuge 
and those who are asked to provide this refuge. is is the present impera-
tive, and it is one that will neither decrease nor disappear over the coming 
decades. Birth rates, and the phenomena of population growth and popu-
lation decline in dierent parts of the world, will continue to change the 
world we live in. I note that demographically Europe is declining quite 
dramatically. At the start of the twentieth century, the countries that today 
STEVEN T. KATZ
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comprise the European Union collectively represented 14 percent of the 
world’s population; today they represent six percent, with further statis-
tical erosion inevitable given present demographic realities. Alternatively, 
Africa and most countries of the Muslim world are growing quite rapidly. 
Continued globalization will insure that what happens in one part of the 
globe will aect other parts of the globe, and that no country will be able to 
isolate itself from these transformational events. 
Moreover, even without any alteration in demographic circumstances, 
there are, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, 21.5 million individuals who are today classed as refugees, i. e., people 
who, fearing for their safety, have uprooted themselves and le their home-
land. At the same time, according to the same source, the conicts that 
cause these departures take, on average, 37 years to come to a resolution, 
and the average refugee needs 17 years to locate a permanent new home.
So we urgently need rational, mediating, practical solutions that can 
garner suciently broad national and international support. And it may 
well be that dierent solutions are necessary for dierent countries and 
regions. In some places aid may mean in-migration; in others nancial 
assistance; in still others, limited-time work permits; or, alternatively, solu-
tions might entail providing massive development aid for those countries 
from which the refugees and economic migrants come. But we can nd 
these substantive answers only if we have an informed exchange of ideas 
and concerns: an exchange that must center on policy as well as politics, 
and on regulation and prudent management strategies as much as on the 
mood of the electorate, though the sensibilities and will of the electorate 
will ultimately be crucial. en, too, we need to conduct this conversation 
without rancor or overheated rhetoric. 
II.
I now would like to take this opportunity to oer some brief introductory 
comments on the contributions to this volume so as to indicate the kinds of 
historical and contemporary issues that the conference participants were 
asked to address.
Our opening two papers were presented by Archbishops Paul R. 
Gallag her and Silvano M. Tomasi at the rst session of the conference. 
Archbishop Gallagher, drawing on the great progress that has been made 
PREFACE
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in Jewish-Christian relations, indicated that the Vatican was deeply 
committed, based on past, painful, experiences like the Holocaust, to 
being part of any meaningful solution to the present refugee crisis. Arch-
bishop Tomasi seconded this ambition and emphasized the urgency of the 
contemporary situation and the need for the international community—
following the lead of the Catholic Church—to “tirelessly advocate for the 
respect and promotion of all human rights of migrants and refugees.” Here 
the deep issues at the heart of the current situation were directly connected.
Our opening panel, chaired by Father Norbert Hofmann, centered on 
the refugee crisis that began in the 1930s and continued through the years 
of the Second World War. e panel’s three participants addressed, respec-
tively, the failure of most countries to accept Jewish refugees (Susanne 
Heim); the work of the Holy See on behalf of refugees (Johan Ickx); and the 
eorts of Jewish organizations to open doors for persecuted individuals 
eeing from Nazi Germany in the 1930s and Nazi occupied Europe in the 
1940s (Avinoam Patt). Heim does a very persuasive job of linking past and 
present. Ickx’s paper is particularly notable because it provides a great deal 
of information on Vatican activities during the war, a subject about which 
there is much debate; while Patt’s paper shows the many sustained attempts 
by the Jewish community to make a dierence in aiding Jewish (and other) 
refugees, some having a modicum of success, others failing outright. Each 
of these three papers revealed, in its own way, the exceptional complexity 
of the situation at the time, and, essentially, the failure to resolve it satisfac-
torily despite heroic eorts in many quarters. e degree of indierence to 
the suering of others and the power of prejudice were, ultimately, deter-
minate in this dark time. 
is is not a record to be proud of; it warns us that we must do better. 
We face similar problems today, and, unless we wish to be judged as 
unsuccessful as our predecessors, we need to learn at least two funda-
mental lessons. e rst is that international cooperation—which failed 
in the 1930s and 1940s—is necessary in order to confront the stark issues 
of today. Secondly, excessive nationalism can betray the state’s dual moral 
obligations: to their own citizens and to others.
e second panel, chaired by Veerle Vanden Daelen, considered 
various important responses to the massive refugee problems resulting 
from the war. e rst paper, by Dan Plesch, centered on the work of inter-
national organizations like the United Nations and its relief agency, the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), rst 
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created in 1943. e second paper, by Juliane Wetzel, explored the reac-
tion of European countries to the postwar situation, and the third presen-
tation, by Carl J. Bon Tempo, dealt with American policy following the 
defeat of Nazi Germany. Plesch notes the diversity of reactions to the work 
of UNRRA, the grave problems that this organization faced in trying to 
coordinate international relief projects, and the programmatic initiatives 
to create new standards of international law and human rights. Some of 
the latter eorts, despite many obstacles, have led to important progress 
in this area over the past half-century. However, the many missed oppor-
tunities should provide a lesson on the need for sustained and mean-
ingful action in these fundamental areas of concern. Juliane Wetzel’s 
essay on European responses concentrates on the treatment of “displaced 
persons” (DPs) and the special needs of Jewish DPs particularly in postwar 
Germany. e essay emphasizes that a great deal of resistance, predicated 
on misconceptions and anti-Jewish stereotypes, directly intervened in the 
conversation of how to solve the many problems. is lesson is highly rele-
vant to the current situation, which is oen dened by falsehoods about 
“foreigners” and “others,” whether based on color or religion. Lastly, Carl 
J. Bon Tempo revisits American policy towards refugees aer 1945. e 
good news is that gradually the United States opened its borders to refu-
gees and created a number of programs that brought 650,000 refugees. is 
policy of openness continued into the 1960s with the Cuban refugee situ-
ation, and through strong political and nancial support for UNRRA and 
the International Refugee Organization. is was made possible by funda-
mental changes in attitude within American society regarding the value of 
diversity and the nature of what it means to be an American citizen. What 
is paramount in the story retold in this essay is the suggestion that polit-
ical realism can form a healthy symbiotic relationship with ethical ideals to 
produce, aer much hard work and some resistance, benecial outcomes 
both for those welcoming refugees into their national community, and for 
those newly arriving. is lesson is highly repercussive because it points to 
the realistic possibility of overcoming the usual, and destructive, either/or 
polarity oen assumed in the diagnosis of the refugee issue.
Our third panel, chaired by omas Michael Baier, focused on “the 
present situation.” Stefan Lehne takes a hard look at the circumstances 
dominant in today’s Europe, specically the policies adopted by the Euro-
pean Union. He is explicit about the very serious failures that have occurred 
as a result both of a lack of preparation to meet the crisis eectively, and a 
PREFACE
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lack of common purpose, with an upsurge in national self-interest inter-
vening in unfortunate ways. More importantly, he suggests signicant 
ways in which to improve the management of the refugee problem inside 
Europe, paying particular attention to the control of the routes by which 
refugees and migrants reach the European mainland. e paper concludes 
that a new, powerful European “embrace of ethnic and religious diversity,” 
interpreted as benecial economically and politically to Europe’s present 
citizenry, is required. To achieve this, Europe’s leaders must better control 
the ow of migrants, insure that the chaos of 2015 and 2016 is not repeated, 
invest in needed infrastructure to achieve the successful integration of 
new populations, and agree on common rules regarding asylum seekers 
and refugees. All of these proposals represent sensible suggestions that if 
adopted would make a material dierence on the ground. 
e second paper in this session was given by Kristina Touzenis on the 
crucial topic of “International Law and Migration.” Aer briey explaining 
the legal background relating to international laws governing migration 
and the rights of refugees, Touzenis turns to the major question of what is 
legal today and what is not, as Europe—and the world community more 
broadly—grapple with the consequential dilemma confronting them. Here 
Touzenis rightly focuses on the demands and obligations associated with 
“human rights,” with the key recognition that international law is not an 
abstraction; rather, it aects all of us, and not least because legal standards 
protect us all.
e third presentation, by Giovanni Pietro Dal Tosa, deals with the 
current refugee eorts being made by the Holy See. e paper provides a 
very knowledgeable “insider” view of the extensive Vatican eorts, based 
on humanitarian values, to assist with the present crisis. In particular, the 
Holy See has been active in supporting relief eorts in the Middle East, in 
countries like Syria and Iraq, both of which have been devastated by war. 
Spending a good deal of money in these locations, the Church’s under-
takings center around education and health services, propelled by a deep 
commitment to arming and maintaining the human dignity of every 
individual. By reminding us of the latter consideration, the paper provides 
a distinctive, and essential, perspective that is all too oen neglected in the 
political and bureaucratic conversation about what needs to be done.
e last paper, by Mukesh Kapila, adds a truly crucial, striking dimen-
sion to this collection of papers, as it did to the conference in Rome. And this, 
because it addresses the present refugee circumstance from the perspective 
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of the refugees themselves. ough obviously central to the dialogue about 
what needs to be done—what should be done—this required input is oen 
neglected when the important conversations take place. What Kapila 
succeeds in doing is to bring to the fore, through personal stories and indi-
vidual experiences, the pain and suering of those caught up in and trans-
formed by the terrible, lethal, political events that have overtaken their 
lives.
With great sensitivity and attention to detail, three IHRA rapporteurs 
(Wolf Kaiser, Robert Williams, and Cecilie Stokholm Banke) summarized 
the key points made in the preceeding discussions.
e closing remarks involved two extremely thoughtful presenta-
tions. e rst, by Stephane Jaquemet, emphasizes the signicance of 
“remembering.” By calling this theme to our attention we are reminded 
of what took place when xenophobia, racial hatred, and antisemitism went 
unchecked in society and governments succumbed to right-wing national 
political movements. e message here is very simple: Hate and prejudice 
undermine the democratic political order. And they are abetted by “indif-
ference” and the adoption of the “bystander” stance. is was true in the 
1930s and 1940s and is just as true today. us “remembering” is a prophy-
laxis against apathy and inertia. Owning the memory of past atrocities can 
spur ethical action today and tomorrow. is is the dierence between 
memory and history. e former touches us, denes us, encourages us. 
Its essential lesson is that “the moral compass must guide us” and that we 
must, taking our lead from the past, be vigilant today. e main lesson to 
be learned from the past is that indierence is as powerful as deliberate evil 
in the formation of uncivil societies.
e last paper in this volume, by Michael O’Flaherty, concerns the 
link, the relevance, between the present mood in the European Union 
and the substantive matters addressed in Rome. O’Flaherty emphasizes 
ten issues: the need to learn from the past; the need to listen to others, 
including to refugees; the need to critically examine current policies and 
approaches; the need for our judgments and actions to be based on “facts”; 
the need for the conversation to be “framed” correctly, and this not least 
in terms of universal ethical values; the requirement that all discussion, 
proposals, and actions be properly “contextualized”; the need to publicly 
“shame” immoral and illegal behavior when we witness it; and, skipping to 
his tenth and nal issue, the need “not to lose hope.” is quite long inven-
tory touches upon many, if not most, of the main themes and subjects taken 
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up during the conference. In total, this to-do list provides a solid founda-
tion for the construction of a viable process for dealing with the current 
refugee issue as we go forward. 
In sum, these many contributions, taken together, provide a deep 
understanding of where we have been, where we are, and where we need 
to go. It is now our collective task to make the future better than the past.
Steven T. Katz
Advisor to the IHRA 2010–2017
STEVEN T. KATZ
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Foreword
The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, 
the Holy See and the International Conference on 
Refugee Policies
On February 16 and 17, 2017, the International Holocaust Remembrance 
Alliance (IHRA) and the Holy See organized a conference in Rome on 
Refugee Policies from 1933 to the present day. e conference brought 
together public policymakers from Europe, North America and the Middle 
East and representatives of media, NGOs and civil society organizations. 
How did this conference come about? And why did the IHRA engage in 
such an endeavor? 
What was the dilemma? 
Our venture was inspired by the well-known events of the summer of 2015, 
when, as a result of the crises and civil wars in the proximity of Europe, 
the number of people eager or forced to migrate rose drastically. In conse-
quence, the IHRA and its Member Countries found themselves confronted 
not only with the tragic events in the Mediterranean accompanied by a 
massive increase in illegal tracking, but also with an increasing number 
of applications for asylum in some member states of the European Union. 
e situation became aggravated when national interests and political posi-
tioning toward refugees and migrants clashed with Europe-wide achieve-
ments, such as the Schengen and the Dublin regimes. 
At the IHRA Debrecen Plenary in November 2015 it was unanimously 
agreed that the IHRA could and should react. is sentiment was nour-
ished by the awareness that the strength of the Alliance lies in the expertise 
upon which it can draw. e given situation oered the unique opportu-
nity to make the comprehensive knowledge acquired by the IHRA’s experts 
of refugee and migration policies of the 1930s, with all their successes and 
failures, visible and accessible to organizations and governments dealing 
with this issue today. Discussions in Debrecen led to a twofold outcome: 
As a rst step, experts were requested to collect relevant material that 
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   23 12.02.2018   15:59:42
24
could immediately be used for educational purposes and later be processed 
through IHRA channels as well as through the networks of its Member 
Countries. At the IHRA Bucharest Plenary in May 2016 it was decided to 
accumulate and lter this information into an IHRA blog named “Seeking 
Protection.” A second step aimed at gathering international experts to 
explore the topic of refugee policies and their impact from the 1930s to the 
present day by means of an international conference. 
How does this t into the IHRA’s general mission and 
the concrete work carried out by the IHRA? 
e IHRA unites governments and experts to shape, advance and promote 
Holocaust education, remembrance and research worldwide and to 
uphold the commitments of the 2000 Stockholm Declaration. e Stock-
holm Declaration, the founding document of the International Holocaust 
Remembrance Alliance, states in article 3, “With humanity still scarred 
by genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, antisemitism and xenophobia, the 
international community shares a solemn responsibility to ght those 
evils.”1 is mission basically mandates the IHRA to stand up and react. It 
is for this same reason that the IHRA, in its general work, explicitly includes 
reection on other genocides, crimes against humanity, and current soci-
etal circumstances in which human rights are challenged. is concern 
resulted in a 2010 paper by the Education Working Group of the IHRA, 
entitled “Why relate the Holocaust to other genocides and crimes against 
humanity?” e answer given was that “a clear and well-informed under-
standing of the Holocaust, the paradigmatic genocide, may help educa-
tors and students understand other genocides, mass atrocities, and human 
rights violations.” Since this paper, work on this comparative approach has 
evolved considerably within and outside of the IHRA. It is no longer a ques-
tion of “should we” or “could we” respond to these issues; it is a reality and 
it is happening. e IHRA wishes to reect on how to do this in the best 
way possible. 
1 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. Declaration of the Stockholm 
International Forum on the Holocaust (or “Stockholm Declaration”), https://www.
holocaustremembrance.com/stockholm-declaration, February 7, 2018.
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One way in which the IHRA is taking an active stance in addressing 
the third article of the Stockholm Declaration is by way of the develop-
ments emanating from its Committee on “Holocaust, Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity”, formed at the IHRA Plenary in June 2014. Central to 
the work of this committee is the study of research regarding educational 
programs and commemorations related to the Holocaust, as well as other 
genocides and crimes against humanity, in order to analyze dierences and 
similarities, patterns, mechanisms, and early warning signals. is IHRA 
Committee brings together representatives from the four IHRA Working 
Groups (the Academic, Memorials and Museums, Education and Commu-
nication Working Groups), as well as representatives on the political level 
from IHRA Member Countries, Observer Countries and organizations. It 
is a clear signal that the IHRA does not wish to discuss, analyze, remember, 
and educate about the Holocaust in isolation. Instead, its ambition is to 
connect its activities with the world, both that of yesterday and of today, in 
order to build a better tomorrow for every human being. 
e IHRA, and specically its Committee on the Holocaust, Genocide 
and Crimes Against Humanity, reaches out to organizations such as Global 
Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes (GAAMAC) and important initia-
tives that work within the framework of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and 
Genocide Prevention (GP). e 2014 International Conference on Geno-
cide Prevention, which took place in Brussels on March 31 and April 1 of 
that year, was organized on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the 
genocide in Rwanda and the then-upcoming commemoration of the July 
1995 Srebrenica genocide.2 e Chair of the conference was Jan Deboutte, 
Belgian ambassador and the IHRA Chair during the Belgian presidency in 
2012. In cooperation with key speakers from the elds of genocide preven-
tion and responsibility to protect, the IHRA took a central role in the 
conference as the speakers also included the Honorary Chair to the IHRA, 
Prof. Yehuda Bauer, and Sir Andrew Burns, that year’s Chair of the IHRA. 
is was an excellent example of how the IHRA shares its expertise and 
knowledge through international conferences that go beyond the topic of 
the Holocaust. In a similar way, when considering what we, as experts and 
educators on Holocaust history, could do to assist in the current refugee 
situation, we realized that our strength lies in our expertise. Policymakers 
2 International Conference on Genocide Prevention, http://www.genocidepreven 
tion.be/, accessed January 26, 2018.
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and people working on the ground with refugees have little to no time to 
read essays and anthologies on the refugee policies of the 1930s. In light of 
this situation it was strongly felt that the IHRA experts could help others 
by making available and accessible our knowledge of the successes and fail-
ures relative to refugee policy from the past, especially to governments and 
NGOs dealing with the issue today. ough the experts of the IHRA do 
not pretend to have ready-made answers to the extraordinarily complex 
problems that presently confront us, the scholarly community linked to the 
IHRA does believe that its expertise allows it a seat at the table where these 
complex issues are being discussed, and that its presence will help advance 
the ongoing conversation and assist other groups, both governmental and 
non-governmental, in their important work.
Why co-organize the conference with the Holy See?
Since 2008 the IHRA has maintained a working relationship with the 
Secretariat of State as well as with the Secretariat for Promoting Christian 
Unity at the Holy See. In particular, the concern about the current refugee 
crisis is shared by Pope Francis who has made compassion for and gener-
osity to refugees a hallmark of his ponticate. He has referred to Europe’s 
migrant crisis as “the greatest humanitarian crisis aer the Second World 
War.” His speeches, as well as the way he greets the migrants and refu-
gees—see for example his address and his meeting with those interned 
at the Moria refugee camp on the island of Lesbos in Greece on 16 April 
2016—give evidence of his deep concern, his compassion and his readiness 
to advocate for the migrants and refugees. Ambassador Mihnea Constan-
tinescu, IHRA Chair during the Romanian chairmanship in 2016–2017, 
fully supported the organization of this conference together with the Holy 
See. He declared: “We are honored to be holding this conference with the 
Holy See and our cooperation should send a strong signal to the interna-
tional community that we have both a moral and a historical responsibility 
to address the present-day situation facing refugees. e IHRA knows all 
too well the consequences of the international community failing to act. 
e current refugee situation is the litmus test for international solidarity.”3
3 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. IHRA Conference on Refugee 
Policies, February 10, 2017, https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/conferen 
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How was the conference and its program designed? 
From the very start of the IHRA’s conversations with the Holy See, it was 
made very explicit that the IHRA wished to address not only the past but 
also the challenges of today. A joint conference was planned with four main 
panels that would address in chronological order the refugee policies and 
challenges of: (a) the 1930s; (b) the Second World War and its immediate 
aermath; and (c) the refugee crisis of today. e fourth and nal panel was 
intended to address the issue of “where do we go from here.” ese panels 
would try to represent and explore past and present European and Amer-
ican responses, responses from NGOs and international organizations, the 
position of the Holy See, and also the perspective of the refugees themselves. 
Current trends within Holocaust studies that focus on the victims, giving 
agency to the persecuted, is an approach that also promises to be valuable 
in addressing the challenges of the present refugee crisis. ese ongoing 
discussions were continued during the IHRA’s Plenary in Geneva in June 
2017, within its Committee on the Holocaust, Genocide and Crimes Against 
Humanity. e perspective of refugees and the impact of statelessness and 
powerlessness on displaced persons were therefore clearly highlighted.
e task of the rst three conference panels was to analyze refugee 
policies, to discuss the main actors, their actions, and the degree to which 
they were or are successful, and nally, to identify what their shortcom-
ings were or are. e rst two panels, dealing with the period of the 1930s, 
and the Second World War and its immediate aermath, were also explic-
itly asked to reect on lessons that can be learned from this past in order 
to help deal with the current refugee crisis. How did all the dierent agen-
cies reacting to the refugee crisis during those periods act and interact? 
What failures occurred that ought to have been avoided? To what extent 
have parties adhered to or implemented obligations enshrined in interna-
tional legal instruments? What are the chances of seeking legally binding 
regulations with regard to migration and internal displacement? What are 
the prospects for following up on the 2016 New York Declaration for Refu-
gees and Migrants4 expressing the political will of world leaders to save 
ces/refugee-policies-1933-until-today-challenges-and-responsibilities-16-17-feb 
ruary-2017, accessed February 7, 2018.
4 General Assembly of the United Nations. Resolutions, A/RES/71/1, http://www.
un.org/en/ga/71/resolutions.shtml, accessed January 26, 2018.
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lives, protect rights, and share responsibility on a global scale? How should 
one think of this complex eld of actors, with governments, intergovern-
mental organizations, religious organizations, and NGOs all attempting to 
respond? Which actions have proven to be successful and to what extent 
can similar measures be taken today? e concluding panel on future plans 
sought to propose new ways for governments, international organizations, 
and religious groups to respond to refugees. 
It was the explicit goal of the conference organizers to oer multiple 
perspectives on the topic. Hence, the program brought together a balanced 
group of representatives from the IHRA and the Holy See, as well as 
academics from the US and Europe, representatives from the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration, the Refugee Crisis Group, the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, and diplomats.
What type of conclusions were we able to draw?
e goal of organizing the conference and bringing all the respective 
experts together was to reect on the past in order to enhance the possi-
bility of creating ethically responsible and rational, well-informed poli-
cymaking today. Preliminary outcomes and suggestions that emerged 
from the conference, and that were grounded in the history of the 
Holocaust, included: collecting evidence of war crimes from refugees, 
enhancing cooperation between NGOs and the state, and rearming 
respect for the value of international law, its implementation, and human 
rights.
As organizers of the conference, we found it gratifying to listen to the 
strong keynote address delivered by Archbishop Silvano Tomasi, Secre-
tary Delegate of the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Devel-
opment, who, drawing on his rich experience in humanitarian work, 
reminded us that we have currently reached the highest number of forc-
ibly displaced persons since the Second World War. He deplored the fact 
that the suering of the people he had met in refugee camps all over the 
world did not seem to have taught us many lessons. Moreover, it is timely 
to recall, as was expressed by Kristina Touzenis, Head of the International 
Migration Law Unit at the International Organisation for Migration, 
“that the Rule of Law applies to everyone, that there are legal standards of 
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accountability and conduct which states can be asked to uphold.”5 Finally, 
it was specically encouraging to hear the director of the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights, Michael O’Flaherty, commenting that 
he welcomed the conference “as an opportunity to learn from and build 
on the past, as well as to galvanise attention to the scale of the challenge 
and the need for principled and just responses.”6
omas Michael Baier/Veerle Vanden Daelen
5 See article by Kristina Touzenis in this volume, p. 201.
6 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. FRA and UNHCR to close IHRA 
Conference, February 7, 2017, https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/media-
room/stories/fra-and-unhcr-close-ihra-conference, accessed July 20, 2017.
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Opening Remarks 
Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
As Chair of the IHRA, it is a great honour to open the conference “Refugee 
Policies from 1933 until Today: Challenges and Responsibilities.”
Noting that compassion and generosity to refugees is one of the hall-
marks of the mission of His Holiness Pope Francis, it is a great privilege for 
the IHRA to hold this event in cooperation with the Holy See. 
Please let me begin by expressing our particularly heartfelt thanks 
to H. E.  Archbishop Paul Gallagher, Secretary for Relations with States, 
Monsignor Antoine Camilleri, Under-Secretary for Relations with States, 
Monsignor Ionut Paul Strejac from the Secretariat of State of the Holy See 
and Father Norbert Hofmann, secretary of the Vatican Commission for 
Religious Relations with the Jews, without whom this conference would 
have never come into being. 
We are also delighted to welcome H. E.  Archbishop Silvano Maria 
Tomasi, Secretary Delegate of the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human 
Development as our keynote speaker. 
Let me also thank the other representatives of the Holy See and IHRA 
delegates who acted as moderators and rapporteurs. e IHRA is repre-
sented here by committed individuals who are the heart and soul of our 
organization and I deeply appreciate their continuous support and advice. 
Looking at the programme, I am sure you noted that our invited panel-
lists come from a host of varied and well-respected organizations that have 
refugee policy at the centre of their work. I thank our external panelists for 
having joined us at this important event. 
For you to understand the genesis of the IHRA, let me briey take you 
back to a historic meeting which was held in January 2000 in Stockholm. 
Former Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson had been concerned by a 
poll conducted in Sweden, which seemed to show that high school chil-
dren had little knowledge of the Holocaust. Barely half a century aer the 
horror of the Holocaust, Auschwitz, Treblinka, Sobibor were beginning to 
fade into history─to disappear from collective memory.  Recognizing the 
crucial need for a coordinated, international eort on Holocaust-related 
issues, Persson brought together the representatives of 46 states with 
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scholars, educators and survivors to attend the Stockholm Forum that 
January in the year 2000. 
at meeting was also attended by ve representatives of the Holy See. 
In the written message the delegation of the Holy See submitted to the 
Forum, they outlined their hope that “justice and peace will be the result of 
all endeavors that the Forum might inspire.” 
e initial outcome of the Forum was the Stockholm Declaration and 
the formation of the unique network which exists today as the IHRA. In the 
Stockholm Declaration, which outlines the commitments of our Member 
Countries, we echo the words of the Holy See “to rearm humanity’s 
common aspiration for mutual understanding and justice.”
As an organization which deals with the history of the Holocaust, the 
IHRA knows all too well the consequences of the international community 
failing to respond appropriately to humanitarian crisis. e circumstances 
surrounding the current refugee situation are notably dierent from the 
persecution of Jews and other victims before, during and aer the Holo-
caust; nonetheless, there are parallels between the treatment of refugees 
then and now—particularly regarding the closing of borders, the rise of 
xenophobia, and the use of dehumanising language.
Expert delegates of the IHRA are profoundly concerned about the 
plight of the refugees eeing war-torn countries and the current trends of 
rising antisemitism, anti-Muslim sentiment and right-wing nationalism. 
e IHRA greatly respects the work of organizations and volunteers on 
the ground working to help ensure dignied treatment and sanctuary for 
people seeking refuge. However, as a network of policymakers, historians 
and educators, the IHRA wishes to contribute to supporting this important 
work in the best way it knows how—this is through sharing expertise. Poli-
cymakers and people working on the ground with refugees have little to 
no time to read anthologies on the refugee policies of the 1930s, but IHRA 
experts can make knowledge on successful and failed refugee policies from 
the past visible and accessible to organizations and governments dealing 
with this issue today. 
is is what we tried to do in our recent publication on the neutral 
countries and the Shoah and this is what we try do here with this publica-
tion. Let us call this historically-informed policymaking. 
We wish to establish ourselves not only as a body of historical experts, 
but as an institution which reects on the past in order to contribute to 
positive and ethical solutions to the worrying challenges of the present. 
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is is the IHRA contribution to seeking justice and peace and we are 
honoured to have the Holy See cooperate with us here today in working 
towards this noble goal. 
* * *
In the summer of 1938, delegates from thirty-two countries met at the 
French resort of Evian. Records note that country delegate aer delegate 
took the oor to express great sympathy for the plight of refugees but as 
Time magazine reported, most of them “pleaded that they had already 
absorbed their capacity”, or even “turned in a at ‘No’ to Jews.”
In the winter of that year, the rst Kindertransport train le Berlin for 
Harwich in the United Kingdom. ere are touching photographs of unac-
companied minors arriving on British soil—but there are no photographs 
of their parents, le to their fates in Nazi Europe. 
Six months later the vast majority of the 937 passengers on board the 
SS St Louis—mostly Jews eeing the ird Reich—were turned away from 
the American continent before being forced to return across the Atlantic. 
By the end of the war 254 of them would be dead. Murdered in Sobibor. In 
Auschwitz-Birkenau. In Buchenwald. 
Needless to say the list above is not exhaustive—as Professor Yehuda 
Bauer always reminds us, no one comes out of the Holocaust clean. Let us 
remember the policies that brought relief. But let us not forget the failures 
of the international community. 
I nish with these examples of failure from the not too distant past 
because they are so very relevant today. I urge you to keep them in your 
minds as we discuss. Let us call to mind those individuals who in this very 
moment nd themselves standing before a sealed border with nowhere to 
go. 
We must oer a way out. 
We must make a place. 
We must act together as a humble reection of the Saint wisdom: “Let 
us not lose heart in doing good, for in due time we shall reap if we do not 
grow weary.”
I am condent that this conference will be an important contribution 
to the present international initiatives addressing the situation of refugees 
in the world. 
OPENING REMARKS 
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Let us raise awareness and speak out about the problems they are 
facing, inspired in each of our endeavors by the visionary and generous 
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Opening Remarks
Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
First let me express a warm welcome to everyone. I am delighted to 
welcome you today to this beautiful and historic Palazzo della Cancelleria, 
which is a little piece of Vatican territory in the heart of Rome, on the occa-
sion of the opening of the conference organized by the International Holo-
caust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in collaboration with the Holy See’s 
Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews. 
In particular, I would like to greet H. E.  Ambassador Mihnea Constan-
tinescu, Chair of the IHRA, who dedicated time and energy to organizing 
this conference, together with H. E.  Ambassador Liviu-Petru Zăpîrțan, the 
Ambassador of Romania to the Holy See, and the sta of the Embassy of 
Romania to the Holy See.
I also wish to greet Dr. Kathrin Meyer, Executive Secretary to the 
IHRA; Prof. Steven T. Katz, Advisor to the IHRA; and Fr. Norbert Hofman, 
SDB, Secretary of the Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews 
and the Holy See’s contact person with the IHRA. And nally, I also greet 
my colleague Archbishop Silvano Tomasi, who will deliver the keynote 
speech this evening.
is conference represents a major collaboration between the Holy 
See and the IHRA on an issue that has been close to Pope Francis’s heart 
since the very beginning of his ponticate. We hope that this conference 
will be an important contribution to addressing the various refugee crises 
that have been engulng the world over the last few years, raise awareness 
about the realities of their suering, and more importantly, bring about 
solutions. Before doing so, however, I would like to say a few words about 
the IHRA and the Holy See in the context of Catholic-Jewish relations.
1. The IHRA
For almost twenty years, since it was established in Stockholm on 7 May, 
1998, through the initiative of the former Swedish Prime Minister Göran 
Persson, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) has 
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focused on Holocaust education, remembrance, and research. During its 
activities, it has addressed important topics such as antisemitism and Holo-
caust denial, the situation of the Roma and the Roma genocide, comparative 
genocide, Holocaust education, and promoting Holocaust Memorial Days. 
ese topics are of interest to the Holy See, which follows with special atten-
tion the work of the IHRA. Indeed, the presence of Holy See representatives 
at IHRA Plenary Meetings in the past few years—in the United Kingdom, 
in Hungary, and in Romania, and the designation of a contact person in 
February 2015—is a concrete sign of the Holy See’s interest in and apprecia-
tion for the IHRA’s work, in the context of Catholic-Jewish relations.
2. Catholic-Jewish Relations
In 2015, we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Second Vatican Council’s 
Declaration Nostra Aetate, the document that heralded a new springtime, 
a veritable thaw in Catholic-Jewish relations and dialogue. is document, 
promulgated on 28 October, 1965, states explicitly and unequivocally the 
Catholic Church’s attitude towards antisemitism: “e Church repudiates 
all persecutions against any man. Moreover, mindful of her common patri-
mony with the Jews, and motivated by the gospel’s spiritual love and by no 
political considerations, she deplores the hatred, persecutions, and displays 
of anti-Semitism directed against Jews at any time and from any source” 
(Nostra Aetate, n. 4).
Another important step in this dialogue was the establishment, in 1974, 
of the Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews in order to promote 
and foster dialogue with the Jewish people on a global level. Among the 
most important topics of the work of this Commission is the question of 
how to combat antisemitism and educate about the Holocaust. As an entity 
of the Holy See, the Commission is not tasked with organizing commem-
orations for the whole Catholic Church; rather it is charged with estab-
lishing the theoretical framework for dealing with Holocaust issues and 
producing general guidelines for the Catholic Church that may be of use, at 
the local and national levels, for the development of concrete measures for 
education and Holocaust remembrance initiatives. 
I would like to mention briey two important documents on antisem-
itism and the Holocaust. First, the Commission’s 1985 document entitled 
Notes on the Correct Way to Present the Jews and Judaism in Preaching and 
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Catechesis in the Roman Catholic Church. is document referred explicitly 
to the phenomenon of antisemitism—which sadly is always ready to reap-
pear under dierent guises—and thus it called for the urgency and impor-
tance of “precise, objective and rigorously accurate teaching on Judaism.”
e Commission’s other signicant document, coincidently issued 
the same year that the IHRA was founded (1998), was We Remember: A 
Reection on the Shoah. On the occasion of its publication, which he had 
desired expressly, Pope John Paul II—who in 1979 became the rst Pope 
to visit Auschwitz—wrote, “[O]n numerous occasions during my Ponti-
cate, I have recalled with a sense of deep sorrow the suerings of the Jewish 
people during the Second World War. e crime which become known as 
the Shoah remains an indelible stain on […] history.”1 
At Auschwitz, Pope John Paul II knelt and prayed in silence for the 
victims of the Holocaust. He also prayed at the Yad Vashem memorial, 
during his visit to the Holy Land in 2000. ese powerful acts of prayer and 
commemoration were also made by Pope Benedict XVI (at Auschwitz in 
2006 and at Yad Vashem in 2009) and Pope Francis (at Auschwitz in 2016 
and at Yad Vashem in 2014), thus conrming the Church’s commitment, at 
its highest level, to remembering the Shoah.
Why this commitment to remembering the Shoah? e document We 
Remember oers two basic reasons. First, in the face of such evil and injus-
tice, “no one can remain indierent.” Our shared humanity demands of 
us not to be “indierent.” More than that, however, the Church cannot 
remain indierent “by reason of her very close bonds of spiritual kinship 
with the Jewish people.” us, in many countries (for example, Italy, 
Austria, Poland, the Netherlands, Switzerland), Bishops’ Conferences have 
introduced a “Day of Judaism” in order to commemorate the victims of 
the Shoah and to draw attention to the Jewish roots of the Christian faith 
and the progress made in Jewish-Catholic dialogue. In this regard, we can 
mention the annual commemorations of “Kristallnacht” on 9 November 
and the liberation of Auschwitz on 27 January.
But there is also a second reason, recalled oen by John Paul II, Bene-
dict XVI and Pope Francis: We remember the Shoah in order that it may 
never be repeated again. Speaking to the members of the delegation of 
the “Conference of European Rabbis” on 20 April 2015, Pope Francis 
1 Letter of His Holiness Pope John Paul II on the occasion of the Publication of the 
Document “We Remember: A Reection on the Shoah,” March 12, 1998.
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described the great tragedy of the Shoah, which took place in the heart of 
Europe, as “a warning to present and future generations.” More recently, 
this past 27 January 2017, when he received a delegation of the European 
Jewish Congress, and on 9 February 2017, when he received a delegation 
of the Anti-Defamation League, he stressed once again the importance of 
remembering past tragedies so that they may not be repeated. Moreover we 
have to promote the “culture of encounter and reconciliation” that engen-
ders life and gives rise to hope, in contrast to the “non-culture” of hate 
that sows death and reaps despair. “To this end, let us continue to help one 
another,” he said, “as Pope John Paul II desired, ‘to enable memory to play 
its necessary part in the process of shaping a future in which the unspeak-
able iniquity of the Shoah will never again be possible’2: a future of genuine 
respect for the life and dignity of every people and every human being.”3 
In all of these remarks, there is a clear and unequivocal message: We 
must learn from the lessons of the past, so that “Never again!” may be our 
constant refrain and objective. We remember, so that we may build a better 
future together. 
I have referred to just a few of the more recent encounters between 
Pope Francis and Jewish groups, but there are many other similar occa-
sions—with previous Popes and also at the national and local levels of the 
Church—that indicate the fruitful ongoing dialogue between Catholics and 
Jews. While the IHRA, of course, is not a Jewish organization but an alli-
ance of governments committed to Holocaust education, remembrance and 
research, the Holy See values its relationship with the IHRA in the context of 
Catholic-Jewish dialogue and cooperation, as it seeks to promote a culture 
of encounter and collaboration in facing the problems of today’s world. 
3. Refugee Policies, Challenges and Responsibilities
us, this conference is an expression of our common desire to learn from 
the past so that we may respond better to the current refugee crisis and the 
phenomenon of migration, which have reached new levels in part because 
2 Letter on the Occasion of the Publication of the Document “We Remember: 
A Reection on the Shoah,” March 12, 1998.
3 Pope Francis, Address to the Delegation of the Anti-Defamation League, February 
9, 2017.
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of wars and conicts that have deprived people of hope for a better future. 
In fact, the memory and experience of the past, and in particular the past 
tragedy of the Jewish people, urge us to work to ensure that such a tragedy is 
never repeated to any population. us, the phenomenon of refugees needs 
to be illuminated by the understanding that every human life is sacred and 
inviolable and must be defended. 
Down through the years, the Holy See has focused on the humani-
tarian aspect of the refugee crisis, but it also has focused on welcoming refu-
gees and on their integration in their host countries, by intervening with 
local churches and governments and always seeking a culture of dialogue 
and mutual understanding that respects human life as sacred and invio-
lable. e moral authority of the Pope and the Apostolic See has constantly 
been recognized and this has been demonstrated by the frequent appeals 
of International organizations requesting help and interventions in various 
situations. 
e action of the Holy See, however, is not limited to the aforemen-
tioned aspects: In fact, the Holy See has always urged facing the root causes 
that give rise to refugees in the rst place; and in this regard the Holy See 
has constantly made appeals for peace and reconciliation in an eort to 
prevent humanitarian crises. Moreover, in following the Social Doctrine of 
the Church, the Popes have unceasingly rearmed the importance of inte-
gral human development, the equitable distribution of goods and the ght 
against injustice.
It is my hope, therefore, that this conference, by reecting on the 
themes proposed and in the light of the memories and the experiences of 
the past, may help bring forth new responses to current challenges.
Archbishop Paul R. Gallagher
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Refugee Policies: Challenges and Responsibilities 
I.
Ours has been dened as the Age of Migrations. Population movements 
crisscross the globe in a variety of conditions and for many reasons. People 
move because of wars and persecution, ethnic conicts, economic inequal-
ities and famine, climate change and natural disasters. e World Bank 
estimates that 250 million people live and work or are resettled in a country 
other than the one where they were born. All these people seek survival and 
protection and many are victims forcibly uprooted from their homes and 
countries. In fact, the world has now reached the highest number of forcibly 
displaced persons since the end of the Second World War. According to the 
annual report, Global Trends of the U. N. High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, in 2015 there were 65.3 million persons—including 23.3 million refu-
gees—who were forced to ee from their homes, compared to 59.5 million 
the previous year.
II.
is conference, jointly organized by the International Holocaust Remem-
brance Alliance (IHRA) and the Holy See, is certainly timely and oppor-
tune. Indierence and forgetfulness can kill, as tragic events in our 
recent history have shown. I am grateful for the kind invitation to share 
some thoughts on the refugee situation today. I will briey present a very 
succinct sketch of where we stand with legal protection, a reference to the 
current data on refugees, the commitment of the Church and of the inter-
national community to their cause. Reecting on refugees, I could not 
avoid rethinking of the dozens of camps and refugee groups I have met 
over the years in Cambodia, ailand, Hong Kong, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, 
Zambia, Sudan, and the Philippines, and of the refugees taking their rst 
steps toward integration in Canada and the United States. It is a long list of 
places, and of human suering that seems to have taught us little.
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III.
Forced migration and ows of asylum seekers are perhaps the most di-
cult challenges facing the international community. e Special Repre-
sentative on Migration of the U. N. General Secretary adds with a certain 
sadness: “We have a duty to: (1) address the root causes of forced migration; 
(2) relieve the terrible suering of the people forced to leave their homes; 
and (3) nd solutions to their plight. On all three fronts, individual States 
and the UN have been failing.”
True, the world is a long way o in responding adequately to the plight 
of refugees. e legal protection of the rights of refugees and migrants in 
modern times, however, has been steadily rened and made more eec-
tive. An organic attempt to coordinate assistance and to facilitate a solution 
to the predicament of refugees was begun at the end of the Second World 
War, when the countries of Europe were faced with the responsibility of 
nding a solution for several million people displaced by the destruction 
and the restructuring of borders brought about by the war. e interna-
tional community produced the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its 1967 
Protocol, which are still the pillars of the current global architecture for the 
governance of forcibly displaced people and the legal basis for protection 
and assistance to those who are recognized as refugees within the meaning 
of the Convention. However, several states, including those like Jordan and 
Pakistan that are home to the largest number of the world’s refugees, have 
not ratied one or both of these documents. Moreover some countries that 
have acceded to the Convention maintain practical indierence to its prin-
ciples and injunctions. 
As the priority of human rights took hold in the activities of the UN 
through the progressive enactment of major conventions specifying the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, basic rights were recognized 
for forcibly displaced people. For example, the 1984 Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment states in article three, paragraph one: “No State Party shall expel, 
return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.” 
e 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child states in article 22, 
paragraph one that “States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure 
that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in 
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accordance with applicable international or domestic law and procedures 
shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by 
any other person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assis-
tance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Conven-
tion and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments 
to which the said States are Parties.”
International declarations and recommendations have multiplied as 
crises multiplied. And I have contributed my share in the various years 
spent as Vatican Representative to the U. N. and International Organiza-
tions in Geneva. In fact, notwithstanding the progress made, it seems to me 
that the legal protection of refugees is still in the phase de jure condendo. 
ere are regional instruments that have been developed and that point the 
way forward. An example is the African Union Convention for the Protec-
tion and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala 
Convention) that entered into force in 2012. Another example is the 1984 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International 
Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama. But 
events and social changes moved at a faster pace than juridical eorts. New 
categories of people are not included in any juridical provision notwith-
standing their vulnerability and rightful claim of the solidarity of the 
international community because the desert or the ocean has eliminated 
their area of livelihood. ere is an increasing consensus that it is urgent 
to dene the responsibility of states toward people on the move who are in 
vulnerable situations and may not be able to return home, but who do not 
qualify for protection under the 1951 Convention. Discernment is required 
to address the large grey areas in mixed ows that include people escaping 
extreme poverty and those who ee literally at gunpoint. Indeed, states 
may occasionally adopt a more compassionate policy, as when they give 
protection to war refugees without requiring them to prove that they face 
a threat of persecution as individuals. Humanitarian visas may be given to 
victims of natural disasters or of generalized violence in failed states.
IV.
e exibility of states is more an ad hoc response and lacks a systemic or 
binding policy. e juridical and the political approaches have not moved 
in parallel. While progress has been evident in the steady development of 
KEYNOTE
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   43 12.02.2018   15:59:43
44
human rights implementation and in the agreement on binding measures 
of protection, the gap with conditions on the ground has remained wide. 
Certainly, an eventual juridical agreement covering all vulnerable groups 
is desirable, but it remains insucient and this awareness prompted 
Pope Francis to write to the Secretary General of the United Nations on 9 
August 2014: “e tragic experiences of the Twenthieth Century, as well 
as the most elementary notion of human dignity, require the international 
community, especially through the norms and mechanisms of interna-
tional law, to do all that is possible to stop and prevent further systematic 
violence against ethnic and religious minorities.”1
e political will to develop and to apply norms and mechanisms 
of international law is the key factor, of course. If we look at the current 
world scene, the resistance to open the door to asylum seekers and other 
desperate migrants is very evident in the emerging populist parties, with 
their focus on border control, detention, repatriation schemes, in building 
walls and fences, on policies of border externalization. is attitude of 
rejection notwithstanding, the eort continues toward nding a humane 
response to displacement. At the U. N. level, in September 2016, world 
leaders came together at the General Assembly and adopted the New York 
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which expresses the political will 
of world leaders to protect the rights of refugees and migrants, to save lives 
and share responsibility for large movements on a global scale. A recent 
ecumenical initiative provides an additional model to follow: the use of 
humanitarian corridors to resettle vulnerable refugees. Such an initiative 
is particularly timely if we consider that the average stay in refugee camps 
is 17 years and these refugees fade from the headlines.
A step forward has been taken in the states’ pledge to reach a common 
understanding at the global level about who needs international protec-
tion, and to embody this in guiding principles on migrants in vulnerable 
situations. ese measures may in time evolve into so law and maybe 
even into binding legal instruments. To sustain this eort, however, a 
realistic view of the human person is necessary as is a sensibility that 
comes from the heart, inspired by this view and by faith. Without an 
anthropology that recognizes the equal dignity of every person, and that 
appreciates his or her transcendent dimensions, it seems to me it is not 
1 https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/letters/2014/documents/papa-france 
sco_20140809_lettera-ban-ki-moon-iraq.html, accessed November 1, 2017.
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possible to promote a public culture of solidarity and respect for every 
person without distinction. ese convictions become the platform on 
which acceptance of refugees and, more important, the prevention of 
situations that lead people to ee, are possible, including by addressing 
the root causes of forced migration. As Pope Francis stated in his 2015 
Message for the 101st World Day of Migrants and Refugees: “Solidarity 
with migrants and refugees must be accompanied by the courage and 
creativity necessary to develop, on a world-wide level, a more just and 
equitable nancial and economic order, as well as an increasing commit-
ment to peace, the indispensable condition for all authentic progress.” In 
fact, let us not forget that along with the right to leave one’s homeland, 
each person has the right not to leave but rather to live there in peace 
and dignity.2 Religiously inspired organizations, individuals, and busi-
nesses have rescued people at sea, helped with the reception and integra-
tion of refugees and migrants in local communities, at times by hosting 
them in their homes, oered legal aid and translation services, provided 
private sponsorship, and much more. e root of this generosity is found 
in the Bible. Speaking to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See, 
Pope Francis reminded us of the biblical message: “e Bible as a whole 
recounts the history of a humanity on the move, for mobility is part of our 
human nature. Human history is made up of countless migrations, some-
times out of an awareness of the right to choose freely, and oen dictated 
by external circumstances. From the banishment from Eden to Abra-
ham’s journey to the promised land, from the Exodus story to the depor-
tation to Babylon, sacred Scripture describes the struggles and suerings, 
the desires and hopes, which are shared by the hundreds of thousands of 
persons on the move today, possessed of the same determination which 
Moses had to reach a land owing with ‘milk and honey’ (cf. Ex 3:17), a 
land of freedom and peace.
Now as then, we hear Rachel weeping for her children who are no 
more (cf. Jer 31:15; Mt 2:18). Hers is the plea of thousands of people who 
weep as they ee horric wars, persecutions, and human rights violations, 
or political or social instability, which oen make it impossible for them 
to live in their native lands. It is the outcry of those forced to ee in order 
to escape unspeakable acts of cruelty towards vulnerable persons, such 
2 Pope Francis, Message for the World Day of Migrants and Refugees 2016, January 
17, 2016.
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as children and the disabled, or martyrdom solely on account of their 
religion.”3
By placing at the center of all considerations the dignity of the human 
person created in the image of God, we establish the premise that the other 
is not a threat and that to welcome him can be an enrichment. Again, Pope 
Francis sums up the process well: “e acceptance of migrants can thus 
prove a good opportunity for new understanding and broader horizons, 
both on the part of those accepted, who have the responsibility to respect 
the values, traditions and laws of the community which takes them in, 
and on the part of the latter, who are called to acknowledge the benecial 
contribution which each immigrant can make to the whole community.”4 
Putting together the principles derived from natural law, from faith 
and religious wisdom, and from experience, Christian reection arrives 
at formulating an interpretative framework on migration that begins with 
the armation of the rights of the most vulnerable persons and arrives 
at the duty to welcome newcomers. In the current preoccupation with 
heightened security and the raising of new walls and fences at borders, the 
Church moves countercurrent and proposes solidarity with the arriving 
asylum-seekers since they share equal dignity and have a rightful claim to 
protection. While the states should at least respect the juridical commit-
ment they have undertaken, the Church reminds society that the jurid-
ical aspect is a minimum and does not exhaust the ethical responsibility, 
the fruit of the conversion of the heart. It proposes a culture of welcome 
and encounter prompted by the awareness that we constitute one human 
family and that love is the main road building a common future. At the 
same time, there are some basic values that newcomers must accept to 
achieve a peaceful coexistence. In this context, a rst step is giving top 
priority to correct information: ere is neither an invasion nor a radical 
sudden transformation of society, rather a transformation that newcomers 
and native population can jointly manage. For example, the European 
Union takes in ten percent of the world’s asylum seekers and Italy three 
3 Pope Francis, Address of his Holiness Pope Francis to the Members of the Diplomatic 
Corps Accredited to the Holy See for the Traditional Exchange of New Year Greet-
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percent of this total. e Social Doctrine of the Church provides a guide 
that inspires action for today’s exodus. In fact, the Church responds to 
the challenge posed by the current migration crisis with a two-pronged 
approach: with her doctrine and with her action. In particular, the Church 
tirelessly advocates for the respect and promotion of all human rights of 
migrants and refugees, including the education that is so crucial to their 
future.
V.
Allow me to conclude with a talmudic parable. Two brothers making a 
living with their families o the same plot of land must separate because 
a sudden drought causes a shortage of food. e older brother decides 
he will emigrate to ensure his and his brother’s survival. Aer many 
years, the younger brother decides to journey to meet and thank his 
older brother who had made this sacrice. As he moves along, he spots 
some movement in the distance and thinks that wild beasts are coming 
towards him. He holds fast to his walking stick, ready to defend himself. 
As he advances, he realizes that people are approaching, and he fears that 
they are bandits ready to assault him. But relying on his strong stick, he 
continues ahead—and nally, face to face with the approaching person, he 
discovers that it is his brother who has come to meet him. All newcomers 
need to be discovered as our brothers. en the international community 
will succeed in nding the needed juridical and political solutions to the 
plight of today’s refugees.
Archbishop Silvano M. Tomasi, C. S.
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Introduction 
is year, we mark the 80th anniversary of two events that triggered great 
waves of mainly Jewish refugees from Central Europe: the German inva-
sion of Austria, or Anschluss, in March 1938 and the pogroms in Germany 
and Austria in November of that same year, the so-called Kristallnacht. 
International reactions were diverse: While the Evian Conference in 
July, attended by representatives of 32 states, was a failure, the organiza-
tion of the Kindertransport to England and some other countries aer the 
November pogroms provided refuge for thousands of children. ough 
they were separated from their parents and in many cases never saw them 
again, at least those children who were sent to Great Britain, Switzer-
land and Sweden found a safe haven. However, it would be premature to 
conclude that international agreements are less likely to succeed than are 
initiatives of individual states. Each case merits a careful description of the 
historical context, the interests and intentions of the decision-makers, and 
the causes of failure or success. Before drawing conclusions from historical 
experiences, current conditions and developments must also be analyzed 
not only with regard to similarities but also in the light of the numerous 
dierences that are evident when we compare Europe and the world today 
with the 1930s, let alone the 1940s. 
e three papers presented in this chapter give an impression of the 
complexity of the refugee crisis caused by Nazi politics. ey consider very 
dierent aspects of the phenomenon. Susanne Heim focuses on the atti-
tude of populations and politicians in the host countries and of those coun-
tries that refused to accept refugees or strictly limited admission. Avinoam 
Patt describes the eorts of nongovernmental organizations, in particular 
Jewish relief organizations, to support Jewish refugees before, during, and 
aer the Second World War. is of course necessitates considerations of 
the politics of governments that relief organizations had to address in order 
to improve conditions for their work or to operate at all. Johan Ickx only 
briey takes a look at Jews eeing from one country to another; he mainly 
describes the eorts of the Holy See to provide refuge for Jews under threat 
of deportation. Aer mentioning nuncios and pontical delegates and 
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some Catholic charitable organizations that initiated and conducted rescue 
operations in various countries under German occupation, he focuses 
on endeavors of the Catholic Church in Italy, mainly in Rome and its 
surroundings, aer the German invasion. Most of the Christians of Jewish 
descent and Jews who were hidden in convents and other Catholic institu-
tions were Italian citizens; only a minority were foreigners who had come 
to Italy for various reasons. 
When reading what the authors tell us about refugees in the 1930s 
and 1940s, we can hardly avoid thinking of refugees today and political 
reaction to the so-called refugee crisis. Susanne Heim points out that the 
perception of the ight of a large number of people as a crisis depends on 
context, previous experiences, and point of view. Compared to the number 
of refugees who arrived in Europe in recent years, the number of people 
who ed aer the Nazis had assumed power does not seem very impres-
sive. Nevertheless, their migration was considered a severe crisis. Similarly, 
we perceive today’s migration to Europe from a limited perspective. In the 
context of migration worldwide, the number of refugees coming to Europe 
is small. is, of course, cannot justify underestimation of the challenges 
confronting host countries, let alone disregard for the dangers, hardship, 
and suering to which most refugees are exposed. But it puts our percep-
tion into perspective.
In the early years of Hitler’s rule, many people in neighboring coun-
tries reacted with compassion to the situation of refugees. But the climate 
changed quickly, as Heim observed. We have seen a similar climate change 
in several European countries recently. In such a situation, it is crucial to 
ask whether politicians jump on bandwagons or show leadership by nding 
ways to respond to dicult challenges in a manner consistent with the 
values that they arm and praise on other occasions. International coop-
eration can help to successfully manage a perceived crisis but if it fails, 
consequences can be disastrous. Heim notes that the Evian Conference not 
only failed to solve the problem of where to shelter refugees from Germany 
and Austria; it also triggered a chain reaction of increasingly restrictive 
measures against refugees, including those who had already been admitted 
to certain countries. 
Aer the beginning of the Second World War, German Jews and polit-
ical opponents whom the Nazi regime had forced to ee were treated as 
enemy aliens by their host countries. Rejecting refugees was justied as 
a security measure, with the argument that Nazi spies could enter the 
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country disguised as refugees. In the US, this argument was used long 
before the country joined the war eort. e assumption that there were 
spies among refugees created fears and potentially generalized suspicion. 
A similar mechanism can be observed today. e fear that terrorists would 
pretend to be refugees and thus enter European states, or that refugees 
would be radicalized and commit terrorist acts, contributed greatly to the 
political climate change in many countries. e argument is also used as 
a pretext for pursuing a very restrictive policy towards refugees. In partic-
ular, Muslim refugees are greeted with suspicion though many of them 
have decided to ee because they felt threatened by Isis or other terrorist 
organizations. 
Finally, Heim refers to the repercussions that the measures against the 
admittance of refugees had on the democratic substance of European states 
that increasingly adopted the methods of totalitarian states; she points 
to the militarization of borders that forced refugees to take illegal and 
dangerous routes; the treatment of refugees as criminals; and the estab-
lishment of camps that became prisons. Her last sentence could also be 
read as an analysis of developments that can be observed today—or as a 
warning and even as an appeal to oppose these developments that (unlike 
past events) can still be thwarted. 
While Heim focuses on the societal attitudes and politics in countries 
that accepted refugees or could have oered refuge, Patt mainly considers 
the impact of the work of Jewish relief organizations. He describes their 
admirable eorts but also the insurmountable limitations of their inuence. 
e lack of an eective response from the international community could 
not be compensated for by NGOs. ey did everything possible under the 
prevailing conditions to help Jews living under Nazi rule to escape and to 
alleviate the misery of the refugees, but attempts to inuence political deci-
sions failed. While they still had access to the Evian Conference in July 1938, 
they were not even invited to attend the Bermuda Conference in April 1943 
when the scope of the Nazi policy of annihilation had become widely evident. 
Obviously, the potential inuence of relief organizations does not grow with 
the severity of their clientele’s distress, but depends on the prevailing condi-
tions and the interests of their political counterparts. With the end of the 
war, Jewish organizations assumed new tasks. e defeat of Nazi Germany 
oered new opportunities to help survivors, but Jewish organizations faced 
enormous challenges. Survivors in DP camps in Germany needed mate-
rial and political support, even though they themselves were remarkably 
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eective in organizing their life under dicult conditions and in defending 
their own interests. For many survivors these interests included the political 
aim of creating a national home in what was then British Mandate Pales-
tine and the right to migrate and settle there. Patt shows that Jewish DPs 
managed to impress the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which 
recommended the admission of 100,000 survivors to Palestine in its report 
of April 1946. ough this recommendation was not implemented, it was a 
step in the complicated process that nally resulted in the founding of the 
State of Israel and the immigration of two-thirds of the Jewish DPs to the 
new state. In the present discussion on refugees, self-help and organized 
articulation of their goals seem to be underestimated. is is probably due 
to the diversity of refugees today, but nevertheless should be given greater 
prominence in considerations on how to improve their conditions.
Among those organizations that initiated or supported help for 
Jewish refugees, the Catholic Church had a unique position. Not only was 
it present in every country where Jews suered persecution and in coun-
tries that could provide refuge; the Church could also use the diplomatic 
services of the Holy See to intervene. In most cases, such interventions 
and rescue operations resulted from individual initiatives of diplomatic 
representatives of the Pope. Johan Ickx presents a long list of nuncios and 
pontical delegates who took part in such initiatives. en he describes 
in detail how Jews as well as Christians of Jewish descent found shelter 
in convents and other ecclesiastical buildings in Rome and its surround-
ings. He also mentions interventions of the Holy See with the German 
authorities for “non-Aryans” who were arrested and deported, in some 
cases also for unbaptized Jews, indicating the direct or indirect involve-
ment of Pope Pius XII. Today, the Holy See can intervene on behalf of refu-
gees with much less concern about counterproductive results than during 
the Second World War. Pope Francis has done this in unequivocal terms, 
e. g. in his powerful speech at the reception of the diplomats accredited to 
the Holy See on January 11, 2016.1 At the same time, many organizations 
and persons belonging to the Catholic Church contribute considerably to 
aid and relief for refugees, encouraged by the Pope and many bishops.2 
1 http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2016/january/documents/pa 
pa-francesco_20160111_corpo-diplomatico.html, accessed October 10, 2017.
2 Cf. e. g. the “Guidelines for the German Catholic Church’s commitment to refugees” 
that were adopted by the plenary assembly of the German Bishops’ Conference in 
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Not only do they enjoy incomparably better conditions for their profes-
sional and voluntary work, but also by far more opportunities to cooperate 
with non-Catholic organizations and relevant administrative bodies. Pope 
Francis’ words, addressing the present situation, do certainly apply even 
more to the situation of helpers and rescuers of Jews under German occu-
pation. He said that “the values and principles of humanity, respect for the 
dignity of every person, mutual subsidiarity and solidarity [. . .] may prove, 
in some moments of history, a burden dicult to bear.” Simultaneously he 
emphasized that there should be no loss of these values and expressed his 
“conviction that Europe, aided by its great cultural and religious heritage, 
has the means to defend the centrality of the human person and to nd the 
right balance between its twofold moral responsibility to protect the rights 
of its citizens and to ensure assistance and acceptance to migrants.”3
Kloster Schöntal on February 18, 2016, https://www.dbk.de/leadmin/redaktion/
microsites/uechtlingshilfe/2016-Leitsaetze-ENG-Guidelines-for-the-German-
Catholic-Church%E2%80%99s-commitment-to-refugees.pdf, accessed October 
10, 2017. 
3 is sentence rearmed a statement that the Pope made in his address to the Euro-
pean Parliament on September 25, 2014, http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/
en/speeches/2017/march/documents/papa-francesco_20170324_capi-unione-
europea.html, accessed October 10, 2017.
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Susanne Heim
The Attitude of the US and Europe to the Jewish 
Refugees from Nazi Germany
If we consider current refugee numbers it might seem rather strange that 
emigration from Germany aer the Nazis’ ascent to power was perceived 
as a refugee crisis. ere were 500,000 Jews living in Germany in 1933 
and most of them did not even consider leaving the country, condent 
that the Nazi government would not survive longer than its predecessors 
throughout the Weimar Republic. Of the estimated 60,000 people who le 
Germany in 1933—the majority of them Jews—many came back aer a few 
weeks or months, either because they had underestimated the diculties 
of life in exile or because they had received comforting news convincing 
them that the crisis was more or less over. Only 37,000 decided to leave the 
country permanently in 1933, while during the following years until the 
end of 1937 emigration gures reached around 21,000 to 25,000 per year.1 
With the incorporation of Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938 the number 
of Jews under German rule increased considerably, as did the pressure to 
emigrate. 
Some three quarters of all Jews who ed Germany in 1933 went to other 
European countries, primarily to France, Czechoslovakia, the Nether-
lands, and Switzerland. Since German citizens did not need a visa to enter 
the Netherlands and Switzerland, these two countries could not control 
how many refugees entered their territory. About 20 percent of Jews living 
in Germany did not hold German citizenship but were of Eastern Euro-
pean origin. Among those who ed Germany in the early months of Nazi 
rule this percentage was much higher—around 50 percent. In order to 
enter France or Belgium, both Germans and Eastern Europeans needed a 
visa. As a rule, France accepted everyone as a refugee who ed Germany in 
1933—but they were expected to leave the country once the crisis was over. 
1 Strauss, Herbert A. “Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi Policies and Jewish 
Responses.” e Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, vol. 25, no. 1, January 1980, pp. 
313–361, here p. 326.
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In Belgium, however, authorities were willing to accept only those who 
were considered “useful immigrants,” meaning people with the nancial 
means to maintain themselves or with a specic qualication or entrepre-
neurial skill. ose who were not considered to be “useful” were ordered to 
leave the country, but they were not directly expelled. Nevertheless, Belgian 
authorities applied considerable pressure to make them leave for France 
or the Netherlands—a fact that increased diplomatic tensions between the 
neighboring countries.2 
e British government found it much easier to maintain control over 
its territory and the entry of foreigners. Refugees generally were granted a 
transitional stay only. A very limited number were accepted, usually for no 
longer than two years. ey had to prove that they had a guaranteed means 
of livelihood and had to report to the police on a regular basis.3 Apart from 
the dicult economic situation and the high unemployment rate, the main 
reason for these measures was the appeasement policy towards Germany.4 
Czechoslovakia was a preferred country of refuge for German intel-
lectuals due to the country’s German-inuenced cultural environment, its 
proximity to Germany, and its comparatively liberal immigration legisla-
tion. But apart from writers and journalists, refugees were prohibited from 
employment and it was virtually impossible to obtain a work permit. ose 
with a minimum amount of capital had a chance to sustain themselves as 
small traders or artisans—at least temporarily—as residence permits could 
easily be denied by the Czech authorities.5
2 Caestecker, Frank & Bob Moore. “Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Develop-
ment of Refugee Policies, 1933–1937.” In: Caestecker, Frank & Bob Moore (eds.). 
Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European States. New York/Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2010, pp. 207–243, here p. 222.
3 Strickhausen, Waltraud. “Großbritannien.” In: Claus Krohn, et al. (eds.). 
Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration 1933–1945. Darmstadt: Wissen-
schaliche Buchgesellscha, 1998, pp. 251–266, here p. 252.
4 According to the U. S. ambassador in London, Joseph P. Kennedy, British Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain “took the view that the Jews had, though inno-
cent, been the cause of the serious setback and possible destruction of his policy of 
appeasement;” quoted in Szajkowski, Zosa. e Attitude of American Jews to World 
War I, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and Communism (1914–1945). New York: 
Ktav Publishing House, 1972, p. 107.
5 Report of a visit to Czechoslovakia, submitted by Walter M. Kotschnig, sta member 
of the High Commission for Refugees, Feb. 7/8, 1935. In: Karen J. Greenberg (ed.). 
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While refugees were initially received with compassion in the liberal 
European countries, the climate changed aer it became obvious that the 
inux of refugees would not stop and they would not be able to return to 
Germany anytime soon. Due to the global depression and high unemploy-
ment, refugees were largely regarded as a problem for the local labor market 
in most of the potential receiving countries. Any liberalization of immi-
gration policies was unpopular especially among middle class citizens, 
who feared the new arrivals as competitors. Consequently, the rst steps 
taken against them involved access to the job market. Before long, restric-
tive measures were ushered in that amounted to a clampdown on the refu-
gees’ freedom of movement, political activities, and opportunities for long-
term employment. Step by step, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
Belgium introduced measures to ensure their control over foreign labor, 
requesting work permits or forcing peddlers to apply for a license.6 e 
Belgian government was especially keen to abolish a nineteenth century 
law according to which immigrants who had resided in the country and 
had been employed for a while could not be expelled if they became unem-
ployed and were even entitled to receive welfare payments.7 
e internal responses of the European countries can be summarized 
as follows: As is the case today, most reacted according to what they consid-
ered to be their national interest: protecting the internal labor market and 
economy against newcomers. e measures introduced had one over-
arching rationale: to stop, or at least to curb, undesired immigration as 
quickly as possible. However, authorities usually refrained from sending 
refugees back to Germany once they had managed to escape. 
While they might have been worried about the political situation in 
Germany, most European governments did not want to confront or provoke 
the powerful Germans. In the preliminary discussions, which nally led to 
the establishment of a High Commissioner of the League of Nations for 
Columbia University Library, New York: e James G. McDonald Papers. New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1990, pp. 157–162, here p. 158; Heumos, Peter. “Tschecho-
slowakei.” In: Krohn, et al. (eds.). Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration 
1933–1945, pp. 411–426, here p. 414; see also: Frankl, Michal & Kateřina Čapková. 
Unsichere Zuucht. Die Tschechoslowakei und ihre Flüchtlinge aus NS-Deutsch-
land und Österreich 1933–1938. Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2012.
6 Caestecker & Moore (eds.). Refugees from Nazi Germany, p. 75.
7 Ibid., p. 73.
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refugees coming from Germany, it became very obvious throughout 1933 
that no country pushed for the creation of the new institution, because 
such a step might have oended the German government.8 Eventually, the 
Dutch government reluctantly took the initiative of suggesting the estab-
lishment of a High Commissioner, all the while stressing repeatedly to the 
Germans that this should not be seen as a criticism of Germany but rather 
purely as a measure of self-defense. As the reports of the German embas-
sies to the Foreign Oce in Berlin reveal, the Germans were at this stage 
still comparatively sensitive to criticism from abroad. However, the indi-
vidual and nationalistic reactions of the League’s member states encour-
aged the Germans in their rather arrogant and self-righteous assumption 
that their policy of forced migration was legitimate, while other countries 
had to cope with the consequences, i. e. the refugees. 
e fact that no one wanted to confront the Germans led to a compro-
mise that debilitated the High Commissioner’s Oce from the outset. It 
was not accountable to the League but to a governing body of representa-
tives from interested nations and thus had little inuence. 
e United States was not a member of the League but sent a repre-
sentative to the governing body. e new High Commissioner, James 
McDonald, was a US citizen. Nevertheless, the US administration missed 
no opportunity to make clear that it did not back McDonald in his eorts 
to nd settlement opportunities for the refugees, thus further weakening 
his position. All this was carefully observed and gleefully commented 
upon by the German Foreign Oce. Immigration into the United States 
was limited by a quota system. According to this, no more than 25,000 
Germans were allowed to enter the States each year. However, although 
many thousands wanted to leave Europe for America, apart from the year 
1939 the quota was never lled. e reason for this was the so-called LPC 
clause, which barred anyone from immigration to the US who might be 
likely to become a public charge. (is proved to be much more eective in 
limiting immigration than the quota system.) e decision on how much 
money an immigrant had to own in order not to be considered a potential 
public charge was le completely up to the consuls,9 most of whom were 
8 McDonald Stewart, Barbara. United States Government Policy on Refugees from 
Nazism 1933–1940. New York: Galland, 1982, p. 97.
9 Ibid., p. 57.
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very sensitive to the expectations of the State Department and to the anti-
immigration climate in the US.
Aer 1933, the US labor ministry pushed for a liberalization of the 
immigration rules for foreigners with close relatives in the United States 
who were able and willing to provide them with nancial support. However, 
opposition in the State Department as well as in large parts of Amer-
ican society turned out to be stronger. Many Americans, even those who 
wanted to support refugees, were worried that large numbers of incoming 
Jews might add fuel to general anti-immigration and antisemitic senti-
ments. Such concerns were widespread among American Jews as well and 
inuenced their views on how many and what kind of refugees would be 
welcome: preferably those who spoke English and had a chance of nding 
employment in the near future and therefore were not dependent on relief, 
as well as those who were not visibly religiously observant.10 e Amer-
ican Federation of Labor, while taking a rm stand against the German 
Nazi government and backing the anti-Nazi boycott, also stood resolutely 
against loosening immigration laws.11 President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
did not interfere in the debate, at least not publicly, as he did not want to 
alienate either side. He even avoided condemning the Nazi policy of perse-
cution, claiming it to be an internal aair of the German state.12 
In March 1938, aer the annexation of Austria to the German Reich 
and the attendant pogroms, refugee numbers skyrocketed. On the Euro-
pean level, the situation was aggravated further by the fact that some coun-
tries, such as Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, put rather strong 
pressure on their Jewish minorities to make them leave the country. As 
a consequence of the increasing refugee numbers, US President Roos-
evelt initiated an international conference that took place at Evian in 
France in July 1938—and turned out to be a complete failure. e dele-
gates of the 32 participating states expressed their compassion with the 
refugees but argued that for economic reasons they could not accommo-
date more foreigners. On the one hand, this at least supercially disguised 
xenophobic and antisemitic motives. On the other hand, it must be taken 
into consideration that before they le the country refugees from Germany 
10 Szajkowski. e Attitude of American Jews, pp. 131–133.
11 Breitman, Richard & Allan J. Lichtman. FDR and the Jews. Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: e Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013, p. 71.
12 Ibid., p. 80.
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were deprived of their belongings through a sophisticated system of taxes, 
fees, and tributes. is impeded their establishment in exile and indeed 
made them “likely to become a public charge,” a condition no country was 
willing to accept. us, the Germans, by expropriating them, turned the 
Jews into the unwanted minority they had always declared them to be.
e countries participating in the conference were confronted with a 
fundamental dilemma. If they refused to accept indigent refugees they were 
leaving them vulnerable to German anti-Jewish persecution. If, on the other 
hand, they declared themselves willing to accept refugees even without 
concessions from the German side regarding the refugees’ assets, they were 
in eect aiding and abetting the expulsion of the Jews—possibly not only 
from Germany but from Poland, Romania, and other countries as well. 
e Germans claimed the right not just to exclude “foreigners” from 
German territory, but also to declare sections of the German population to 
be “not of German blood” and thus not part of the ethnic community.13 As 
long as the countries of refuge did not want to enter into open confronta-
tion with the Nazi state, they could only try to deal with the consequences 
of the German redenition of their ethnic community. 
e Evian conference triggered a chain reaction of closing borders, 
strengthening border police, and inventing a variety of restrictions for 
refugees living in the various participating countries.
For a brief moment aer the November pogrom—the so-called 
Kristallnacht—this tendency seemed to reverse: In Great Britain, the public 
was alarmed by news about the pogrom, a reaction that made the famous 
Kindertransport initiative possible: 10,000 Jewish children from Germany, 
Austria, and, soon aer, from Czechoslovakia were brought to Britain and 
placed in refugee camps or with foster families. Oces to organize these 
children’s transports soon sprang up in the Reich. Britain was not the only 
country to take in large numbers of Jewish children: e Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Belgium, and Sweden did so as well.14
13 See Gosewinkel, Dieter. Einbürgern und Ausschließen. Die Nationalisierung der 
Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001, p. 371. 
14 According to Strauss, Jewish Emigration, p. 328, at least 18,000 children emigrated 
unaccompanied by their parents and were placed in homes or foster fami-
lies abroad. McDonald Stewart, quoting statistics by German Jewish organiza-
tions, states that before the war, 9,354 children immigrated to Britain, 1,500 to 
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However, this initiative would remain an exception. Over the course of 
1938, and particularly aer November, escape became more dicult and 
more chaotic, forcing refugees to take illegal and oen dangerous routes 
out of the country or to pay huge sums of money to trackers. Competition 
for the few remaining possibilities of ocial emigration intensied corre-
spondingly, as did the Gestapo’s eorts to force the remaining Jews out of 
the country. In the countries of refuge, consuls as well as border guards 
were instructed to do whatever possible to keep Jews out of the country. 
US consuls in Germany and Austria were ordered to assess the applicants’ 
moral and nancial standing and oen discouraged potential applicants 
from applying in the rst place.15 e US government, which even at the 
conference of Evian had declined to change its restrictive immigration 
regulations, was guided by the internal political climate. 
In many European countries, refugee organizations, which had carried 
the main nancial and administrative burden of feeding and housing 
refugees, reached their limits. Increasingly, refugees were conned in 
camps—partly due to the lack of housing, and partly to keep “unwanted” 
newcomers away from the public sphere and render them invisible. When 
the war broke out these camps turned into an instrument of detention and 
many refugees became so-called enemy aliens. Border control now was not 
only regarded as a matter of immigration policy but increasingly was justi-
ed as necessary for security reasons. Long before the United States entered 
the war, the administration argued that Nazi spies might be smuggled into 
the country in the guise of refugees. In June 1941, the State Department 
prepared “a regulation which would deny a visa to any immigrant who had 
‘close relatives’ in occupied Europe.”16 Before the new regulation could be 
implemented, the American consulates in the German-occupied coun-
tries closed down in mid-July 1941. In October 1941, the Nazi government 
prohibited all Jewish emigration in preparation for the deportations and 
the so-called Final Solution. 
the Netherlands, 1,000 to Belgium, 600 to France, 300 to Switzerland and 450 to 
Sweden. See McDonald Stewart. United States Government Policy, p. 519. On the 
children’s transports in general, see Curio, Claudia. Verfolgung, Flucht, Rettung. 
Die Kindertransporte 1938/39 nach Großbritannien. Berlin: Metropol, 2006.
15 McDonald Stewart. United States Government Policy, p. 65.
16 Feingold, Henry L. e Politics of Rescue. New York: Holocaust Library, 1980, p. 
160.
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Responses of Europe and the US to the refugee movement of the 1930s 
were rather shortsighted and nationalistic, defending control over one’s 
own territory and economy and avoiding confrontation with the Germans. 
is resulted not only in a lack of solidarity between the European coun-
tries and towards the refugees: It also meant that the initiative was le to 
the Germans, who forced the Jews to leave Germany and forced the neigh-
boring states to deal with them. e failure to deal with the refugee crisis 
on a political level other than by “defending one’s own nation” damaged 
the democratic substance of the European nation: By militarizing their 
borders, forcing refugees to take illegal and dangerous routes to save their 
lives, treating them as criminals and establishing camps that turned into 
prisons, the democratic countries increasingly adopted the methods of 
totalitarian states.
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Johan Ickx
The Holy See and Refugees (1933–1945)
Introduction
One of the essential elements of the Catholic Church is charity. roughout 
its bi-millennial history, the Church has always felt the duty to promote 
corporal works of mercy and to assist the sick, the poor, and the needy.1 
In modern and contemporary times, this tireless charitable work is also 
to be seen in the aid and assistance to those who are forced to ee their 
country because of internal wars, and nd refuge elsewhere: refugees. is 
paper focuses on the work of the Holy See as the subject of international 
law representing the Catholic Church concerning refugees in the 1930s and 
1940s. It is important, however, to emphasize that its humanitarian eorts 
required the Church to make agreements with civilian authorities, most 
oen using diplomatic channels.
It is important to mention that the conditions of the Holy See in the 
1930s were dierent from those during and aer the First World War. In 
1929, the Lateran Treaty had claried and codied the international posi-
tion of the Holy See. is new situation helped, on the one hand, to distin-
guish the Holy See, its territories, and its action on the international level 
from those of Italy. On the other hand, it enabled the Holy See to act inde-
pendently. For example, the creation of Vatican Radio and postal and tele-
graphic services would prove to be most useful for implementing part of 
the Ponti’s charity during the war.2 Another key dierence was that the 
1 An undated and anonymous manuscript on charitable work in early Christianity 
with the title “Fiamme di Carità nella Storia della Chiesa,” Segreteria di Stato, 
Sezione per i Rapporti con gli Stati (henceforth: SdS, S.RR.SS), Archivio Storico, 
Fondo Organizzazioni Internazionali, Croce Rossa 3192, pos. 2, fasc. 1, . 15–99v. 
2 Viganò, Dario E. “Pius XII, i media e la comunicazione.” In: Chenaux, Philippe 
(ed.). L’eredità del magistero di Pio XII. Città del Vaticano: Lateran University 
Press, 2010, pp. 152–158. See also, Actes et Documents du Saint-Siège relatifs à 
la période de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, 11 vols., Città del Vaticano: Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana, 1965–1981 (henceforth: ADS), vol. VI, p. 5. 
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refugee issue of greatest concern to the Holy See during the First World 
War, namely the rights of prisoners of war and detained civilians, had been 
codied by the Conventions of the International Red Cross of Geneva in 
1929,3 and those of Tokyo in 1934.4 
Whereas the Catholic Church considers charity to be part of its essen-
tial nature, the Holy See is not in itself a charitable organization comparable 
to any other organization of its kind. Its own traditions and its position as 
a spiritual entity, however, means that it is above all military conicts, and 
thus it has been granted particular obligations and unique possibilities.5 In 
its charitable endeavors, however, the Holy See is not alone; it works along-
side many charitable organizations, whether Catholic or not. 
Refugee Aid of the Holy See in the 1930s
Using material that refers to the ponticate of Pius XI in the Archives of 
the Secretariat of State, which preserve the acts and decisions of the Holy 
See in the international context, and using literature published during the 
Second World War, we will try to reconstruct part of the unceasing work 
of those committed to ensuring a better future for men, women, and chil-
dren in need. Here is not the place to speak about the aid provided by the 
Apostolic See for the Armenian people persecuted in Turkey.6 For the Aid 
Mission (Missione di Soccorso) in Russia I will limit myself to only a few 
indications in the references.7
3 Some documents on this historic moment are also conserved in: SdS, S.RR.SS., 
Archivio Storico, Fondo Organizzazioni Internazionali, Croce Rossa 3192, pos. 1, 
. 2v–9v (XIa Conferenza Internazionale di Ginevra); Id., pos. 2, . 2–212 (Progetto 
di Convenzione Internazionale presentata dalla Ambasciata di Francia etc.).
4 SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, Fondo Organizzazioni Internazionali, Croce 
Rossa 3192, pos. 1, . 14v–38v.
5 ADS, vol. VI, p. 10.
6 Ruyssen, Georges-Henri. La questione Armena, vol. VII: 1908–1925 (20 febbraio 
1923–24 gennaio 1930). Documenti dell’Archivio Segreto Vaticano (ASV) e 
dell’Archivio S.RR.SS. Roma: Valore Italiano, 2015, p. 599.
7 Without doubt, one of the most dicult missions was that of the Pontical 
Commission Pro Russia, instituted in the year 1925 in order to help directly the 
Russian population, a true and proper material and spiritual assistance to the 
elderly women and children. Cfr. e chapter on “La création de la Commission 
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During the Spanish Civil War, the Holy See, in cooperation with many 
charitable associations, promoted support and provision of homes for chil-
dren. ese young refugees, who had escaped the horrors of war in their 
homeland, were entrusted to families and schools, both Catholic and non-
Catholic. In France and the Netherlands, committees were instituted that 
provided material and spiritual care for children in displaced families. 
Even from Mexico, El Salvador, and Guatemala, associations such as Cath-
olic Action and Catholic Youth contributed so generously that in some 
countries they were considered “Crusaders of charity,” coming to the aid 
pro Russia: un instrument dans les mains de Pie XI.” In Pettinaroli, Laura. La poli-
tique russe du Saint-Siège (1905–1939). Rome: École française de Rome, 2015, 
pp. 368–380. e adverse conditions of the territory were dicult, and also the 
time in which the population in Russia lived in the wake of the outbreak of the 
Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent period of the civil war that further 
impoverished the population already starving of hunger. A document dated July 
18, 1922, describes the situation in “Crimea where numerous victims succumb daily 
to hunger and the plague.” See: SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, Fondo della Sacra 
Congregazione degli Aari Ecclesiastici Straordinari (AA.EE.SS.), Pont. Comm. 
Pro Russia, 1922, sc. 80, fasc. 393, f. 5r. e documents evoke the concern that in 
Crimea there were many Catholic Armenians and Latin Catholics, especially in 
the centers of Sinferopoli, Karassubazar, Feodosiya, Sevastopol and Yevpatoria, 
requiring relief, food, medicines and clothing more than money. is is only one 
example of dozens of missions that the Holy See directed and nanced to relieve 
the suering of a population that lived in a state of poverty without precedent. 
ere were organized missions of liberation of Russian Catholics imprisoned by 
the Soviet government. We mention here the episode in which the Polish Govern-
ment assisted Mgr. Antonio Okolo-Kulak, Domestic Prelate of the archdiocese of 
Moghilev, who intervened for the fate of the Russian Catholics, priests, sisters and 
laity. He dedicated himself to realizing the exchange of those imprisoned by the 
Convention between Poland and the Soviets and provided them with relief mate-
rials by sending goods and money. See: SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, AA.EE.
SS., Pont. Comm. Pro Russia, 1924, sc. 80, fasc. 397, f. 45r. e work of charity of 
the Holy See continued incessantly as far as possible. In 1930, the same League 
of Nations, through its Secretary General, Mr. Eric Drummond, and urged by 
Princess Maria Cristina Giustiniani Bandini, dedicated itself to the Russian refu-
gees by a special Commission. For what the League of Nations realized, i. e. the 
legal and political protection of Russian refugees, but also, in “condential” ways, 
the distribution of funds for humanitarian purpose, see: SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio 
Storico, AA.EE.SS., Russia, 1930, pos. 654, fasc. 36, . 38r–40r. 
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of orphans whose parents were victims of the Civil War.8 ey expressed 
the desire to ensure that the poor young homeless could return to embrace 
their relatives who had survived the war.9 In a report of November 6, 1937 
the Nuncio in Switzerland, Mgr. Filippo Bernardini, informed Cardinal 
Eugenio Pacelli about the League of Nations commissioners’ report on the 
conditions of Republican Spain, which estimated that three million refu-
gees were suering from hunger.10
At the end of the Civil War, there were problems with the repatria-
tion of Spanish refugees in France. On October 15, 1937, aer a conver-
sation between the French Minister for Foreign Aairs and the Apos-
tolic Nuncio, Mgr. Valerio Valeri, the Holy See was told that it would be 
the French government’s responsibility to repatriate the foreign ghters 
from Spain. at would largely improve the situation in Europe. However, 
General Franco remained hostile. e French Foreign Minister asked the 
Holy See to exert its inuence on General Franco so that he would declare 
himself in favor of the repatriation of volunteers, in view of the major bene-
ts that would bring to the maintenance of peace in Europe. e paradox 
was evident: While there was talk of peace in Spain to ensure a peaceful 
Europe, the Second World War would soon be unleashed.
is contribution will now deal largely with the issue of Jewish refu-
gees and deportations. Given that, at the time of writing, it is unfortu-
nately not yet possible to consult the archival documents of the Holy See, 
I will rely mostly on the results of research done by Dominiek Oversteyns 
over the past ten years, including the most recent data on the presence and 
movement of Jews in Rome. Oversteyns bases his research, as yet unpub-
lished, entirely on testimonies about Roman Jews by Jews and their rescuers 
8 SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, AA.EE.SS., Spagna, 1937, pos. 902, fasc. 308, . 
2r–96r. A cable dated May 31, 1937, sent by the Cardinal Secretary of State Eugenio 
Pacelli, to the Apostolic Nuncio in Austria H. E. Mgr. Gaetano Cicognani, who a 
year later was appointed Apostolic Nuncio in Spain, expressed the concern of the 
Holy Father Pius XI for Basque children. In that cable, they were called “souls to 
save,” and he desired that the children be welcomed in Catholic institutions and 
assisted in the best possible way. See: SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, AA.EE.SS., 
Spagna, 1937, pos. 902, fasc. 308, f. 50r.
9 Ibid., pos. 907, fasc. 312, f. 107r.
10 Ibid., pos. 940, fasc. 347, . 59r–61r.
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and compares his results with archival documentation already available.11 
is explains the absence of the traditional published sources that are now 
mostly outdated.12
When speaking about the Holy See’s eorts in favor of Jewish refu-
gees we must make a clear distinction between the defense and preven-
tion that the Holy See developed on the ideological level and the concrete 
actions on the material and spiritual level. Indeed, the Holy See sought, 
already in the 1930s, to limit—in a preventive way—the racist ideologies 
of National Socialism. Pius XI and his Secretary of State, Eugenio Pacelli, 
were much better informed about the paganist spirit that inspired Hitler’s 
ird Reich than is usually thought. A new archival series, called “scatole 
bianche” (white boxes), which was recently opened for public consultation 
by the Archivio Storico of the Secretariat of State, reveals that Pius XI and 
Pacelli were informed almost daily about the political situation in Germany. 
Furthermore, another new collection in the same archive, “International 
Organizations,” conrms how little sympathy, or rather, the total aversion 
11 Oversteyns, Dominiek. De geschiedenis van de Hebreeërs tijdens de nazibezetting 
en vervolging in Rome en de rol van de eerbiedwaardige Paus Pius XII in het redden 
van hen, editie 3, volume I. Rome: [Privaat], 2017, 561 pages. a) Geschiedenis van 
de Hebreeërs gered in de Romeinse Kloosters, vol. 3-I, pp. 6–506; b) Geschiedenis 
van de Vreemde Hebreeërs in Rome, vol. 3-I, pp. 507–556. Oversteyns, De geschie-
denis, editie 3, volume II. Rome: [Privaat], 2017, 664 pages. a) Geschiedenis van de 
Romeinse Hebreeërs gevlucht in de bergdorpen rond Rome, vol. 3-II, pp. 7–56; b) 
Geschiedenis van de gearresteerde en gedeporteerde Hebreeërs van Rome, vol. 3-II, 
pp. 61–280, 488–495; c) Geschiedenis van de interventies van de Heilige Stoel en zijn 
medewerkers voor de gearresteerde en of gedeporteerde Romeinse Hebreeërs, vol. 
3-II, pp. 281–487; d) Geschiedenis van de Hebreeërs verborgen in Vatikaanstaat, 
vol. 3-II, pp. 496–660. Oversteyns, De geschiedenis, editie 3, volume III. Rome: 
[Privaat], 2017, 710 pages. a) Geschiedenis van de Hebreeërs gevlucht in de privaat-
woning van hun Romeinse vrienden, vol. 3-III, pp. 8–177; b) Evaluatie, nieuwe 
bronnen, bookreviews, conclusies, vol. 3-III, pp. 178–710.
12 Some of the Authors remain valuable because they based their studies on genuine 
documents. So for instance Andrea Riccardi (L’inverno più lungo 1943–1944. 
Roma: Editori Laterza, 2008) is very signicant for the information about Jews 
hidden by Roman friends. Also, Grazia Loparco (Gli ebrei negli istituti religiosi 
a Roma (1943–1944). Dall’arrivo alla partenza. Roma: Herder, 2004) remains a 
primary source on Jews hidden in convents in Rome, and Liliana Picciotto (Il libro 
della Memoria. Gli ebrei deportati dall’Italia (1943–1945). Milano: Mursia, 20146) 
remains a basic and useful work for the deported Roman Jews. 
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that Pope Pius XI and his administration had towards National Socialist 
ideology. Certainly, one oen has to read between the lines, but it is note-
worthy to recall the Pope’s categorical refusal to attend the Eleventh Congress 
of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, held in Berlin from 
August 18–24, 1935.13 It is interesting to note that the Congress program 
included the question of whether the ght against criminality justied steril-
ization and restricting industrial and professional liberty as well as measures 
for admission of prisoners in civil society.14 is resistance, on the ideological 
level, would cost the Catholic Church many lives before and during the war.15
The Years 1938–1939
A radical shi in the attitude of the Holy See towards the National Socialist 
regime was certainly the Encyclical “Mit brennender Sorge” (With burning 
anxiety), of March 14, 1937, read from the pulpits in the whole of Germany 
and recently again the object of study among scholars.16 e Encyclical 
is the global political reaction to the continuous infringements by the 
NS-Regime of the Concordat and can be considered as the peak of the 
Catholic protest against Hitler.17
13 SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, Fondo Organizzazioni Internazionali, Associ-
azione (Commissione) Internazionale Penale e Penitenziaria 3206, pos. 1, f. 4r.
14 Ibid., pos. 1, f. 6r.
15 Also in Germany, where the Catholic Church was under attack and many Catho-
lics persecuted, many Christians were engaged in helping and protecting Jews. An 
overview of single individuals is found in Moll, Helmut. Martyrium und Wahrheit. 
Zeugen Christi im 20. Jahrhundert. Weilheim: Gustav-Siewerth-Akademie, 20176. 
In his book, in the chapter “Boykott beim Dienst am Nächsten,” the author refers 
on the existing literature about Christians in Germany who helped Jews during 
the Nazi-regime. See also the part in “Die Blutzeugen unter Hitlers Terror.” In: 
Moll, Helmut (ed.). Zeugen für Christus, Das deutsche Martyrologium des 20. Jahr-
hunderts. Paderborn: Schöningh, 20156.
16 New light was shed on the Encyclical with the recent conference on the topic: 
Bouthillon, Fabrice & Marie Levant. Pie XI, un pape contre le nazisme? L’encyclique 
Mit brennender Sorge (14 mars 1937). Actes du colloque international de Brest, 4–6 
juin 2015. Brest: éditions dialogue, 2016.
17 Rohrbacher, Peter. “Die Enzyklika ‘Mit brennender Sorge’: Zollschan, Pacelli und 
die Steyler Missionare.” Römische Quartalschri für christliche Altertumskunde 
und Kirchengeschichte. (henceforth: RQ), vol. 109, 2014, pp. 198–225, here p. 199.
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In my opinion, together with the rescript of the Congregation for Cath-
olic Education against Nazi racism of April 13, 1938, this document was a 
turning and starting point towards action, even if those actions remained 
comparable to an invisible river nding its way beneath the earth.
With his encyclical letter of November 1938, sent to the Apostolic 
Nunciatures in Ireland, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba 
and Central America, and also to the Apostolic Delegations in the United 
States, Australia, Albania, Belgian Congo, Indochina, Syria, Egypt, and 
South Africa, Cardinal Pacelli sent a cable that read as follows: 
“Many Italian and German Jewish converts are forced by the well-
known law to abandon their country and ask whether they may exer-
cise their professions specically medicine and teaching. His Eminence 
Cardinal Mercati is willing to suggest illustrious professors of various 
branches of science for university teaching. We request that Your Excel-
lency communicate all opportune information on the existence of univer-
sities, Catholic institutes, hospitals or other institutions willing to appoint 
such persons and on what conditions.”18
On January 24, 1939, Cardinal Pacelli received a report from the Apos-
tolic Nuncio in Dublin, Mgr. Pascal Robinson, o. f. m.,19 concerning the 
immigration of Jews to Ireland.20 It stated that “the Irish Government 
conceded 90 ‘Visas’ to German and Austrian refugees. Of those 90 Visas, 
20 were given to Jews. […] 27 to Protestants and 43 to Catholics.”21 e 
report refers to the Irish Coordinating Committee of Christian Refugees of 
Central Europe, which was created in 1938 to help Jewish converts coming 
18 “Parecchi ebrei convertiti italiani e tedeschi sono costretti da note leggi ad abban-
donare patria e per vivere chiedono di poter esercitare la loro professione e segna-
tamente insegnamento o medicina. Anche Eminentissimo Cardinale Mercati 
disposto suggerire illustri professori vari rami scienze per insegnamento univer-
sitario. Prego Vostra Eccellenza comunicarmi con tutte opportune informazioni 
se costi’ vi siano Università, Istituti Cattolici, Ospedali o altri enti disposti assu-
mere dette persone e a quali condizioni.” SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, AA.EE.
SS., Stati Ecclesiastici, 1939, pos. 575, fasc. 606, f. 78r. See also: Pollard, John. e 
Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, 1914–1958. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014.
19 Franciscan order.
20 SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, AA.EE.SS., Stati Ecclesiastici, 1939, pos. 575, fasc. 
606, f. 31r.
21 Ibid.
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to Ireland. e documentation showed clearly the interest of the Holy See 
in helping Jewish converts to Catholicism. 
Astonishing for some scholars is the fact that the help was invoked 
for “converted” Jews and not for Jews tout-court. ere are several reasons 
why the Church hierarchy of the Holy See made this clear distinction. e 
rst is rather simple: e shepherd’s rst concern is the ock and there-
fore it is understood, quite logically, that bishops and cardinals, in the rst 
place, sought to defend “Christian” Jews. Moreover, the so-called Christian 
Jews could not count on help from Jewish relief organizations and were as 
such vulnerable. Certainly, some further explanation may also be neces-
sary. e whole debate on racism, provoked by the German and Italian 
racist laws, but much more by the events of the “Kristallnacht”, caused an 
unprecedented reaction by the Catholic hierarchy in Europe.22 Moreover, 
the limits set by those racial laws did not leave any space to help anyone 
of Jewish birth. In my opinion, however, another explanation should also 
be taken into account: In the context of the Concordat with Germany, the 
Church, in its ocial actions and speech, could only reach out to those who 
were baptized, otherwise such words and actions could be considered as 
22 Gabriele Rigano speaks of “con un tempismo sospetto.” Rigano, Gabriele, “‘Spiri-
tualmente semiti’. Pio XI e l’antisemitismo in un discorso del settembre 1938.” RQ, 
vol. 109, no. 3–4, 2014, pp. 281–308, here p. 304: “L’omelia [of Cardinal Schuster, 
Archbishop of Milan, on the erroneous doctrine of racism of November 13, 
1938], fu molto amplicata dall’Osservatore Romano, lasciò un segno profondo 
sull’opinione pubblica, attestato da varie testimonianze. Il 24 novembre fu la volta 
del cardinal van Roey di Malines con una lettera di sostegno del cardinal Verdier 
di Parigi e il 29 novembre del cardinal Cerejeira di Lisbona. Vari cardinali europei, 
con un tempismo sospetto, prendevano posizione contro il razzismo e la statola-
tria, trovando spazio sull’organo vaticano in concomitanza con il varo della legis-
lazione razzista fascista e sotto le forti impressioni degli echi della notte di cris-
talli in Germania.” (e Homily [of Cardinal Schuster, Archbishop of Milan, on 
the erroneous doctrine of racism of November 13, 1938], given much prominence 
by L’Osservatore Romano, le a deep impression on public opinion, as testied 
by various sources. On November 24, it was the turn of Cardinal Van Roey of 
Malines, with a letter of support of Cardinal Verdier of Paris, and on November 
29 of Cardinal Cerejeira of Lisbon. With a suspicious timing, various European 
cardinals took a position against racism and the idolatry of the state, and were 
published in the Vatican newspaper, at a moment that coincided with the enact-
ment of the fascist racial laws and under the strong inuence of the echoes of the 
“Kristallnacht” in Germany).
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interference in state matters. In this respect, the “Christian” particularity 
was a necessary invention, if not a linguistic trope, to create the juridical 
space in which one could help as many people as possible. 
The Holy See and Refugees during the Second World War
ose rst years of the Second World War, however, were only the begin-
ning of a long Calvary for those who were homeless or on the run. eir 
situation worsened with the increasing violence and the war’s expansion 
over more geographical zones. e traditional methods of intervention 
used in the rst year of the war did not change and followed the traditional 
agenda: 
1.  First aid to the wounded and Prisoners of War (POW), research into 
the fate of the missing, and consolation of families living in anxiety 
and doubt. 
2.  Material aid to those who, although not caught up in the whirlwind of 
the war, suered its devastating consequences. is part of the work 
had to be done with the maximum discretion and in silence, in order 
not to provoke imperatives of a military character, nor the nationalist 
pretentiousness that was easily provoked by any kind of resistance to 
its plans, even if those were inhuman. 
But concern for the refugees, whether in reaction to the racial laws or in 
opposition to the National Socialist regime, was already a main issue on 
the agenda of the Holy See before the war. Pierre Blet has pointed out that: 
“e very mass of documents stands as an eloquent testimony of the inten-
sity of the care that the Pope showed on behalf of the human problems that 
the war brought about throughout the world”.23
Although Pius XII in his radio message of August 24, 1939, still used 
general diplomatic terminology to warn the nations that “[…] the danger 
is imminent, but there is still time. Nothing is lost with peace, but all can 
23 For a chronological list of the most important interventions of Pope Pius XII, see: 
Marchione, Margherita. Pius XII. Architetto di pace (= Uomini e storie, 1). Rome: 
Pantheon 2000, pp. 132–140. 
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be lost with war […]”24 it would soon be clear that, with more than half of 
Europe occupied in less than half a year, the situation for refugees was crit-
ical and it was becoming very dicult, if not sometimes impossible, to help 
them. Borders were closed and neutral countries were placing increasingly 
sophisticated bureaucratic obstacles in the way of refugees seeking entry 
or even safe passage. e delay caused by this closing bureaucratic curtain 
would mean a sure death sentence for thousands of Jews. Nor could the 
Holy See intervene for the Polish forced laborers deported to Germany or 
Poles under German occupation. e Nazis fooled the whole international 
community, organizing “Jewish settlements” such as eresienstadt, which 
was in reality partly a ghetto and a concentration camp. e same applied to 
the two million Poles deported to Siberia by the Russians: it was considered 
an internal aair. Whereas Moscow and Berlin did not show the slightest 
respect for the international agreements on soldiers in captivity, others did 
observe the regulations (Slovakia, Romania, Italy, and Hungary). 
In January 1940, the German Embassy to the Holy See reported to 
Berlin that the latest volume of the “Attività della Santa Sede” (the year-
book of the Holy See issued by the Secretariat of State) mentioned for the 
rst time its aid to Jews ─ “persons considered to be of non-Aryan race and 
therefore punished in the law of certain states”.25
us, it is not surprising that Pius XII, in his Christmas radio message 
of 1940, devotes all his attention to the victims of the conict: “But among 
the many misfortunes deriving from the dreadful conict one in particular 
has burdened at once, and burdens still, Our heart: that of the Prisoners 
of War.”26 Referring to the refugees, displaced and dispersed persons, the 
Pope said: “We are eager to make Our own the apprehension of the anxious 
families about the fate of their far away and unhappy relatives. We have 
started another work, of no small import, which we are actively developing 
24 “Imminente è il pericolo, ma è ancora tempo. Nulla è perduto con la pace. Tutto può 
esserlo con la Guerra.”
25 “Persone considerate essendo di razza non-ariana e per questo penalizzate dalle 
leggi di certi Stati.” ADS, vol. VI, p. 11.
26 “Ma fra le tante sciagure derivate dell’immane conitto una specialmente ha gravato 
subito, e grave tuttora, il Nostro cuore: quella dei prigionieri di Guerra.” AAS 33/2, 
vol. 8, 9. On the relief eorts of Pius XII and the Holy See in favor of the prisoners 
of war, see: Marchione, Margherita. Crociata di carità. L’impegno di Pio XII per i 
prigionieri della seconda Guerra mondiale. Milano: Sperling & Kupfer, 2006.
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and realizing. We are asking and transmitting news where it is possible and 
permissible to do so.”27 
e Pope is alluding of course to the activities of the Vatican Informa-
tion Oce, founded in 1939. A two volume, 1,511-page publication entitled 
“Inter arma Caritas” contains all the letters addressed to the Pope and to 
the collaborators of the hierarchy within the Vatican.28
However, let us get back for a moment to Christmas 1940. In the Consis-
tory of December 24 the Pope, in his address to the College of Cardinals, 
also broadcasted by Vatican Radio, expresses himself in the following way: 
“Of no little comfort is it to Us to have been able to console, with the moral 
and the spiritual assistance of Our Representatives and with the contribu-
tion of Our subventions, huge numbers of refugees, expatriates, emigrants, 
also among those of Jewish lineage.”29
Literature in general points to 1941 as the year that a new expression 
of inhumanity entered the international plan: the rst step of the National 
Socialist plan to liquidate and exterminate all the Jews on the European 
continent. e Pope’s words at Christmas 1940 suggest that the Holy See 
was, in that exact moment, already aware of the particular situation of the 
Jewish people in the midst of the refugee problem in Europe. 
Deportations, aer having been initiated in Austria and Germany 
itself, were carried out in Slovakia, Croatia, France, Belgium, and Holland. 
It is in this perspective that the humanitarian help of the Holy See was 
developed at its full extension and power during these years of the Second 
27 “Avidi poi di far Nostra l’ansia delle trepidanti famiglie sulla sorte dei loro lontani 
e infelici congiunti, altra opera, di non piccola mole, abbiamo iniziata e andiamo 
attivamente svolgendo e per chiedere e trasmettere notizie, ove appena sia possibile 
e lecito il farlo.” AAS 33/2, vol. 8, 10.
28 Inter arma caritas. L’Ucio Informazioni Vaticano per i prigionieri di guerra isti-
tuito da Pio XII (1939–1947), vol. I: Inventario/vol. II: Documenti (= Collectanea 
Archivi Vaticani, 52). Città del Vaticano: Archivio Segreto Vaticano, 2004. A 
digital version is also available.
29 “Né minore conforto è per Noi l’essere stati in grado di consolare, con l’assistenza 
morale e spirituale di Nostri Rappresentanti o con l’obolo dei Nostri sussidi, ingente 
numero di profughi, di espatriati, di emigranti, anche fra quelli di stirpe semitica.” 
Cfr. Dicorsi e radiomessaggi di Sua Santità Pio XII. II Anno di Ponticato, 2 marzo 
1940–1°marzo 1941, Città del Vaticano: Tipograa Poliglotta Vaticana, 1955, 347. 
Cited also in Tornielli, Andrea. Pio XII. Il Papa degli Ebrei. Casale Monferrato: 
Piemme, 2001, pp. 167–168. 
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World War. On August 1, 1941, Pope Pius XII said on Vatican Radio that 
“a great scandal is presently taking place, and this scandal is the treatment 
suered by the Jews; that is why I desire that a free voice, the voice of a 
priest, should be raised in protest. In Germany, the Jews are killed, brutal-
ized, tortured because they are victims bere of defense. How can a Chris-
tian accept such deeds […]. ese men are the sons of those who 2000 years 
ago gave Christianity to the world.”30 By the time of the Wannsee Confer-
ence, January 20, 1942, which ocially approved the extermination of all 
the Jews in Europe (“Endlösung”), this silent extermination that already 
had been under way for several years had become a political reality. 
e correspondence, ocial and personal, between Pope Pius XII and 
his immediate collaborators revealing the immediate reaction of the Holy 
See to the mass murder is immense. A small part of it was already published 
in the 8th volume of Actes et Documents du Saint-Siège relative à la Seconde 
Guerre mondiale: Le Saint-Siège et les Victimes de la Guerre, janvier 1941–
décembre 1942.31
Who Were the Agents of Assistance?
To answer this question, one could dierentiate the problem of the refugees 
according to a geographical scale. e rst level would be international, the 
second regional and the third Rome and the Vatican itself. 
On the International Level
e main actors for humanitarian assistance were the Pope’s diplomatic 
representatives.32 As noted, the most active nuncios and pontical dele-
gates were Mgr. Angelo Roncalli, the Apostolic Delegate for Turkey and 
30 Marchione, Margherita. Crusade of Charity. Pius XII and POWs (1939–1945). New 
York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2006, pp. 24–25. And also cited in: Lacouture, 
Jean. Jesuits. A Multibiography. Paris: Seuil, 1991, p. 387.
31 Le Saint-Siège et les Victimes de la Guerre, janvier 1941–décembre 1942. Città del 
Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1974.
32 For their career and general biographical data, see: De Marchi, Giuseppe. Le nunzi-
ature apostoliche dal 1800 al 1956. Città del Vaticano: Libreria editrice Vaticana, 
20062, passim and Filipazzi, Antonio G. Rappresentanze e Rappresentanti pontici 
dalla seconda metà del XX secolo. Città del Vaticano: Libreria editrice Vaticana, 
2006, passim. 
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Greece; Mgr. Cesare Orsenigo, Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin; Mgr. Pietro 
Bernardini, Apostolic Nuncio in Berne; Mgr. Angelo Rotta, Apostolic 
Nuncio in Budapest;33 Mgr. Xaverius Ritter and Mgr. Giuseppe Burzio, 
Apostolic Nuncios in Bratislava;34 Mgr. Andrea Cassulo, Apostolic Nuncio 
in Bucharest; Mgr. Pietro Ciriaci, Apostolic Nuncio in Lisbon; Mgr. 
William Gorey, Apostolic Delegate in London; from 1938, Mgr. Gaetano 
Cicogniani, Apostolic Nuncio in Madrid; Mgr. Francesco Borgongini 
Duca, Apostolic Nuncio in Rome; Mgr. Valerio Valeri, Apostolic Nuncio 
in France (succeeded in December 1944 by Mgr. Angelo Roncalli); Mgr. 
Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate in Washington; and last 
but not least, the Apostolic Visitator to the Croatian bishops in Zagreb.35 
ree of them (Roncalli, Rotta, Cassulo) have been honored among the 
Righteous of the Nations at Yad Vashem. I believe the others merit equal 
attention in this respect. 
As we pointed out earlier, other charitable organizations were also 
go-betweens in situations where the Holy See could not reach out to refu-
gees seeking help. In order to coordinate the relief for Jews, the Secretary 
of State decided in the late 1930s to establish Catholic relief Committees 
in various countries. For example, in Fribourg there was the “Mission 
Catholique Suisse,” in collaboration with the Red Cross. In Germany itself, 
the “St. Raphaelsverein” was active.36 is organization was directed by the 
Pallottine Fathers in Hamburg, and later in Rome, with a representative in 
Lisbon to supervise the Polish refugee emigration. For the Jewish refugees, 
33 See Napolitiano, Matteo Luigi. I Giusti di Budapest. Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo 
Edizioni, 2013.
34 With the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia” and the independence of 
Slovakia, Mgr. Ritter went to Bratislava, capital of the Republic of Slovakia. On 
their activity see: Brandmüller, Walter. Holocaust in der Slowakei und katholische 
Kirche. Neustadt an der Aisch: Schmidt Verlag, 2003. 
35 For their actions on behalf of the Jews and other refugees in individual countries 
see: Morley, John F. Vatican Diplomacy and the Jews during the Holocaust 1939–
1943, New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1980. 
36 On January 9, 1939 a circular letter, with request for nancial support for the Cath-
olic relief committees and especially for the ‘Raphaelsverein’ was sent to the arch-
bishops in England, United States, Scotland, Luxemburg, Canada, Costa Rica, 
Salvador, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and 
Australia. SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, AA.EE.SS., Stati Ecclesiastici, 1939, 
pos. 575, fasc. 606bis, f. 27r/v. 
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the “Catholic Committee of Refugees” with its center in Utrecht was active. 
is organization had a correspondence with the Holy See. In England 
“Catholic Committees for Refugees of the ‘Reich’” were founded in 1938, 
and cooperated with the Committees in other countries.37 In Ireland, the 
Society of St. Vincent de Paoli, with its president Sir Joseph Glinn, came 
to agreement with the Irish government to coordinate the help for Cath-
olic Jews escaping from Austria, organizing their escape-line to Australia, 
Africa and South-America.38 In France, during the rst year of the war, 
the “Aumônerie des Prisonniers de Guerre” was very active in the eld of 
refugee aid.39 
Let us take a closer look at the situation with Washington in the late 
1930s. In December 1938, the Apostolic Delegation in Washington reported 
about “e Catholic Committee for Refugees from Germany” set up to help 
Jews who had converted and those who had not. is committee handled, 
on average, one hundred immigration cases a month; i. e. rstly, ada-
vits for refugees and, secondly, direct assistance to facilitate immigration. 
Fiy percent of the cases involved married couples: e report is clear on 
their motives. “A large number of these could have remained unharmed in 
Germany, if they had been willing to obtain a divorce from their non-Aryan 
partner.”40 is committee worked together with the “St. Raphaelsverein,” 
the Swiss and Dutch committees. In New York, the committee worked in 
close cooperation with the Protestant and Jewish Refugee committees, the 
American Christian Committee and the National Coordinating Commit-
tee.41 e delegate Mgr. Cicognani, with the help of the National Catholic 
37 SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, AA.EE.SS., Stati Ecclesiastici, 1939, pos. 575, fasc. 
606bis, f. 39r (Letter of Cardinal Hinsley to Card. Pacelli, January 14, 1939); f. 41r 
(Letter of Archbishop Andrew omas McDonald to Card. Pacelli, January 16, 
1939).
38 SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, AA.EE.SS., Stati Ecclesiastici, 1939, pos. 575, fasc. 
606bis, f. 64r–65r.
39 On this organization of “religious” people of all dierent faiths see: Henneresse, 
Dominique & Marie Claude Henneresse. Insignes et tenues des aumôniers mili-
taires français depuis 1852. Antony: ETAI, 2011, pp. 89–107. 
40 Report of the Committee for Catholic Refugees from Germany, 123 Second Street, 
New York City, Covering the period from January 1, 1937 to September 30, 1938. 
New York City, 1938. SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, AA.EE.SS., Stati Ecclesias-
tici, 1939, pos. 575*, fasc. 606*a, f. 9. 
41 Ibid. 
JOHAN ICKX
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   76 12.02.2018   15:59:44
77
Welfare Conference (NCWC), initiated the diplomatic actions. e proce-
dure was very complicated and there was a little nasty surprise at the end: 
1.  e names of the candidate refugees were referred to the Committee 
for Catholic Refugees;
2.  e committee, in turn, had rst to nd persons willing to sponsor the 
respective refugees and able to provide guarantees of support;
3.  e committee then had to make certain of the preparation of suit-
able adavits and support and documents substantiating all nancial 
claims such as salary, savings, stock and bond ownership, real estate, 
and other property and income. e consuls were very demanding as 
to these documents;
4.  en the refugee had to wait his turn on the list of visa applicants at the 
respective consulate. 
e report of the NCWC of November 1938 to Amleto Cicognani also 
mentions that since the beginning of June 1938, the consuls were inun-
dated with applications: eir number rose to 103,000, of which 45 percent 
would have been easily discarded as ineligible. e remainder─says the 
report─was sucient to ll the German quota for the next twenty years!
At this time, in a letter dated December 30, 1938, the Cardinal Secre-
tary of State Pacelli insisted again to Cicognani: “I will be most grateful 
to Your Excellency, if you would keep me informed of eventual possibil-
ities for relocating over these professionals of Jewish origin, Italians or 
foreigners, who for some time are living in Italy and who are constrained 
by the well-known legal provisions to leave the Italian territory before 
March 12, without any hope of returning to their homeland because they 
lack citizenship and consequently a passport. In fact, the requests for help 
and protection for sad and urgent cases are numerous.”42
42 “Sarò molto grato all’E. V. se vorrà tenermi sollecitamente al corrente di even-
tuali possibilità di collocare costì professionisti di discendenza ebraica, italiani o 
stranieri, che da tempo dimorano in Italia i quali in seguito ai noti provvedimenti 
devono lasciare il territorio italiano entro il prossimo 12 marzo, senza speranza 
alcuna di poter rientrare nel loro paese d’origine perché privi della cittadinanza e 
del conseguente passaporto. Le domande infatti di aiuto e di protezione per casi 
pietosi ed urgenti sono numerose.” SdS, S.RR.SS., Archivio Storico, AA.EE.SS., 
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Aer the decision of the Nazi regime to commence “Final Solution” 
mass deportations of Jews became the new scenario on the European conti-
nent. ese deportations followed the mass emigration of the years before. 
Now the policy of the Holy See to protect Jews was even more relevant. 
Appointing persons with no diplomatic training or experience at all but 
who were noted for their activities inclined to save Jews could shed light 
on a nomination policy of the Holy See in a region like Yugoslavia. Pacel-
li’s and Maglione’s choice of Abbot Marcone as the representative for the 
Holy See for Yugoslavia was, in that respect, interesting.43 Marcone and 
churchman like Mgr. Burzio, Apostolic Nuncio in Slovakia, Mgr. Rotta, 
Apostolic Nuncio in Hungary, Mgr. Roncalli, Apostolic Delegate in Turkey 
and Greece and Mgr. Valerio Valeri, Apostolic Nuncio in France were 
inclined to save Jews and did so without fear in the face of Nazi and fascist 
terror. Sharing this conviction, they formed a discreet but most ecient 
network.
On the National and Regional Level
It is generally known that the Holy See continuously succeeded in obtaining 
“concessions” for Italians and foreigners touched by antisemitic or racial 
laws in fascist Italy. ese concessions were articulated to dierent degrees: 
complete discrimination, permission for “conne libero” (internment 
camps) or emigration, and visits in the camps. From 1933 to 1940, more 
than 120,000 Jews ed from Europe to Palestine via the harbor of Trieste.44
e immigration of Jews escaping persecution in Germany and occu-
pied zones was blocked at the borders of Italy. In the spring of 1940 about 
18,000 Jewish refugees were present on the peninsula, but by June 1940, 
Stati Ecclesiastici, 1939, pos. 575*, fasc. 606*a, f. 22r/v (Dra of letter of Card. Pacelli 
to Mgr. Cicognani, Vatican December 30, 1938).
43 Ickx, Johan. “‘Benedictina’ e la diplomazia ponticia: alcuni esempi.” In: Piatti, 
Pierantonio & Renata Salvarini. San Benedetto e l’Europa nel 50° anniversario 
della Pacis nuntius (1964–2014). Materiali per un percorso storiograco. Città del 
Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2015, pp. 162–166.
44 Dipper, Christoph. “Flüchtlinge, Juden, Auslandsdeutsche—die Spannbreite des 
deutschen Exils im faschistischen Italien.” In: Matheus, Michael & Stefan Heid 
(eds). Orte der Zuucht und personeller Netzwerke. Der Campo Santo Teutonico 
und der Vatikan 1933–1955 (= RQ, Supplementband 63). Freiburg/Basel/Wien 
2015, p. 29. 
JOHAN ICKX
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   78 12.02.2018   15:59:44
79
aer an emigration wave, only 5,000 were still there.45 On the other hand, 
the Italian government had a policy of non-deportation and did not hand 
over Jews who were already residing within its national borders. Jews who 
escaped from Croatia towards the coast occupied by Italy (Dalmatia and 
the Slovene province of Ljubljana) remained in limbo.
Until 1941, the Papal Nuncio was able to intervene, at least for converted 
Jews in the camps. In addition, the Jesuit Father Tacchi-Venturi tried to 
intervene, sometimes in vain, at the highest political level in favor of Jewish 
refugees. 
Several studies have shed light on the escape-line network through the 
Vatican during the last years of the war. ese studies show clearly that 
collaboration between ecclesiastics and the Italian resistance was devel-
oped and successful.
In Rome and the Vatican
e same studies reveal further details about a network that was active 
in Rome and the Vatican, supported and organized by various priests 
and clergy of dierent nationalities. e most well-known of them is the 
Irishman, Mgr. Hugh O’Flaherty,46 who lived in the College of the Campo 
Santo Teutonico of the Germans and the Flemings (he worked with the 
help of John May, butler of Sir D’Arcy Osborne, British envoy to the Holy 
See). He was also helped by the Austrian Mgr. Alois Hudal,47 Rector of the 
Teutonic Institute and the College of S. Maria dell’Anima; the Swiss Father 
Pankratius Pfeier;48 a Salvatorian priest; and the Dutch priest Anselmus 
45 1,680 Jews were part of the 5,000 Jewish refugees cited by: Dipper. Flüchtlinge, 
Juden, Auslandsdeutsche, p. 35; p. 41. 
46 On his activities and his stay at the Teutonic College of Campo Santo: Ickx, Johan 
& Stefan Heid. “Der Campo Santo Teutonico, das deutsche Priesterkolleg und die 
Erzbruderscha zur Schmerzhaen Mutter Gottes während des Zweiten Welt-
krieges.” In: Matheus & Heid (eds.). Orte der Zuucht, pp. 137–196.
47 Ickx, Johan, “e Roman ‘non possumus’ and the Attitude of Bishop Alois Hudal 
towards the National Socialist Ideological Aberrations.” In: Gevers, Lieve & Jan 
Bank (eds.). Religion under Siege, vol. I: e Roman Catholic Church in Occupied 
Europe (1939–1950). Leuven/Paris/Dudley, MA: Peeters Publisher, 2007.
48 Samerski, Stefan. Pancratius Pfeier, der verlängerte Arm von Pius XII. Der Salva-
torianergeneral und die deutsche Besetzung Roms 1943/44. Paderborn: Schöningh, 
2013.
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Musters O.S.E.A. [Ordo Fratrum Erimitarum Sancti Augustine],49 who 
was arrested in 1944 on the steps of Santa Maria Maggiore. Although 
imprisoned and brutally tortured by the Gestapo in Via Tasso, he never 
betrayed the Roman Escape Line and its members. Hans Jansen remarks 
that O’Flaherty helped those Jews whose lives were in danger and that the 
contacts and conversations with those in need of help took place in his oce, 
on the rst oor of the Holy Oce.50 e Roman Escape Line presumably 
saved about 6,000 people of all dierent nationalities. All evidence points 
to the fact that the Holy Oce played a key role in these saving eorts.
On September 25, 1943, an important agreement was reached between 
the Germans and the Holy See whereby the Vatican and its buildings 
outside Vatican property were granted neutral status, and therefore protec-
tion from German intrusion. Some activities, however, suggest that such an 
agreement was already tacitly in place as early as July onwards.51 A hanging 
blade sign, dated 25 September 1943 and issued by the “Governatore dello 
Stato della Città del Vaticano” [Governor of the Vatican City] in the name 
of Pope Pius XII and General Stahel, indicated that the property was 
protected as it was “untouchable extraterritorial property of the Vatican.”52
49 Molfenter, Arne & Rüdiger Strempel. De Monsignore en de Nazi. Hoe een Vati-
caanse priester 6000 mensen redde van de Gestapo, Tielt: Lannoo, 2015.
50 Jansen, Hans. De zwijgende Paus? Protest van Pius XII en zijn medewerkers tegen 
de jodenvervolging in Europa. Kampen: Kok, 2000, p. 264.
51 Loparco, Gracia. “Gli ebrei negli istituti a Roma (1943–1944) dall’arrivo alla 
partenza.” Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia, 58, no. 1, 2004, p. 184; Riccardi. 
L’inverno più lungo, p. 141. e Monastery of Maria Bambina, Via Sant’Uzio 
17, nowadays Via Paolo VI 21, 00193 Rome, was already provided with a hanging 
blade indicating its protected status. In the Monastery, at the end of September 
1943, there were 29 Jews hidden, of whom three are known: Giacobbe Isaia Levi 
and his wife, and Giacomo Terracina. A German Jew, Fritz Volbach, recommended 
by the Secretariat of State, joined later this group (Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 
3-II, p. 532). In the French seminary, Via di Santa Chiara 12, ve Jews found shelter 
already before September 8, and another two arrived still before October 16. At the 
end of October, y Jews and y non-Jews were hidden here. But in December, 
aer the warning of a possible round-up, the whole group of 100 refugees was 
displaced. In January 1944, the French Seminary however, was again giving shelter 
to a mixed group of refugees. On June 4, 1944, at the end of the war, there were 40 
refugees of whom 25 were Jews (See Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-I, p. 412, 
who was able to extend and improve the results of Grazia Loparco.)
52 Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-I, p. 412.
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Jewish Refugees from October 16, 1943, to June 4, 1944
On June 4, 1944, there would have been 9,975 Jews present in Rome (8,000 
Roman Jews and 1,975 foreign Jews53). Of those, 1,697 (about 700 were 
hunted as refugees and the others were taken out of their houses in Rome) 
were murdered during their arrest or aer their deportation to concen-
tration camps (1,622 Roman Jews and 75 foreign Jews). A total of 117 Jews 
(110 Roman and seven foreign) survived the deportations; of those, 102 
can be considered as refugees. A total of 495 Jewish refugees (of whom 486 
were Roman and nine foreign) found shelter outside Rome in the moun-
tain villages. A total of 1,324 Jewish refugees (of whom 1,281 were Roman 
and 43 foreign)54 survived in private houses of friends (Catholic and 
non-Catholic),55 and 336 Roman Jews were saved in parishes, colleges or 
53 A “Roman Jew” indicates each Jew whose name is to be found on the list of the 
8,000 that the Nazis wanted to arrest during the roundup of October 16, 1943 at 
5 o’clock in the morning. e “Foreign Jew” denes a Jew not registered by the 
Germans on this list.
54 Andrea Riccardi described the story of the survival of 365 of those 1,324. Riccardi. 
L’inverno più lungo, p. 158–294. Oversteyns, Dominiek. Pius XII. Redder van de 
Joden in Rome: een recontructiemodel. Rome: [private], 2009, pp. 139–141, 168.
55 Paolo Mieli, without knowing the exact numbers and statistics that are at our 
disposal today, and basing himself on superated studies, in 2003 stated the following 
[our translation]: “Moreover, the facts of that night of ’43 are there to remind us—
aside from the horrors of the Nazis—of that which the Church did for the Hebrew 
people in those circumstances, something that should not be forgotten. Years ago 
Renzo De Felice spoke about a hundred convents, forty-ve male institutes and ten 
parishes that received and saved Jews during the Nazi occupation of Rome. At the 
end of September, a seminar of studies was held by the Coordinamento storici reli-
giosi, presided over by Giancarlo Rocca, entitled ‘Poverty and richness of a hidden 
history,’ during which the historian Sister Grazia Loparco documented, one by 
one, which were these safe-houses. Following the studies of De Felice and a book of 
Enzo Forcella, ‘La Resistenza in convento’ (published by Einaudi aer the author’s 
death) that tells about the help given by the religious institutes to the antifascists, 
the historian was able to identify 4,329 Jews who found shelter in those ‘islands of 
salvation’ (the list of the institutes and of the Jews was published by Avvenire on 
last Tuesday, September 23). And, again according to Loparco, ‘it seems that the 
numbers are underestimated.’ At the margins of this conference, another Italian 
historian, Gian Maria Vian, recalled that aer the night of the raid on the ghetto 
on October 16, 1943 during which 1,259 Jews were arrested, the following morning 
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hospitals administrated by diocesan priests, while 4,205 Jewish refugees (of 
whom 4,118 were Roman and 87 were foreign) took advantage of the situ-
ation to seek shelter in 235 convents. Furthermore, 160 Jewish refugees (of 
whom 136 were Roman and 24 foreign) survived in Vatican City and its 26 
extra-territorial areas.56 On the day of liberation, June 4, 1944, 40 Jews were 
252 were released and 1,007 were sent to the extermination camps. ‘is fact—said 
Vian—is an exception in the history of the deportations and the saving in extremis 
of those 252 spouses and children of mixed marriages could have been the result 
obtained by the Holy See in exchange for not making a formal and ocial protest 
in relation to the event.’ It is an hypothesis that one reads already between the 
lines of Forcella’s book (who had observed that the Church was the only one to do 
something on that October 16, 1943) and that helps us to frame better the ‘silence’ 
of Pius XII in the face of the Nazi atrocities. But even if one doesn’t accept Vian’s 
hypothesis, according to the Catholic historian Pietro Coppola, as a result of the 
research of Sister Loparco there emerges ‘a Church, active through its own forms, 
by means of a molecular, diused and civil Resistance.’ And, Coppola adds ‘it is 
dicult to imagine that the Holy See would have been unaware of this generous 
and continuous undertaking of hospitality, carried out in the capital city by female 
and male religious orders and congregations.’ An historian of Hebrew origin, 
Anna Foa, expressed herself in agreement with this reading of the facts: ‘ere 
is no doubt that the interventions of the Church’s communities were executed, if 
not with the ocial endorsement of the Holy See, than certainly with its consent.’” 
Paolo Mieli. Corriere della Sera, October 15, 2003. 
56 For the Palatine Guard, instead of the 410 Jews usually mentioned, the statis-
tics of Dominiek Oversteyns counts only ve Jews. ose ve are included in the 
160 present in Vatican City and its 26 extra-territorial areas. Martini, Antonio. 
La Guardia Palatina d’Onore di Sua Santità. 1850–1970 fedeltà, onore, servizio. 
Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2015, pp. 104 states: “e Second 
World War was a high point in the history of the Palatine Guard. In September 
1943, when German troops occupied Rome in response to Italy’s conclusion of 
an armistice with the Allies, the Guard was given the responsibility of protecting 
Vatican City, various Vatican properties in Rome, and the Pope’s summer villa at 
Castel Gandolfo. e guardsmen (mainly Roman shopkeepers and oce clerks) 
whose service had previously been limited to standing in ranks and presenting 
arms at ceremonial occasions now found themselves patrolling the walls, gardens 
and courtyards of Vatican City and standing guard at the entrances to papal build-
ings around the Eternal City. On more than one occasion, this service resulted in 
violent confrontations with Italian Fascist police units working with the German 
authorities to arrest political refugees who were hiding in buildings protected by 
the Vatican. At the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, the 
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still hidden in Vatican City. Under protection of the Italian welfare organ-
ization DELASEM (Delegazione per l’Assistenza degli Emigranti Ebrei), 
1,680 foreign Jews, thus all of them refugees, were distributed among 420 
private apartments and houses in Rome, all of them Swiss property with 
diplomatic protection. ey received nancial and material help from Pope 
Pius XII and the Vatican administration. 50 Roman Jews died of natural 
causes during the nine months of the German occupation, and in the same 
period 50 children were born to Jews of foreign origin. e nal destiny of 
the 197 Roman Jews, out of a total number of 9,975 Jews who were sought 
by the Germans, remains unknown to this day. us, of the total number of 
9,975 Jews who should have been present in Rome on liberation day, 6,381 
(4,590 Roman and 1,791 foreign Jews)57 were helped or protected by Pope 
Palatine Guard mustered some 500 men, but the German occupation required the 
recruitment of additional personnel. By the liberation of Rome in June 1944, the 
corps had grown to 2,000 men, but at the end of the war the majority of these men 
le the Pope’s service and the unit returned to its pre-war force level.” e number 
of 2,000 men in 1944 is quite credible, although Card. Tarcisio Bertone in a lecture 
on June 5, 2007, quoted that the Palatine Guard in December 1943 already counted 
4,425 members (cfr. “Cardinal Bertone on Pius XII.” Zenit, June 5, 2007, http://
www.the-latinmass.com/id176.html), in the ocial version on the Vatican website 
that number was corrected and changed to 575+1,425 (and not 4,025!), i. e. 2,000. 
 e number of ve Jews is estimated by Oversteyns on the basis of one testimony 
and a document of ADS, vol. IX, 631, n. 487, 2.b). See: Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, 
vol. 3-III, p. 649. One should take in account the testimony of Cardinal Pietro 
Palazzini, who states that the Palatine Guard was not a typical structure to recruit 
Jews but to hide Italian soldiers. See: Palazzini, Pietro. Il clero e l’occupazione 
tedesca di Roma. Il ruolo del Seminario romano maggiore, Roma: Apes, 1995, p. 
27. e fact that only one Jewish witness (Bruno Ascoli) is known to have survived 
thanks to the Palatine Guard points also in that direction. Tornielli, Andrea. “E 
Pio XII arruolò l’ebreo per salvarlo dai nazisti.” Il Giornale, November 15, 2007, 
translated: Another testimony about how Pius XII and the Vatican saved Jews, 
posted November 16, 2007, http://wdtprs.com/blog/2007/11/another-testimony-
about-how-pius-xii-and-the-vatican-saved-jews/, accessed on August 23, 2017; 
Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-II, pp. 616–620. 
57 e 6,381 Jews helped by Pope Pius XII and Vatican institutions and the Roman 
Vicariate consists of the following: 336 Roman Jews who were sheltered in parishes 
and Catholic hospitals of the Vicariate; 4,205 (of whom 4,118 were Roman and 87 
foreign) who were sheltered in 235 convents under the protection of Pope Pius XII; 
160 Jews (of whom 136 were Roman and 24 foreign) hidden in Vatican City State 
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Pius XII, the Vatican institutions and the Roman Vicariate. is means 
that 63.97 percent of the Jews who should have been present on June 4, 1944 
were helped or saved by Pope Pius XII, in collaboration with the Vatican 
oces or the diocesan clergy of Rome.58
e convents in Rome were constantly under threat of possible raids. 
It is known that 60 out of 235 convents were raided; this means that 26 
percent of the convents were a target of Nazi aggression.59 During the Nazi 
occupation of Rome, every week two convents, on average, were subjected 
to Nazi intrusion, in which 46 Jews were arrested. Seven of those were 
later released,60 but 39 were deported and murdered.61 us the risk for a 
Jewish refugee of being killed was 39/(4.205+39) = 0.92 percent. e seven 
who were released probably owe their lives to the liberation of June 4. is 
makes the risk-rate of being killed for those hidden in the Roman convents 
about one percent. 
If we extend these calculations to Vatican City and its 26 extraterrito-
rial areas, which experienced a total of 24 war aggressions (not only by the 
Germans, but also by the Allied forces), the risk rate of war aggression was 
24/27 = 89 percent. Furthermore, in those 27 Vatican territories, it is known 
that 29 Jewish refugees were killed as a result of war aggression (deportation 
and bombing), which translates to 15 percent; 29/(160+29). On February 
3, 1944, during a raid in the extra-territorial area of Saint Paul’s outside 
the walls, 19 Jews were arrested and deported; 17 of them were killed in 
concentration camps. In the extraterritorial area of Castel Gandolfo, by 
February 10, 1944, about twelve Catholic baptized Jews were hidden in the 
Propaganda Fide Palace. is palace was bombed on February 10, 1944 
by the US Army62 and 500 hidden refugees were killed, included those 12 
Jews. It explains why we have no testimony at all from June 4 onwards from 
Jewish refugees who survived in Castel Gandolfo. Furthermore, aer the 
and its 26 extraterritorial areas; and nally, 1,680 foreign Jews who received nan-
cial and material help from Pope Pius XII.
58 State of research on March 2, 2017 communicated to the Symposium in Rome and 
cited in Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-III, p. 641. 
59 Ibid., pp. 643–644.
60 Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-II, pp. 631–632.
61 Ibid., pp. 630–631.
62 Ickx, Johan. “e bombing of Castel Gandolfo and the quest for reparation.” 
L’Osservatore Romano (English edition), September 4, 2013, p. 12.
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bombing, it is obvious why Jews looked for safer places. We can conclude 
that the risk of suering an attack on Vatican City and its 26 extraterritorial 
areas was 89 percent/26 percent= 3.43—more than three times higher than 
the risk of suering such an aggression in a convent within the anonymity 
of the city of Rome, with its two million inhabitants during the Second 
World War. On the other hand, it also means that the death rate for Jewish 
refugees in Vatican territories (15 percent/1 percent) was 15 times higher 
than that of Jewish refugees hidden in Roman convents.63
is proves that the strategy of Roman Jewish refugees of hiding them-
selves in small groups and in very dispersed and anonymous places assured 
them of the highest rate of survival. It was the right strategy. e strategy 
of Pope Pius XII also was to avoid concentrating large numbers of Jewish 
refugees in the Vatican territories, but to spread them over a large number 
of convents. is strategy becomes clear when one considers the evidence 
of his actions aer September 8, 1943, onwards, when he ordered the 
transfer of Jewish refugees who had been hidden in the Vatican to various 
convents in Rome and also placed new Jewish refugees in various convents. 
Both strategies are conrmed by the following numbers: On the one hand, 
3,499 Jewish refugees, on the run by their own initiative, survived in 625 
dierent locations, with on average about six Jews in each location. On the 
other hand, the 4,365 Jewish refugees who were hidden by Pope Pius XII in 
Vatican institutions and the Vicariate survived in 262 dierent locations, 
with an average of almost 17 Jews per location. is number of 17 is about 
three times higher than six in each location as a result of the strategy of 
the Jews individually, but it lies within the same order of magnitude. e 
numbers prove, in fact, that the strategy of spreading out the number of 
hidden Jews was the only right and eective one. 
Jewish Refugees from September 8, 1943, to October 15, 1943
rough October 15, 1943, we nd the following activity: 1,323 Jews (of 
whom 1,116 were Roman and 207 foreign) were on the run, searching for a 
safer place to hide. Of those we can, for the moment, trace back 18 Jews (two 
Roman and 16 foreign) to Vatican City and its 26 extraterritorial areas. In 
the mountain villages around Rome, 393 Roman Jewish refugees were in 
63 Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-III, p. 548.
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hiding. ere were 368 Jews (197 Roman and 171 foreign) hidden in the 
private houses of their Catholic and non-Catholic friends. In 49 convents, 
we nd 500 Jews hidden (480 Roman and 20 foreign). e moment Jews 
found shelter in such convents, the building came under protection of the 
Holy See. Various parishes and pontical colleges hid 44 Roman Jews. 
On the morning roundup of October 16, 1943, there were 8,207 present 
in Rome (8,000 locally registered and 207 foreign Jews). is means that 
before the roundup 16.12 percent (1,323/8,207= 0.1612) already had le 
their houses and were searching for better hiding places. 
What was the impact of Pope Pius XII and the Catholic Church helping 
those 1,323 Jewish refugees? It is proven that 714 of them asked for help and 
were eectively helped by Pius XII and his collaborators of the Vatican and 
Vicariate.64 Of the remaining 609 Jews, 393 went on their own initiative into 
the mountain villages around Rome and 216 others found shelter, on their 
own initiative, with friends. Some reasons why Roman Jewish refugees ed 
before October 16, 1943, can be understood by studying their testimonies. 
A signicant group ed Rome aer the bombings of July 19, and August 13, 
1943.65 Another group of Roman Jews consisted of young men who were 
considered by the Germans as potential deserters.66A third reason why 
they le Rome is that they were terried of the German occupation aer 
64 Of those 714 Jewish refugees (526 Roman and 188 foreign), 18 (2 Roman and 16 
foreign) were hidden in Vatican City and its 26 extraterritorial territories; 152 
foreign Jews were helped by DELASEM and nancially and materially supported 
by Pope Pius XII and his collaborators. Exactly 500 Jewish refugees (480 Roman 
and 20 foreign) were hidden in 49 Roman convents; another 44 Roman Jews found 
shelter in parishes and pontical colleges. 
65 For example, the seven-member Roman Jewish family of Giorgio Modigliani, on 
summer holiday in a rented house in the Morice quarter in Velletri, decided to 
protract the rental. Informed about the raid of October 6, 1943, they then le the 
summer house and went, on October 16, 1943, to another shelter in Acqua Palomba 
not far from Velletri. Cfr. Gutman, Israel & Bracha Rivlin (eds.). I Giusti d’Italia. 
I non ebrei che salvarono gli ebrei 1943–1945. ed. italiana di Liliana Picciotto. 
Milano: Mondadori, 2006, pp. 80–81.
66 For this reason, the four young Roman Jews, the brothers Romolo and Mario 
Spizzichino and their cousins Guglielmo Curiel and Sandro Tagliacozzo, ed to 
Olivano Romano about 54 km. outside Rome. Ibid., pp. 167–168. 
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September 10, 1943.67 Another reason to escape from Rome was the Nazi 
demand for a ransom of 50 kg of gold from Jews on September 27, 1943.68 
More reasons are cited in the work of Dominiek Oversteyns.69 
For the specic group of 1,116 Roman Jews on the run before October 
16, 1943, we can conclude already that 526 of them asked directly for help 
from the Holy See and were eectively helped by Pope Pius XII, his collab-
orators in the Vatican or in the Vicariate. Of this 526, 2 were hidden in 
the Vatican and its 26 extraterritorial areas. 480 found shelter in Roman 
convents and 44 in parishes and colleges. 
Interventions of the Holy See in Favor of Arrested or Deported 
Roman Jews and Refugees (September 10, 1943—June 4, 1944)
Even for the period of the war before October 16, 1943, it is possible to trace back 
interventions of the Holy See in favor of Jews who were detained or arrested 
by the Fascists and Nazis. For instance, in the case of Vittorio Nachahon,70 
67 e Roman Jewish family Efrati possessed a house in the center of Montebuono, 
near Rieti, where they spent the summer vacation. All together, the group 
consisted of nine members, of three family units. When the Nazis occupied Rome 
on September 8, 1943, the Efrati family moved out and rented a house in Spezzano 
were they survived until the liberation. Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-III, p. 
260, n. 871 (testimony of Leda Efrati). 
68 For this reason, the family of Isaia and Esther Sermonata decided to ee, together 
with four other families: the Astrologos, the Della Riccias, the Di Castros and 
the Fornaris. With their 45 family members in total, they all decided to ee to 
Acuto in the neighborhood of Casino, where they all survived to witness liber-
ation. Cfr. Silvia Antonucci, Haia, et al. (eds.). La memoria nel presente. Gli ex 
alunni ebrei della elementari “Garibaldi” ritornano a scuola. Una testimonianza 
per non dimenticare la violenza delle Leggi razziale fasciste del 1938. Roma: Muni-
cipio Roma Nove, 2011, p. 44. 
69 Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-III, pp. 259–262 (Otto ragioni con esempi di 
testimonianze per cui 1.323 ebrei fuggirono dalle loro case a Roma già prima del 16 
ottobre 1943). An overview of the Roman families known to have escaped from 
Rome before October 16, 1943 or that survived outside Rome until June 4, 1944, in 
Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-II, pp. 7–56.
70 In the internment camp for Jews in Ferramonti for two years, he is transferred to 
another camp in Scerni (Milan). On December 1, 1942, he receives permission to 
return home in order to be baptized as a Catholic and to marry his Italian wife. 
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the Vatican intervened several times, namely on August 25, 1941, on August 
22, 1942, and on October 14, 1942.71
Also of interest are the interventions for Jews arrested during the ve 
weeks between September 10, 1943, and October 15 of the same year: So 
far we have identied ten interventions for six Jews.72 Another group for 
whom the Holy See intervened consists of the 1,030 Roman Jews73 arrested 
on October 16, 1943, and deported at 2 p. m. on October 18, 1943, to the 
Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination camp, where they arrived at around 
midnight of October 22/23.74 Although the activity of the Holy See was 
primarily for the baptized Jews among them, there were also interven-
tions for non-baptized Jews. e Holy See attempted to intervene with 
the German authorities for their immediate release through October 22, 
1943—when they were still alive.75
Returning to the camp he becomes very ill and dies on November 22, 1943 as a 
baptized Jew. Archivium Generale Societas Divini Salvatoris. Rome. (henceforth: 
AGS), 0100.02 (Father Pancratius Pfeier). 
71 AGS, 0100.02, coll. 13, 6.2.21-Lic (04); AGS, 0100.02, coll. 13, 6.2.21-Lic (11–12); 
AGS, 0100.02, coll. 13, 6.2.21-Lic (18). For the examples we rely on the indications 
referred to by Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-II, pp. 281–487. 
72 A representative example is the family of Vittorio Cantoni Mamiani della Rovere. 
e father, Vittorio, son of Jewish parents, was a baptized Catholic. His mother, 
Irma Finzi, was also a baptized Jew. ey were arrested on September 15, 1943 
in Arona (Lago Maggiore) and transferred to the local barracks. Irma was 
murdered immediately on the day of their arrest and Vittorio one day later, on 
the 16th (Picciotto. Il libro della Memoria, p. 829 and pp. 833–834). eir death was 
unknown to the outside world, when on April 13, 1944 Father Pancratius Pfeier 
informally asks the German occupying ocials for information about the loca-
tion and health of Vittorio and his mother. His action was due to a plea of Vittorio’s 
wife to the Secretary of State, charging Father Pfeier to deal with the matter. (cfr. 
AGS, 01002.02, coll. 13, 6.2.21-Lic [10]). 
73 Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-II, p. 262.
74 Picciotto. Il libro della Memoria, p. 44.
75 On October 18, 1943, a list with 29 names of baptized Jews was handed over to 
Ernst von Weizsäcker, Ambassador of Germany to the Holy See, in which the Holy 
See urged their release. At that moment, these baptized Jews were still present in 
Rome. ADS, vol. IX, 513, n. 377. On October 22, 1943, when those Jews had almost 
reached Auschwitz, another intervention, with ve other names on an alleged list, 
was handed over to the same ambassador. e ocial letter starts with almost the 
same word as the former one. Only this time the explicit plea for liberation is added. 
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At the moment the letter was handed over, those Jews were, although already far 
from Rome, still alive. Most striking is the second phrase of this letter: “e docu-
ments proving the baptism of the aforementioned persons are kept at the Secre-
tariat of the Holy See” [I documenti comprovanti il battesimo delle predette persone 
sono conservati presso la Segreteria di Stato di Sua Santità]—thus the administra-
tive apparatus of Pope Pius XII. ADS, vol. IX, 517, n. 381. For an interesting view of 
the German Ambassador to the Holy See during the War, see: Doering-Manteuel, 
Anselm. “Flucht oder Dienst? Ernst von Weizsäcker 1943–1945.” In: Matheus & 
Heid (eds.). Orte der Zuucht, pp. 222–237; Hummel, Karl-Joseph. “Widerstand 
im Wartestand 1943–1946? Ernst von Weizsäcker als Botschaer beim Heiligen 
Stuhl.” In: Matheus & Heid (eds.). Orte der Zuucht, pp. 238–268. Father Pfeier 
intervened for the release of the non-baptized Jewish couple Edoardo and Elvira 
Ricchetti, who were arrested in the morning. Elvira is testied to have been very ill. 
Father Pfeier was charged for this mission by Enrico Dante of the Sacred Congre-
gation for Rites, which had been asked to intervene by Maria Ricchetti, a close 
family member. ey were not freed; instead they were deported and murdered in 
Auschwitz on October 23, 1943. (AGS, 0100.02, coll. 13, 6.2.21 (25); AGS, 0100.02, 
coll. 26, 6.2.21 (R011); Picciotto. Il libro della Memoria, p. 552).  Another interven-
tion of Father Pfeier was the one he executed in favor of the non-baptized Jewish 
Terracina family, consisting of six members. ey were arrested in their house in 
Via Taranto 59 in Rome. e purpose of this intervention was also to obtain their 
freedom. e mediator of this request is unknown. Also in this case, the eorts 
of Pfeier were in vain, because almost a week later, the entire Terracina family 
was deported to Auschwitz where all of them were murdered on October 23, 1943. 
(AGS, 0100.02, coll. 13, 6.2.21 (11); Picciotto. Il libro della Memoria, p. 238 and pp. 
622–624). 
 Very interesting are the interventions of Father Pfeier in favor of Clara Sereno. 
She was a baptized-Jewish woman married to a Christian Italian. She was arrested 
on October 16 and then deported on October 18, 1943 by train to Auschwitz, 
where she died on October 23, 1943 (for Picciotto, the place and time of death 
are unknown, Picciotto. Il libro della Memoria, p. 580). Aer an intervention of 
Father Pfeier, the Ministry of Foreign Aairs of Italy conrmed on October 22, 
1943 that they would intervene with the German Embassy in Rome for the libera-
tion of Clara Sereno. e Vatican intervention was blocked by the representative 
of the Nazi regime in Rome. In his note, Father Pfeier added, “His Holiness took 
personal interest in the case” [Sua Santità s’è interessato personalmente]. AGS, 
0100.02, coll. 27, 6.2.21 (S078-079). Not only Father Pfeier, but also the Secre-
tariat of State (Segreteria di Stato di Sua Sanità, ADS, vol. IX, 517, n. 381) inter-
vened on the same day in favor of Clara. is is thus a good example of a double 
intervention in favor of a Roman Jew. Father Pfeier did a second intervention in 
favor of Clara on November 22, 1943, thus, about one month aer her death in 
Auschwitz, to the Minister of Foreign Aairs of Italy. e Minister promised to 
make a request through the Italian Embassy in Berlin in favor of Clara’s release. 
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We also nd interventions of the Holy See requesting informa-
tion about the Jews, regardless of whether they were baptized, even aer 
October 22, 1943, when, unfortunately, most of those 1,030 Jews already 
had been murdered in Auschwitz.76 Furthermore, the Holy See intervened 
again for the total group of 1,030 Roman Jews on November 6, 1943,77 on 
November 15, 1943,78 and on February 8, 1944.79 
roughout this time, their terrible fate remained a mystery, since 
on January 22, 1945, Mgr. Montini was asking the Nuncio in Berlin, Mgr. 
Orsenigo, to verify if it was true that those deported following the roundup 
of October 16, 1943, were located in a camp near Breslavia.80 As far as we 
know today, the Holy See made 88 interventions in the week from October 
16–22, 1943. Beside this large group of Roman Jews, the Holy See made 
another intervention on behalf of the British and US governments to obtain 
the release of an even larger group of Jews, imprisoned in various concen-
tration camps in northern Italy.81
e last group for whom the Holy See intervened consists of Jewish 
refugees arrested from October 23, 1943, to June 4, 1944. At this moment, 
we can be sure that the Holy See intervened at least 129 times in favor of at 
76 Another request of the Holy See for release of a further ve baptized Jews followed 
on October 23, 1943. On October 31, there followed a request for the release of a 
72-year-old Jewish lawyer (ADS, vol. IX, 538, n. 404) and many other examples can 
be cited. 
77 ADS, vol. IX, 549, n. 416 (Letter from Card. Maglione to ambassador von 
Weizsäcker).
78 ADS, vol. IX, 559, n. 426 (Note of a conversation of Mgr. Montini with the German 
Ambassador).
79 ADS, vol. X, 119, n. 43 (Dra of a letter of the Secretariat of State to the Catholic 
Mission in Switzerland).
80 ADS, vol. IX, 531, n. 438 (Letter from Montini to Nuncio Orsenigo in Berlin). Some 
days later, January 25, 1945, the truth about the nal destination and fate of those 
1,030 became clearer. In a telegram to Mgr. Orsenigo in Berlin, Mgr. Domenico 
Tardini urges the Nuncio, although information gathered speaks about extermi-
nation of the Jews at Auschwitz, to intervene as much as he can: “Con riferimento 
mio telegramma n. 896 faccio presente Vostra Eccellenza Rev.ma che, secondo 
voci qui giunte, si temerebbe, prima del ritiro delle truppe tedesche, massacro 
internati in campo di Oswięcim. Qualora sia ancora in tempo Vostra Eccellenza 
veda se può utilmente intervenire.”
81 ADS, vol. X, 373, n. 290 (Letter, personally handed over by Mgr. Tardini to the 
Ambassador of Germany to the Holy See, August 7, 1944). 
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least 89 Jewish refugees.82 ese interventions reveal some specic charac-
teristics. In the rst place, an intervention for a given Jewish refugee was 
done at both a formal level and at an informal level, thus becoming two 
interventions for one and the same person. is is the case for at least 18 
Jewish refugees in this period.83 Another aspect is that the Holy See’s inter-
ventions became most persistent in order to rescue at least some of the 
arrested Jewish refugees.84 A lot of interventions show traces of a direct or 
82 Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-II, p. 466.
83 For this 18 we nd an interesting correlation. Where in the “Documents relatifs 
à la Seconde Guerre mondiale” (for instance ADS, vol. IX, p. 517) the lists are not 
published, in the archive of Father Pfeier we nd on the same date interventions 
for a number of Jewish refugees. For example, on November 25, 1943, the Secre-
tariat of State made an intervention for arrested Jews (ADS, vol. IX, 540, n. 407, 
note 1) and in the Pfeier papers we nd on the same date and on a single page the 
names of seven Jews (Rosanna Morretti, Jole Vigna Cavallera, Vindico Cavallera, 
Ernesto della Riccia, Stefano Siglienti, Nachman Freiberg, Sara Freiberg) for 
whom Pfeier intervened (AGS, 0100.02, coll. 13, 6.2.21, pp. 14–15). See also the 
case of Clara Sereno (n. 64) and of the family of Mario Segrè (n. 73).
84 e case of the ve interventions for the release of the family of Mario Segrè, 
consisting of Mario (father and husband), Noemi Cingoli (his wife), and their two-
year-old son Marco. ey were arrested in Rome on April 5, 1944. e rst interven-
tion in their favor was made on April 7, 1944 by Cardinal Giovanni Mercati, Cardi-
nale Bibliotecario ed Archivista di Santa Romana Chiesa. (cfr. AGS, 0100.02, coll. 
13, 6.2.21 [28]). For the activities of Cardinal Mercati in helping Jews in Rome, see: 
Vian, Paolo. “Die Brüder Giovanni and Angelo Mercati und die deutschsprachige 
Wissenschaswelt.” In: Matheus & Heid (eds.). Orte der Zuucht, pp. 387–417. 
e second intervention was made by Cardinal Tisserant before April 15, 1944 (cfr. 
AGS, 0100.02, coll. 13, 6.2.21 [29]). e third intervention was made by Mgr. 
Montini, with a written request for the release of the Segrè family, addressed to 
the German Ambassador von Weizsäcker (ADS, vol. X, 216, n. 145, Notes de la 
Secrétairerie d’Etat). e fourth intervention, dated April 17, 1943, was made 
again by Mgr. Montini to Ambassador von Weizsäcker, this time during a conver-
sation. e h and last intervention for the liberation of the Segrè family was 
made by Father Pfeier on April 18, 1944, to Hauptman Carl Schütz in Via Tasso 
(cfr. AGS, 0100.02, coll. 13, 6.2.21 [27]; AGS, 0100.02, coll. 38, 7.24 [5] [“Medi-
ator” 1943–1944]). Father Pfeier was charged for this mission by e Substitute 
of the Secretariat of State, Mgr. Montini, a few days earlier, on April 15, 1944. (cfr. 
AGS, 0100.02, coll. 13, 6.2.21 [29]). e Segrè family members, aer their arrest 
in Rome, were deported on May 15, 1944 and were murdered in Auschwitz on 
May 23, 1944 (Picciotto. Il libro della Memoria, p. 574). In conclusion, this case 
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indirect involvement of Pope Pius XII.85 However, some cases show clearly 
how dicult it was to help arrested Jews from a long distance.86 
One particular type of intervention favored so-called mixed- race Jews. 
ey were arrested even if they had been baptized. e Holy See made many 
interventions in favor of them.87 Fortunately, some of the interventions of 
the Holy See and its collaborators were successful.88 e examples we cite 
proves, on the one hand, the utmost desire to help and to liberate arrested Jews, 
and on the other hand, it shows the total reluctance and refusal of the Nazi bureau-
crats and ocials to intervene and their sinister obscuration of the truth about 
the arrested, deported and murdered Jews. Finally, it shows clearly the complete 
ignorance of Roman civilians and Vatican ocials about the real fate of those who 
were arrested. 
85 See above note 64 (case of Clara Sereno).
86 e Chief Rabbi of Bologna, Leone Alberto Orvieto and his wife Margherita 
Cantoni were both Jewish refugees. Arrested on December 17, 1943, in Florence, 
the Chief Rabbi, on January 3, 1944, wrote a letter to Pope Pius XII invoking his 
help. A rst letter, with a plea for the liberation, was written before April 5, 1944 
and addressed to the Bishop of Carpi, 50 km north of Bologna. As the Vatican 
came to know that the two prisoners, in the meanwhile, were no longer held in 
captivity in Florence, but transferred to Milan, a new letter for liberation was 
written and sent to Cardinal Schuster, Archbishop of Milan. On April 5, 1944, don 
Giuseppe Bicchierrai, a member of the diocesan curia, answered that the interven-
tion lost its sense as the Rabbi and his wife had already been deported to Germany. 
It took some time before the Secretary of State was able to react on May 5, 1944, 
with a letter to the Nuncio in Berlin with a request to intervene for the liberation 
of the Chief Rabbi and his wife (cfr. ADS, vol. X, 65–67, n. 2). In reality, both had 
already been deported to Auschwitz, some months before on January 31, 1944, and 
had been murdered there on February 6, 1944. (Picciotto. Il libro della Memoria, p. 
179 and p. 480). is case shows that the time-lapse for letters and communication 
was rather slow, and therefore rescue missions of the Vatican at a certain distance 
from Rome was very dicult.
87 Isabella Natalia Daninos was a baptized Jewish refugee, but was, nevertheless, 
arrested on October 25, 1943. At the request of the Sacred Congregation for Semi-
naries and Studies, Father Pfeier intervened in favor of her liberation on October 
26, 1943. She was successfully liberated. (cfr. AGS, 0100.02, coll. 13, 6.2.21 [08-09]). 
88 e Jewish brothers Sergio and Guglielmo Sonnino were arrested in Rome on 
November 20 and 21, 1943. On request of the Secretariat of State, Father Pfei-
er made an intervention for them and they were liberated. AGS, 0100.02, coll. 
27, 6.2.21 (S095). Giuditta Piperno, married Zarfatti, was arrested on February 
4, 1944 and arrested in the commissariat in Rome. Alerted by a family member 
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in the notes are typical of the 236 interventions by the Holy See that are 
currently known, involving Pope Pius XII, Mgr. Tardini, Mgr. Montini and 
Father Pfeier, made in favor of 180 Jewish refugees, of whom 42 (31 Roman 
and seven foreign Jews in Rome and four foreign Jews outside Rome) were 
released. In 173 of these interventions, an explicit or implicit request for 
their release was expressed. We should not forget the four interventions for 
the group of 1,030 Roman Jews who were arrested and deported October 
18, 1943. We now know that 162 interventions were requested, transmitted 
or executed by the Secretariat of State, which worked in the name of Pope 
Pius XII.89 We also can conclude that it was very dicult for the Holy 
See to get Jews released, as the Nazis and their ambassador obstructed or 
neglected almost every request. is proves what Mgr. Montini wrote on 
October 18, 1943: “Let them know that we do everything we can,” and on 
October 20, 1943: “e Holy See is doing everything in its capacity to help 
these poor unfortunates.”90 He repeated again on December 17, 1943: “One 
shall always be able to say that the Holy See has done everything for these 
unfortunate Jews.”91
Organizations for Charity and Humanitarian Help 
at the End of the War
Beyond this very complex organization of aid on the bilateral and interna-
tional levels, a particularly intense humanitarian activity was developed in 
favor of the City of Rome. Of this aid, the opening of the Archives of the 
Secretariat of State for the Ponticate of Pius XII will give some surprising 
evidence of the actions undertaken and the commitment developed in 
those years. 
On April 18, 1944, Pius XII decided to create a new structure “Ponti-
cia Commissione di Assistenza ai Profughi.” is bureau, located in some 
rooms made available by the General Curia of the Jesuits in the Borgo 
of Giuditta, Father Pfeier intervened for her liberation with success. (cfr. AGS, 
0100.02, coll. 27, 6.2.21 [T002-T003]). ese examples show that a quick interven-
tion increased the possibility for liberation.
89 Oversteyns. De geschiedenis, vol. 3-II, p. 468.
90 ADS, vol. IX, 606–607, n. 376. 
91 Ibid., n. 469.
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Santo Spirito, consisted of Monsignor Ferdinando Baldelli, President, the 
Jesuit Otto Faller, for the contacts with the German authorities and Don 
Carlo Egger (Canons Regular of the Lateran) for executive tasks. is new 
commission took its origin following the conclusion of two earlier initia-
tives: the “vettovagliamento di Roma” (provision of food) and the “Ucio 
Assistenza Convivenze Religiose” (Oce for assistance to religious 
congregations).92 e rst enabled the Holy See to provide the City of Rome 
with the necessary food and other basic products for its inhabitants. e 
other was set up to provide the convents involved in the hiding and housing 
of refugees with basic foodstus and medicines. 
e situation in and around the city became most critical, in partic-
ular, aer the bombings of July 19 and August 13, 1943. e bombard-
ments that followed avoided hitting the center of the city but focused on 
the villages and the means of communication in the surrounding areas. 
Moreover, due to the war actions there were more than 70,000 refugees in 
these areas, most coming from the region of Cassino. e white-yellow cars 
that crossed the roads of Umbria, Marche and Tuscany were themselves in 
continuous danger: Many were captured or fell victim to war actions.93 
eir activity was two-fold: on the one hand, to provide food for the inhab-
itants of Rome, and on the other, to take care of the immense problem of 
refugees being directed to Rome.
What was the situation around Rome? ere were refugee camps virtu-
ally everywhere. At Camp Breda, located at the 15km marker on the Via 
Casilina, refugees were housed in a structure that was in constant danger, 
lacking in hygienic measures and susceptible to contamination. e Pope’s 
charity, in the rst place, was for orphans and displaced persons: they were 
taken to other sites, such as the Institute of S. Gregorio al Celio, which from 
November 1943 through 1944 was under constant dispute by the police. On 
one occasion, the institute was occupied and used as a prison for hostages; 
the nuns remained heroically in the building, facilitating the escape of 
their guests. At Camp Cesano there were 20,000 refugees. For the Easter 
92 For instance, on Christmas 1943 each convent of Rome received from the Vatican 
200 kg our, 20 liters of oil and a barrel with herring. e whole cargo was a gi of 
Spain (cfr. Riccardi. L’inverno più lungo, p. 253). 
93 Mgr. Baldelli himself was captured and kept prisoner for several days. Ricci, Felice. 
“Origini e sviluppi della Ponticia Opera d’Assistenza.” In: Atti del I Congresso 
Nazionale della P.O.A. (16–17 aprile 1956), pp. 11–26. 
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holiday, Pope Pius XII ordered that 25,000 “slatini” (sandwiches) and 
20,000 eggs be sent. ese were distributed during an air raid in which four 
people were killed and many were injured. In the Castelli Romani, 70,000 
were receiving Papal Assistance. In Lanuvio, people ate grass to survive. 
In Velletri, 2,000 refugees hid out in caves, cut o from any provision of 
salt, our and other nutrition. Genzano’s population was reduced to 1,000, 
incapacitated and poor. To all these cities, the Papal Assistance conveyed 
our, money and medications. e places used as stores were kept secret 
and, although always promised, no list whatsoever of their location was 
ever handed over to the occupying forces. ey remained protected by 
absolute silence. 
Conclusion
Before and during the Second World War, concern for refugees remained 
at the top of the political agenda of the Holy See. is paper shows clearly 
that the intentions and eorts of the Holy See to help refugees were contin-
uously obstructed by the bureaucratic impediments and diplomatic indif-
ference of many national governments. Regarding the humanitarian assis-
tance given to Jewish refugees in and around Rome, even without opening 
the archives of the Holy See for the ponticate of Pius XII, there is ample 
evidence from other available sources to reconstruct and to quantify, at 
least in a preliminary manner, the level of the aid and interventions made 
on behalf of Jewish refugees by Pope Pius XII, the Secretariat of State 
and the Diocese of Rome. e statistical results presented in this paper 
are merely the tip of the iceberg, thus when the archives of Pope Pius XII 
become available, it is reasonable to assume that they will not only conrm 
the information already known, but perhaps will also shed light on many 
more who might have been saved by Pope Pius XII.
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Avinoam Patt 
No Place for the Displaced:  
The Jewish Refugee Crisis Before, During,  
and After the Second World War 
According to statistics compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner 
on Refugees, the UNHCR, in 2015 there were approximately 65 million 
forcibly displaced people in the world, including 21 million refugees—the 
highest levels of displacement ever recorded.1 Contemporary observers 
are quick to make comparisons between the present refugee crisis and the 
Jewish refugee crisis precipitated by the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 
the 1930s and the outbreak of the Second World War, noting the restric-
tive US immigration policies of the 1930s and 1940s and their echoes in 
current debates about immigration and the plight of refugees. While histo-
rians must always be cautious about drawing direct comparisons between 
distinct time periods, this article will examine the refugee crisis of the 1930s 
and 40s with an eye to providing context in line with the stated goals of the 
February 2017 IHRA conference in Rome to assist in developing “histori-
cally-informed policymaking.” Each period provides its own unique set of 
historical circumstances and complexities, but several constants remain: 
We can examine the challenges that confront non-governmental organiza-
tions in responding to crises of such magnitude; and from the perspective 
of the refugee, we can assess the impact of the experience of statelessness 
on subsequent political actions and behavior. How does the experience 
of living in exile aect the displaced? And how do international bodies, 
particularly non-governmental organizations, address the concerns of the 
refugee in resolving such crises? More broadly, what is the responsibility of 
the international community to solve refugee crises? Where are displaced 
people supposed to go? Are nation-states equipped to solve the problem 
of statelessness? In a world organized according to an international ling 
system of citizenship, what happens to those without the protections of a 
state or citizenship?
1 See http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/gures-at-a-glance.html, accessed May 25, 2017.
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The Jewish Refugee Crisis of the 1930s and 1940s
e Nazi rise to power in 1933, followed by the antisemitic discrimina-
tory legislation that sought to remove German Jews from economic, social, 
and cultural life, created a refugee crisis that the international community 
was ill-equipped to handle. Between 1933–39, while over half of Germa-
ny’s nearly 600,000 Jews were able to emigrate to other countries, attempts 
to develop an eective international response through the Evian Confer-
ence, the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, the 
organization of the Kindertransport, and more, failed to reach a compre-
hensive solution, creating a sense among the Nazi leadership that the inter-
national community cared little for the fate of Jews under Nazi domina-
tion. e annexation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and then the outbreak of 
the Second World War created a refugee crisis of even greater scale, which 
individual Jews and Jewish communities in Europe, Jewish social welfare 
organizations, and the Allies scrambled to address. Once again, belated 
attempts to respond, such as the Bermuda Conference of April 1943 and 
the creation of the War Refugee Board, failed to address a crisis of unprec-
edented magnitude. And again, in the aermath of the Second World War, 
allied armies and the UNRRA were ill equipped to address the postwar 
Jewish refugee crisis. 
From the perspective of individual Jews and Jewish organizations, the 
perceived abandonment of the Jews by the international community before, 
during, and aer the Second World War had signicant political and diplo-
matic ramications that would alter the course of postwar history, partic-
ularly with key diplomatic decisions leading to the creation of the state of 
Israel. Both during and aer the war, survivors and refugees carried the 
lessons of their displacement, developing a vocal and independent political 
structure to advocate for themselves.
As the period from 1933–48 is worthy of several volumes and not just a 
short overview chapter, I would like to consider four distinct episodes from 
the period with a focus on the responses of Jewish organizations, Jewish 
communities and Jewish refugees to the refugee crisis in the fall of 1938, 
before and aer “Kristallnacht”; in the fall and winter of 1939–40, aer the 
outbreak of the Second World War, the failures of the Bermuda confer-
ence in April 1943; and nally, the lessons learned and implemented by the 
surviving remnant in the Jewish DP camps in postwar Germany. 
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Evian, Zbaszyn, and the Jewish Refugees Before the Second 
World War
Following the Evian conference, convened in early July 1938 by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in response to mounting political pressure on the refugee situ-
ation, and the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees 
(ICR), the German government was able to state how “astounding” it was 
that foreign countries criticized Germany for its treatment of the Jews, yet 
none of them opened their doors.2 Following the nine-day meeting at 
Evian, when none of the 32 participant countries (with the exception of 
the Dominican Republic) expressed any willingness to accept Jewish refu-
gees, the only tangible outcome was the creation of the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees (ICR), charged with approaching “the govern-
ments of the countries of refuge with a view to developing opportunities 
for permanent settlement” and seeking to persuade Germany to cooperate 
in establishing “conditions of orderly emigration.”
Nonetheless, the deliberations at Evian and the subsequent creation 
of the ICR also revealed the fundamental inability of nation-states to 
address the needs of individual refugees. While the Evian resolutions 
acknowledged that “the fate of the unfortunate people aected has become 
a problem for intergovernmental deliberation,” the resolutions also indi-
cated “the involuntary emigration of large numbers of peoples of dierent 
creeds, economic conditions, professions and trades” at a time of “serious 
unemployment” would lead to severe strain administratively and on the 
public order of the absorbing countries. Furthermore, the Evian resolu-
tions called for “the collaboration of the country of origin” (i. e., Germany) 
in enabling emigrants to take property and possessions with them and 
to emigrate in an orderly manner and asserted that the “governments of 
the countries of refuge and settlement should not assume any obligations 
for the nancing of involuntary emigration.”3 While the governments 
assembled at Evian may have hoped for an orderly and civilized process of 
2 “Emigration and the Evian Conference.” In: USHMM. Holocaust Encyclopedia, 
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005520, accessed May 
26, 2017.
3 United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States Diplo-
matic Papers, 1938, vol. 1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oce, 
1938, pp. 755. See: http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1938v01/reference/
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emigration and resettlement, it would soon become clear that the refugee 
crisis would only become increasingly messy, complex, and disorganized. 
With governments and international bodies unable to respond, it 
oen fell to NGOs and individual actors on the ground to ll the vacuum. 
In late October 1938, the Nazi regime expelled about 16,000 Polish Jews 
from Germany, dumping them across the border into the Polish town of 
Zbasyn. e Polish authorities refused to admit these expellees and the 
town became an ad hoc refugee camp. Among those Polish Jews stranded 
in between the two countries were the parents and siblings of a young man 
named Herszl Grynspan, who was so distraught over what he heard that he 
assassinated a German diplomat in Paris in protest—providing a pretext 
for what would become known as “Kristallnacht”or the night of the broken 
glass on November 9–10, 1938. While “Kristallnacht” would immediately 
seize the attention of the world, the fate of the thousands of Jewish refugees 
stranded in Zbasyn fell to Polish Jewish welfare organizations—in this case, 
the Warsaw oce of the American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), 
TOZ (the Society for the Protection of the Health of the Jewish Popula-
tion in Poland) and CENTOS (a Polish Jewish organization that cared for 
orphans and children), which quickly sprang into action. Within weeks, 
Polish Jews raised 3.5 million zlotys (the equivalent of $700,000 in 1938) 
for the aid of their Jewish brethren.4 Among those who coordinated the 
relief eorts in Zbasyn were Emanuel Ringelblum (later to become known 
as the historian of the Warsaw Ghetto) and Yitzhak Gitterman, also from 
the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (Joint; JDC), who died 
in Warsaw in 1943. Ringelblum detailed the relief eorts in a letter to the 
Polish-Jewish historian Raphael Mahler in December 1938 aer working in 
Zbaszyn for ve weeks: “I think there has never been so ferocious, so piti-
less a deportation of any Jewish community as this German deportation.”
In the course of those ve weeks we (originally Giterman [sic], Ginz-
berg and I, and aer ten days I and Ginzberg, that is), set up a whole 
township with departments for supplies, hospitalization, carpentry 
frus.frus1938v01.i0010.pdf; Telegram of “e Chairman of the American Delega-
tion (Taylor) to the Secretary of State”, Evian, July 14, 1938, 5 p.m.
4 Garbarini, Alexandra & Emil Kerenji & Jan Lambertz & Avinoam Patt (eds.). 
Jewish Responses to Persecution, vol. 2, 1938–1940. Lanham, Maryland: AltaMira 
Press, 2011, p. 5.
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workshops, tailors, shoemakers, books, a legal section, a migration 
department and an independent post oce (with 53 employees), a wel-
fare oce, a court of arbitration, an organizing committee, open and 
secret control services, a cleaning service, and a complex sanitation ser-
vice, etc. In addition to 10–15 people from Poland, almost 500 refugees 
from Germany are employed in the sections I listed above. e most 
important thing is that this is not a situation where some give and some 
receive. e refugees look on us as brothers who have hurried to help 
them at a time of distress and tragedy. Almost all the responsible jobs 
are carried out by refugees. e warmest and most friendly relations 
exist between us and the refugees.5
Detailing cultural and educational eorts in the refugee camp, Ringel-
blum concluded nonetheless with this observation: “Zbaszyn has become 
a symbol for the defenselessness of the Jews of Poland. Jews were humili-
ated to the level of lepers, to citizens of the third class, and as a result we are 
all visited by terrible tragedy. Zbaszyn was a heavy moral blow against the 
Jewish population of Poland. And it is for this reason that all the threads 
lead from the Jewish masses to Zbaszyn and to the Jews who suer there.”6
Since its founding in 1914 to respond to the crisis confronting Jews in 
the Ottoman Empire and then in Europe during the First World War, the 
JDC had been the foremost American Jewish relief organization raising 
and distributing funds to Jewish communities in need around the world. 
e key to JDC success, beyond successful fundraising in America, was a 
dedicated cadre of relief workers on the ground embedded in local commu-
nities who understood the needs of aid recipients, along with their policy 
of empowering individual aid recipients in the work of the organization.7 
us, while nation-states could bicker over who was responsible for the 
displaced, it would be up to individual aid workers like Ringelblum and 
5 Matthäus, Jürgen & Emil Kirenji (eds.). Jewish Responses to Persecution, 1933–
1946: A Source Reader. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littleeld, 2017, p. 28.
6 Mahler, Raphael. “Mikhtavei E. Ringelblum mi-Zbaszyn ve’al Zbaszyn” (“Letters 
of E. Ringelblum from and about Zbaszyn”). Yalkut Moreshet, no. 2, 1964, p. 24. 
See in Garbarini, et al. (eds.). Jewish Responses to Persecution, p. 6.
7 For the authoritative work on the JDC, see Bauer, Yehuda. American Jewry and 
the Holocaust: e American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1939–1945. 
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981. 
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Gitterman, acting on behalf of philanthropic organizations like the JDC, 
as well as the individual refugees themselves, to intervene and respond in 
times of crisis. 
Even aer “Kristallnacht”, which would be widely reported in the 
international press, while the Kindertransport would lead to the immi-
gration of 10,000 children to England, and some individual eorts proved 
successful, Americans remained reluctant to welcome Jewish refugees and 
the restrictive immigration quotas remained in place. e most famous 
example of American indierence to the plight of the Jewish refugees, the 
ill-fated voyage of the German transatlantic liner St. Louis has been well 
documented.8 e boat, carrying 937 passengers (almost all Jews eeing 
the ird Reich), sailed from Hamburg, docking in Havana on 27 May, 
1939. When the Cuban government refused to allow 908 passengers to 
8 Miller, Scott & Sarah Ogilvie. Refuge Denied: e St. Louis Passengers and the 
Holocaust. Washington/Madison: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2006.
“e Jewish Refugees from Germany in Zbasyn” in Olami, Tarbut school publica-
tion (21 November 1938)
USHMM Archives, courtesy of Sarah Sztejnsznajd
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ank you note to Morris Troper from the Captain of the St. Louis for his help in 
nding countries that would accept the passengers of the St. Louis. 
USHMM, courtesy of Betty Troper Yaeger (Photo # 01176)
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disembark and the US State Department insisted the passengers on board 
must “await their turns on the waiting list,” the St. Louis, sailed back to 
Europe on 6 June, 1939. Jewish organizations (particularly the JDC) nego-
tiated with four European governments to secure entry visas for the 
passengers to avoid a return to Germany. Morris C. Troper (1892–1962), 
the American Jewish lawyer and communal leader who from 1938 to 1942 
served as chief of European operations for the JDC, was instrumental in 
convincing the governments of the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and 
Great Britain to oer safe haven to the stranded Jewish refugees: Great 
Britain took 288 passengers; the Netherlands admitted 181 passengers, 
Belgium took in 214 passengers; and 224 passengers found at least tempo-
rary refuge in France. Of the 288 passengers admitted by Great Britain, 
all survived the Second World War save one, who was killed during an 
air raid in 1940. Of the 620 passengers who returned to the continent, 87 
(14%) managed to emigrate before the German invasion of Western Europe 
in May 1940. When Germany conquered Western Europe, 532 St. Louis 
passengers were trapped. Just over half—278—survived the Holocaust. e 
rest were murdered: 84 who had been in Belgium; 84 who had found refuge 
in Holland, and 86 who had been admitted to France.9
It should be noted that there was little support among the American 
public for admitting more refugees at the time, given racial prejudices 
among Americans, as well as antisemitic attitudes held by US State Depart-
ment ocials; this certainly contributed to the failure to admit more refu-
gees. us it would fall to aid organizations such as the Joint Distribution 
Committee and the World Jewish Congress (WJC) to provide relief to Jews 
when the next massive refugee crisis would unfold.10 In 1939, out of the 
organization’s total expenditure of $8.5 million, $3.25 million supported 
Jewish refugees in the countries of refuge, $2.18 million went to Jews in 
central Europe, and $1.25 million to Jews in Eastern Europe.11 
9 Ibid. See also USHMM photo archives summary, letter to Morris Troper.
10 For an early postwar account of the activities of the World Jewish Congress, see 
Institute of Jewish Aairs, Unity in Dispersion: A History of the World Jewish 
Congress, 2nd rev. ed. New York: Institute of Jewish Aairs of the World Jewish 
Congress, 1948. See also the memoir of its wartime Geneva oce director, Riegner, 
Gerhart M. Never Despair: Sixty Years in the Service of the Jewish People and the 
Cause of Human Rights. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006.
11 See in Garbarini, et al. (eds.). Jewish Responses to Persecution, p. 25.
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During the summer of 1939, as the likelihood of war only seemed to 
increase, the JDC began to realign budget priorities and prepare in case 
war broke out. e JDC and HICEM (a merger of HIAS, Jewish Coloniza-
tion Association and the United Committee for Jewish Emigration) orga-
nized an emigration conference in Paris in August 1939, where the two 
organizations’ leading representatives (including Morris Troper, the JDC’s 
European director; Joseph C. Hyman, vice chairman of the JDC based in 
New York; and Saly Mayer from Switzerland) decided to transfer large 
amounts of money to Poland for the second half of 1939, in the hope that 
any hostilities would be over by the end of that year.12 Looking back half a 
year later, Troper described the unease and apprehension that hovered over 
the meeting: 
e imminence of war had been in the air for several weeks. An atmo-
sphere of gravity and depression prevailed. Everyone sensed that at any 
moment the conference on emigration might have to be converted into 
a war emergency meeting. On the very morning of August 22, when the 
rst session took place, the world was startled to learn of the signing 
of the Russo-German pact. e drama of the occasion was heightened 
when one of the French delegates was summoned from the opening ses-
sion, and reappeared a few hours later in the uniform of a French ocer 
to bid his colleagues adieu […]. e meeting proceeded to the end of the 
scheduled program, but even before the nal adjournment, delegates 
were being ooded with anxious telegrams and telephone calls urging 
them to return home. Departures were hastened, and many le with-
out knowing whether or not they would arrive at their destinations. 
Some of the delegates found their homeward paths already blocked and 
remained in France.13 
12 Ibid., p. 189 and Bauer, American Jewry, p. 34. For an overview of wartime relief 
eorts of HIAS, the New York-based Jewish humanitarian organization, see 
Bazarov, Valery. “HIAS and HICEM in the System of Jewish Relief Organisations 
in Europe, 1933–41.” East European Jewish Aairs 39, no. 1, April 2009, pp. 69–78.
13 Troper, Morris. “On the European Relief Front,” Contemporary Jewish Record 3, 
no. 3, May-June 1940, p. 227; Garbarini, et al. (eds.). Jewish Responses to Persecu-
tion, p. 190.
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e beginning of the war created a whole new set of political and nan-
cial challenges that dwarfed the refugee crisis of the 1930s. While Jewish 
organizations struggled to coordinate their response to the overwhelming 
demands for help, the JDC’s traditional reliance on local oces and relief 
workers in fact proved crucial in organizing relief on the ground, without 
waiting for directions from New York. And unlike many prominent Jewish 
leaders from Warsaw who ed ahead of the German onslaught, Emanuel 
Ringelblum and his circle decided to stay in Poland.14 During the war, the 
JDC proved to be the single most important relief organization, even if 
its eorts proved insucient. Just to summarize some of the JDC eorts 
during the war:
–  By the end of 1939, JDC-supported organizations had helped some 
110,000 Jews emigrate from Germany—30,000 in 1939 alone. In 1940, 
JDC was helping refugees in transit in more than 40 countries. From 
the outbreak of the Second World War through 1944, JDC enabled 
over 81,000 Jews to emigrate.
–  From its wartime headquarters in Lisbon, JDC chartered ships and 
continued to help thousands of refugees escape from Europe through 
various routes. In France, JDC nanced legal and illegal organizations. 
It funneled in funds to support some 7,000 Jewish children in hiding 
and to smuggle over 1,000 more to Switzerland and Spain, and it smug-
gled aid to Jewish prisoners in labor camps.
–  In Shanghai, a JDC relief program supported some 15,000 Jewish refu-
gees from Central and Eastern Europe. Packages were shipped from 
Tehran to Polish and Ukrainian Jews who had ed to Central Asia; 
supplies were parachuted into Yugoslavia; and funds were delivered to 
the Polish Jewish underground, some of them to help nance prepara-
tions for the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto revolt.15
14 Kassow, Samuel. Who Will Write Our History? Emanuel Ringelblum, the Warsaw 
Ghetto, and the Oyneg Shabes Archive. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2007, p. 91; on the ight of Warsaw Jewish elite, p. 114.
15 https://archives.jdc.org/history-of-jdc-1930s/, accessed May 26, 2017.
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The Outbreak of War and the Refugee Crisis
Approximately 3.3 million Jews lived in Poland in 1939. With the German 
invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the occupation and partition of 
the country by German and Soviet forces, an even greater humanitarian 
crisis rapidly unfolded. Polish Jews, who had observed the increasing 
persecution of Jews in Germany since 1933 with fear, trepidation, and 
concern and who had organized the relief and assistance for the Polish 
Jews expelled to Zbasyn in the winter of 1939, now fell under the Nazi 
orbit. While thousands of Polish Jewish refugees ed to Warsaw, seeking 
to escape bombings and widespread persecution by the advancing armies, 
others remained in their homes, hoping for the best. Lithuania, which had 
been occupied by the Soviet Union, became the main immediate desti-
nation for Jewish refugees from Poland. Vilna, which had been part of 
Poland in the interwar period but now became the capital of Lithuania, 
became an appealing destination, not only as possibly the only remaining 
way out of Poland but also as the long-standing center of vibrant Jewish 
culture with a well-established Jewish community and infrastructure.16 
According to one refugee: “At rst instinctively and spontaneously and 
then in an organized way, masses of Jews streamed to Vilna […]. Trains 
leaving for Vilna were overcrowded.”17 While approximately 350,000 Jews 
streamed into the eastern, Soviet-occupied section of Poland, the number 
of Polish Jewish refugees in Vilna eventually reached about 14,000, 
according to JDC data.18 
Writing a year aer the fact, the Polish Jewish Bundist Herman Kruk 
documented the early days of refugee life in Vilna: “e hundreds and 
thousands who arrived in Vilna were huddled together, terried, hungry, 
and exhausted. […] A week ago a landlord, the director of a bank, an indus-
trialist; today hungry, naked, and hunched up. Ten days ago a merchant, a 
factory supervisor, a cobbler, a baker; today naked and barefoot, crushed.” 
Kruk also described what he saw as the camaraderie that developed among 
refugees of dierent backgrounds and classes:
16 See in Garbarini, et al. (eds.). Jewish Responses to Persecution, p. 154.
17 Quoted in Arad, Yitzhak. Ghetto in Flames e Struggle and Destruction of the 
Jews in Vilna in the Holocaust. Jerusalem: Ahva Cooperative Printing Press, 1980, 
p. 15.
18 Bauer. American Jewry and the Holocaust, p. 111.
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Tortured and worn out, they look fearfully at tomorrow. Fear brings 
people together, strangers become intimate, people cling to one another. 
e Jewish engineer befriends a Polish factory worker; a Jewish tailor 
is with a group of Polish students. Everything was so simple then, so 
human, so equal. All were brothers and all were close, facing the thou-
sand lurking dangers. If someone is bleeding you tear o your shirt and 
bandage his wounds. If someone falls down, you carry him along, so as 
not to abandon him in the wasteland.19
e thousands of Jewish refugees from Poland who arrived in Lithuania 
depended on Jewish humanitarian aid for survival in their new place of 
residence.20 Nonetheless, as Moshe Kleinbaum detailed in a letter to 
Nachum Goldman of the World Jewish Congress, although the “lot is 
better than that of the other three million unfortunate Polish Jews, there is 
scarcely any possibility for emigration.” Noting the many challenges that 
confronted travel out of Lithuania and the limited routes of transit to free 
countries, Kleinbaum concluded, “Consequently, we must reckon with the 
fact that the majority of the Jewish refugees must remain in Lithuania for 
a long time.”21
While refugees in Lithuania depended on aid to survive, it quickly 
became clear that the various relief organizations were ill equipped to 
work together. Dierences in political outlook between Jewish socialists, 
Zionists, and religious leaders led to conicts and duplication of eorts 
among the organizations active in Vilna, and groups like JDC, HICEM, 
the Lithuanian Jewish Committee of the Red Cross, and WJC struggled 
to unite relief eorts. As Leib Garfunkel, active in organizing relief for 
Polish Jews in Lithuania in 1939–40 and subsequently a member of the 
19 Quoted in Kruk, Herman. e Last Days of the Jerusalem of Lithuania: Chronicles 
from the Vilna Ghetto and the Camps 1939–1944. New Haven/London: Univer-
sity Press/YIVO, 2002 in English translation, p. 28. See in Garbarini, et al. (eds.). 
Jewish Responses to Persecution, p. 168.
20 Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust, p. 116, p. 127.
21 Letter from Moshe Kleinbaum to Nachum Goldmann, March 12, 1940, reprinted 
in: Friedlander, Henry & Sybil Milton (eds.). Archives of the Holocaust: an inter-
national collection of selected documents. New York: Garland Publ., 1990, vol. 8, p. 
119. See in Garbarini, et al. (eds.). Jewish Responses to Persecution, pp. 169–171.
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Kovno Jewish council until 1944, described the chaotic situation in Lithu-
ania in late 1939:
Kaunas
November 22, 1939
e following organizations are concerned with relief for the Jewish 
refugees from Poland:
Joint Distribution Committee
HICEM oce in Kaunas
Lithuanian Jewish Committee of the Red Cross
ere is no possibility of uniting these organizations. e represen-
tative of the Joint Distribution Committee works in accordance with 
instructions issued by the European oce. HICEM is guided by 
instructions from Paris and its own committee in Kaunas, including, 
among others, Rubinstein, Kelson and myself. As for the Lithuanian 
Jewish Committee, it is subject to the Lithuanian Red Cross. From 
telephone conversations with Dr. Nurock and Dr. Kleinbaum, we 
learn that the present situation in Vilna is chaotic. Every organization 
is engaged in registering refugees, but not one does so satisfactorily.22
Despite the numerous challenges and obstacles facing Jewish refugees, 
some did manage to escape, thanks to the assistance of principled diplo-
mats who deed travel bans and obstacles to help refugees. Chiune Sugihara 
(1900–1986) was a Japanese diplomat, a vice consul of the Empire of Japan in 
Kovno, Lithuania, when the war broke out. Risking his professional career, 
he granted Japanese transit visas to Jewish refugees stranded in Lithuania 
against the rules set by the Japanese government, thereby saving thousands. 
Other diplomats—like Jan Zwartendijk in Kovno—took similar risks in this 
period.23 Individual refugees managed to leave Lithuania and travel east, 
22 See Dr. Garfunkelis. Report of the Lithuanian Committee on Behalf of Polish Jewish 
Refugees, November 22, 1939, American Jewish Archives, WJC records, series A, 
box A2, le 2, Day Book of the WJC II, 37–38. Printed in: Garbarini, et al. (eds.). 
Jewish Responses to Persecution, pp. 172–173.
23 Levine, Hillel. In Search of Sugihara: e Elusive Japanese Diplomat Who Risked 
his Life to Rescue 10,000 Jews from the Holocaust. New York: Free Press, 1996 and 
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in some cases on paths that took them from Lithuania across the USSR to 
Japan, Shanghai, India, Iran, or elsewhere. Likewise, when the Germans 
occupied Western Europe, invading France on May 10, 1940, tens of thou-
sands of Jewish refugees poured into neutral Portugal when the Nazis 
invaded France and the Low Countries during the Second World War. Many 
of the Jews living in France ed south. Most sought to enter Spain, proceed 
to Portugal, and then escape by ship. In order to cross the French border 
into Spain, the refugees needed Portuguese entry or transit visas but the 
Portuguese government instructed its consular representatives in France 
not to issue such visas, especially not to Jews, leaving thousands of refu-
gees stranded in Bordeaux. Rabbi Haim Kruger from Belgium, one of thou-
sands of refugees trying to escape, approached Aristides de Sousa Mendes, 
the Portuguese consul general in Bordeaux, and begged him to issue visas 
to the more than ten thousand Jews who had ed to the area. Initially reluc-
tant to defy government orders, aer further consideration Sousa Mendes 
decided to issue visas to all those who needed them, even though he would 
be risking his career and his life. He scrambled to issue thousands of transit 
visas to Jews before the Germans reached Bordeaux and even convinced the 
Portuguese consul in Bayonne (closer to the Spanish border) to issue special 
visas to Jews. Following his return to Lisbon in July 1940, Sousa Mendes 
was dismissed from the diplomatic service and denied all benets (he would 
eventually die in poverty in 1954, survived by his wife and twelve children).24
While principled diplomats like Sugihara and Sousa Mendes were 
able to defy government orders and thereby save thousands of refugees by 
issuing transit visas, these were the exceptions; millions more Jews caught 
in the Nazi net would be unable to escape. Herman Kruk, for example, 
would be conned in the Vilna ghetto, where he played a crucial role in 
both cultural and social welfare organizations. He was eventually trans-
ferred to the Klooga concentration camp in Estonia, where he was executed 
with other prisoners on September 18, 1944.25 
Goldstein, Jonathan. “Motivation in Holocaust Rescue: e Case of Jan Zwart-
endijk in Lithuania, 1940.” In: Diefendorf, Jery M. (ed.). Lessons and Legacies: 
New Currents in Holocaust Research. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
2004, vol. 6, pp. 69–87.
24 See https://jfr.org/rescuer-stories/sousa-mendes-aristides-de/, accessed May 26, 
2017.
25 See Kruk. e Last Days of the Jerusalem of Lithuania.
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As relief organizations scrambled to provide assistance for those under 
the occupation or stranded on routes of escape, it also quickly became clear 
how ill equipped Jewish non-governmental organizations in America and 
Palestine were to confront an unprecedented crisis of such scale. While 
Europe had been the center of world Jewry for centuries, who would take 
the lead to aid European Jewry in its time of need: American Jews or the 
Yishuv in Palestine? ere was no unied American Jewish community 
to speak of in the 1930s, as numerous organizations represented diering 
segments of the community, making unied action impossible.26 At the 
same time, the leaders of the Yishuv grappled with distance from events in 
Europe, their own preoccupation with confronting both British and Arab 
opposition to the Zionist project, and internal divisions over the best course 
of action. Jewish refugees in Europe grappled with powerlessness in the 
face of the overwhelming force of Nazi oppression and the seeming indif-
ference of world powers; Jewish organizations in America and Palestine 
likewise seemed powerless to grapple with a humanitarian crisis rendered 
all the more complex by the politics of war.
The Bermuda Conference of 1943
Eorts at rescue, relief, and resettlement on the part of non-governmental 
organizations like the JDC, the WJC, and the Jewish Agency could not 
address the magnitude of the crisis as the war expanded and the scope of 
the Nazi policy of annihilation—the “Final Solution” —became clear, espe-
cially at the end of 1942 and into 1943. Even when the scope of the “Final 
Solution” became evident, Jewish organizations struggled to convince 
the Allies to change policy and take the mission of rescue work seriously. 
Before the outbreak of ghting in the Warsaw Ghetto on April 19, 1943, 
the other major news item that captured the attention of the world Jewish 
press was the ill-fated Bermuda Conference, convened in response to urgent 
demands to rescue what was le of European Jewry. On January 20, 1943, 
the British Foreign Oce, in response to public pressure from Parliament, 
26 Feingold, Henry. “Who Shall Bear Guilt for the Holocaust? e Human Dilemma.” 
In: Sarna, Jonathan D. (ed.). e American Jewish Experience. New York: Holmes 
and Meier, 1997, p. 285.
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humanitarian organizations, and the Church—especially as the Riegner 
telegram27 had been publicized and the scope of the “Final Solution” became 
more widely known—proposed British and American consultation to come 
up with a possible solution to the crisis. e result was the Anglo-Amer-
ican Conference on Refugees, held in Bermuda April 19–30, 1943. Consul-
tations at the conference, which would ultimately prove completely ineec-
tive, attracted a good deal of attention in the Jewish press in late April 1943.28
Even at the Bermuda Conference, Jewish organizations were not invited 
to attend, reinforcing a sense of powerlessness and impotence on the part 
of world Jewry to make a dent in the apathy of the world; much of the time 
at Bermuda was spent debating whether it was even appropriate to refer to 
the Jews as the Nazis’ primary victims. Jews in the “free world” could lobby 
their political leaders but the ability to rescue and engage in acts of retri-
bution and oensive military action was non-existent. Both Dr. Harold W. 
Dodds, head of the American delegation, and Richard K. Law, head of the 
British delegation indicated “that the solution of the refugee problem lies in 
an Allied victory.” Aid to refugees would be considered secondary to mili-
tary eorts and “no plan [would] be considered by the delegates which can 
be construed in any way as tending to retard the war eort.” When the report 
of the Bermuda Conference was published seven months later on December 
10, 1943, the only positive suggestion was to restart the Evian Committee—
too late to engage in any eective rescue eorts. Unable to participate at 
the conference itself, the majority of American Jewish organizations, repre-
sented together by the Joint Emergency Committee for European Jewish 
Aairs, publicized the text of their appeals to the Bermuda Conference 
through the press: ey demanded that at the very least the United Nations 
begin immediate action to: 1. Negotiate with the Axis Powers to permit the 
exit of Jews, 2. Create temporary and permanent sanctuaries for them by the 
United Nations; and 3. Respond to planned starvation of the Jewish popu-
lace of Europe by feeding those not permitted to leave.
We would be less than frank if we did not convey to you the anguish 
of the Jewish community of this country over the failure of the United 
27 Message of Gerhart Riegner, then Secretary of World Jewish Congress (Geneva), to 
its New York and London oces about the alarming situation for Jews.
28 See https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/bermuda.html, accessed 
October 10, 2017.
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Nations to act until now to rescue the Jews of Europe. For many months 
it has been authenticated that the Nazis have marked the Jewish popu-
lation of Europe for total extermination and that it is estimated that 
almost three million Jews have been done to death, while a similar 
fate awaits those who remain. World civilization has been stirred to its 
depths by these horrors. Every section of public opinion throughout the 
world, and more particularly in England and in the United States, has 
spoken out in demand that the United Nations act before it is too late 
to save those who can still be saved. Six months have elapsed, however, 
and no action has as yet been taken. In the meantime it is reported that 
thousands of Jews continue to be murdered daily.29
As the Jewish press reported on the deliberations at the Bermuda confer-
ence, it is safe to say that the rather limited scope of the discussions and 
the self-imposed boundaries on the delegates only contributed to a sense 
that world Jewry was largely powerless and that democracy had failed in its 
obligation to protect the Jewish minority. As the Jewish Frontier noted in 
an editorial in May 1943 titled “e Gentleman at Bermuda”:
Hitler has won another victory at Bermuda—a moral political victory 
in which Nazidom rejoices. Every reactionary who wants the purposes 
of the United Nations defeated has triumphed in the failure at Ber-
muda. e so-called Refugee Conference has made a mockery, not only 
of the agony of millions of helpless human beings, but of the great cause 
of liberation to which the democratic world is committed, and which 
alone makes the horror of our time understandable and endurable.30 
us even though protests and mobilized action of Jewish groups eventu-
ally led to the creation of the War Refugee Board (WRB) through Executive 
Order 9417 on January 22, 1944, aer the Second World War the WRB’s 
29 http://www.jta.org/1943/04/30/archive/bermuda-conference-closes-decisions-rem 
ain-condential-general-statement-issued, accessed October 10, 2017. Repre-
senting the Zionist position, Chaim Weizmann also called on the British to 
abandon the White Paper of 1939 and make Palestine the principal place of refuge 
for European Jews.
30 “e Gentleman at Bermuda,” May 1943. In: Jewish Frontier Anthology 1934–1944. 
New York: Jewish Frontier Association 19452, pp. 375–378, here p. 378.
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rst director, John Pehle, described the board as “little and late.”31 e 
board’s work has, however, been credited with saving as many as 200,000 
lives during the Holocaust.32 
Even so, the perceived failure of the international community to address 
the Jewish refugee crisis before and during the war set the backdrop for the 
solutions that would emerge aer the war for the Jewish displaced persons. 
Before the war, these were the refugees caught in the international commu-
nity’s inability to respond to members states who did not play by the rules 
of orderly emigration; aer the war, the few who remained and who had 
survived were displaced, without a home, and still with no country willing 
to oer refuge.
Part 4: The Aftermath of the Holocaust, and Zionism 
as a Solution to Jewish Displacement
In the rst days and weeks following the Allied liberation of Germany, 
the country was inundated with the freed captives of the Nazi regime 
who sought to make sense of the new situation, one for which they had 
long hoped. With the conclusion of the war on May 8, up to ten million 
forced laborers, POWs, and other displaced persons ooded the roads of 
Germany, desiring to return home. According to statistics prepared by 
UNRRA (the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) in 
the summer of 1945, there were still 1,488,007 DPs in Germany, Austria, 
and Italy, of whom 53,322 were Jews, or 3.6 percent. ere were also 900,000 
Poles, 140,000 Balts, 121,000 Hungarians, and a variety of other European 
nationalities as well.33 Singled out for extermination by the Nazis, Jews 
were least likely to have survived the war and thus constituted a small 
minority of the total number of refugees in Germany upon liberation. In 
this initial period, however, with the categorization of displaced persons 
31 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/
article.php?ModuleId=10007409, accessed October 10, 2017.
32 For more on relations between the JDC and the WRB, see: http://archives.jdc.org/
topic-guides/jdc-and-the-u-s-war-refugee-board-1944-45/, accessed October 10, 
2017.
33 See statistics in Proudfoot, Malcolm. European Refugees, 1939–1952. A study in 
forced population movement. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1956.
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by national origin from enemy and Allied countries, surviving Jews were 
frequently placed with former collaborators from their countries of origin 
in Displaced Persons camps. 
e creation of a unied policy towards the Jewish DPs developed 
tfully, with the Jewish refugees tossed between postwar diplomatic 
considerations that had to weigh the competing interests of the postwar 
reconstruction of Germany, the developing Cold War with the USSR, 
Anglo-American relations, and British policies in Palestine, in addition to 
the best interests of the displaced persons. e Jewish DPs in the American 
zone were cared for by a number of bodies on several levels. e prepara-
tions for dealing with the DP problem had already begun during the war; 
on November 29, 1943, representatives from 44 countries met at the White 
House to establish UNRRA to work as an administrative and subordi-
nate branch of the military to administer camps and provide supplemental 
supplies, such as food, clothing, medical supplies, and other forms of assis-
tance to those awaiting repatriation (while shelter and medicine were 
Army responsibility). Herbert Lehman (former governor of New York) 
was appointed its director general. According to a SHAEF (Supreme Head-
quarters, Allied Expeditionary Force)-UNRRA agreement on November 
25, 1944, UNRRA agreed to work under direct command of SHAEF, while 
SHAEF acknowledged UNRRA’s postwar responsibilities. 
e SHAEF guidelines on DPs and refugees from December 28, 1944 
as outlined in administrative memorandum #39 identied a “displaced 
person” as any civilian who because of the war was living outside the 
borders of his or her country and who wanted to but could not return home 
or nd a new home without assistance.34 Displaced persons were divided 
into categories by place of origin into those from enemy and Allied coun-
tries. In addition to the newly dened DPs, “stateless persons”—dened 
as “persons who have been denationalized, whose country of nationality 
cannot, aer investigation, be determined, who cannot establish their 
right to the nationality claimed, or who lack the protection of any govern-
ment”—were entitled to receive the same treatment as DPs from Allied 
nations; enemy and ex-enemy nationals persecuted because of race or reli-
gion also were entitled to the same treatment. SHAEF ceased functioning 
34 See discussion in Kochavi, Arieh. Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United 
States, and Jewish Refugees, 1945–1948. Chapel Hill: e University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001, p. 14.
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in mid-July 1945, when responsibility for the care of DPs was transferred 
to the victorious nations in the occupation zones of the three major powers 
agreed upon in the conference at Yalta. Germany was divided into Amer-
ican, British, and Soviet zones of occupation, with a small area in the south-
west of Germany designated as the French zone. e majority of the Jewish 
population, perhaps some 35,000 out of 50,000 liberated, was in the Amer-
ican zone of occupation, many of them around Munich.35 
While most displaced persons aer the war made the decision to return 
home with ease, the Jewish DPs did not face such a clear decision. Members 
of pre-war and wartime Zionist groups began to advocate for immigra-
tion to Palestine, while members of the Jewish socialist Bund party argued 
for a return to Poland, where Jewish workers could assist in the struggle 
to rebuild the country. Unsure of what awaited them at home, oen fairly 
certain that their families had been destroyed during the war, those who 
decided to stay in a DP camp also had to face the fact that this meant 
continuing to live with collaborators who also refused to return home. It 
also became clear following liberation that the US Army was ill equipped 
to address the humanitarian crisis it confronted amongst the survivors of 
the concentration camps. Surviving Jews and Jewish GIs began to send 
reports to the United States describing the atrocious conditions facing the 
surviving remnant. In response to the growing crisis among the Jewish 
Displaced Persons in Germany and Austria, on 22 June 1945, President 
Truman dispatched Earl G. Harrison with a special mission to Europe 
to “inquire into the condition and needs of those among the displaced 
persons in the liberated countries of Western Europe and in the SHAEF 
area of Germany—with particular reference to the Jewish refugees—who 
may be stateless of non-repatriable.” Once Harrison arrived in the camps 
in Germany, the Jewish DPs, along with Jewish chaplains like Abraham 
Klausner and soldiers from the Jewish Brigade, worked to make sure that 
he was aware of the miserable conditions facing the Jews.36 Harrison, 
accompanied by Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz, director of the American Jewish 
Joint Distribution Committee, and Jewish chaplains and leaders of the 
35 See article by Juliane Wetzel in this volume, pp. 145.
36 For a more detailed discussion of Klausner’s role in the DP camps, see Patt, 
Avinoam. “e People Must Be Forced to Go to Palestine: Rabbi Abraham 
Klausner and the Surviving Remnant in Postwar Germany.” Holocaust and Geno-
cide Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, Fall 2014, pp. 240–276.
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Jewish DP population, visited approximately thirty DP camps in Germany 
and Austria, witnessing rsthand the deplorable conditions Jewish DPs 
continued to face some three months following their liberation. His 
report of August 1945 to President Truman criticized the treatment of 
Jewish survivors by the Allies in sharp terms and called for major changes 
to Jewish DP policy; the report also became the most signicant single 
document of the DP era. Among the major changes recommended by the 
Harrison Report were the creation of separate camps for Jewish DPs; the 
appointment of an advisor for Jewish Aairs; and the granting of 100,000 
immigration certicates to allow Jewish DPs to enter Palestine.37 Harrison 
considered the resolution of the Jewish DP crisis not only a reection of US 
policy towards refugees, but also an expression of the US attitude toward 
the postwar reconstruction of Germany. In Harrison’s words, “One is led 
to wonder whether the German people, seeing this, are not supposing that 
we are following or at least condoning Nazi policy.”38 
Given the inability of the international system of citizenship to address 
the problem of Jewish statelessness during and aer the war, it should not 
surprise us that Earl Harrison’s famous report came to the conclusion that 
the best way to solve the statelessness of the Jewish DP population was 
through immigration to Palestine, linking the postwar Jewish refugee crisis 
with the eventual establishment of the State of Israel. “In conclusion,” he 
wrote in the report, “I wish to repeat that the main solution, in many ways 
the only real solution, of the problem lies in the quick evacuation of all non-
repatriable Jews in Germany and Austria, who wish it, to Palestine.”39 Aer 
twelve years of displacement, struggle, and ight, it is unsurprising, too, 
that the majority of Jewish DPs would also embrace Zionism—a Zionism 
37 Kochavi. Post-Holocaust Politics, p. 89; Dinnerstein, Leonard. America and the 
Survivors of the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, chapter 
two. Harrison’s suggestions, excluding the transfer of refugees to Palestine, were 
implemented almost immediately by General Eisenhower, who was assisted in 
his work by the newly appointed advisor on Jewish Aairs, Rabbi Judah Nadich, 
(appointed on August 24, 1945, Kochavi. Post-Holocaust Politics, p. 93). Nadich 
was replaced as special advisor aer three months by Judge Simon Riind.
38 “Harrison report to Truman,” August 24, 1945. In: Dinnerstein. America and the 
Survivors, p. 291.
39  Ibid. See treatments in Kochavi. Post-Holocaust Politics, p. 89; Dinnerstein. America 
and the Survivors, chapter two. For full text of Harrison Report see https://www.
ushmm.org/exhibition/displaced-persons/resourc1.htm, accessed May 26, 2017.
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that addressed their abandonment, their need for independence, and a solu-
tion to their displacement—as a collective solution to the Jewish refugee 
crisis. Critically, Harrison came to this conclusion because he believed this 
is what the surviving population truly desired—years of displacement and 
a perceived sense of abandonment by the international community taught 
the surviving Jewish population that only a national home could guarantee 
the shelter of the Jewish people.
Following Harrison’s report, American authorities, under the leader-
ship of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, worked to ameliorate conditions for 
Jewish DPs, moving Jews to separate camps and agreeing to the appoint-
ment of an Adviser for Jewish Aairs. With the arrival of over 100,000 
Jews eeing continued persecution and antisemitism in Eastern Europe 
with the Jewish organization Bricha (lit. “Escape”), the Jewish DP popu-
lation reached 250,000 in Germany, Italy, and Austria by the beginning of 
1947 (approx. 185,000 were in Germany, 45,000 in Austria, and 20,000 in 
Italy).40 e surviving population was characterized by a highly youthful 
demographic: Reports and surveys consistently estimated the proportion 
of Jewish DPs between the ages of 15 and 30 years at more than half and 
oen above 80 percent of the total Jewish population.41 In the absence of 
families, many survivors quickly created new families, as evidenced by the 
many weddings and the remarkable birthrate among the surviving popu-
lation in the rst year aer liberation. 
40 e Jewish population in the American Zone of Germany rose from 39,902 in 
January to 145,735 on December 31, 1946. JDC calculations, YIVO Institute for 
Jewish Research, New York (YIVO), MK 488, Leo W. Schwartz Papers, Roll 9, Folder 
57, #713.
41 From an early point following liberation it was evident that as much as half of the 
surviving population was under the age of twenty-ve, and some 80 percent were 
under age 40. For example, a survey of Jewish DPs in Bavaria taken in February 
1946 found that 83.1 percent of their number was between the ages of 15–40, with 
over 40 percent between 15–24 and 61.3 percent between 19–34. (Jewish Population 
in Bavaria, February 1946, YIVO, MK 488, Leo Schwartz Papers, Roll 9, Folder 57, 
#581). A study by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee of Jews in the 
U. S. Occupation Zone in Germany over one year aer liberation found 83.1 percent 
between the ages of 6–44. (JDC. Jewish Population, U.S. Zone Germany, November 
30, 1946, YIVO, MK 488, Leo Schwartz Papers, Roll 9, Folder 57, #682). See discus-
sion in Patt, Avinoam. Finding Home and Homeland: Jewish Youth and Zionism in the 
Aermath of the Holocaust. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2009, chapter 1.
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While still living in a transitional situation, hoping for the possibility 
of emigration, DPs succeeded in creating a vibrant and dynamic commu-
nity in hundreds of DP camps and communities across Germany, Italy, and 
Austria. With the assistance of representatives from UNRRA, the Amer-
ican Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), the Jewish Agency, and 
other organizations, schools were established throughout the DP camps. 
e largest camps, including Landsberg, Feldang, and Föhrenwald in the 
American zone of Germany, and Bergen-Belsen in the British zone, boasted 
a vibrant social and cultural life, with a ourishing DP press, theater life, 
active Zionist youth movements, athletic clubs, historical commissions, 
and yeshivot testifying to the rebirth of Orthodox Judaism. e DPs took 
an active role in representing their own political interests: political parties 
(mostly Zionist in nature, with the exception of the Orthodox Agudat 
Israel) administered camp committees and met at annual congresses of the 
She’erit Hapletah (the surviving remnant). e Zionist youth movements, 
with the assistance of emissaries from Palestine, created a network of at 
least forty agricultural training farms throughout Germany on the estates 
of former Nazis and German farmers, demonstrating their ardent desire 
for immigration to Palestine and performing an act of symbolic revenge 
against the Germans. 
e Harrison report served to link the resolution of the Jewish DP 
situation with the situation in Palestine, thereby elevating the diplomatic 
implications of the Jewish DP political stance. e apparent importance of 
Zionism for the increasing numbers of arriving DPs conrmed the neces-
sity of the Zionist solution for representatives of the Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry (AACI). Aer beginning their work in Washington 
and London in January 1946, members of the commission visited the DP 
camps and Poland to assess the Jewish situation beginning in February.42
 
Notwithstanding some concerns over Zionist propaganda and manip-
ulation, on April 20, 1946 the AACI recommended “(A) that 100,000 
certicates be authorized immediately for the admission into Palestine of 
Jews who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution; (B) that 
these certicates be awarded as far as possible in 1946 and that actual 
42 “Visit of the sub-committee to the American zone of Austria,” Vienna, Feb. 25, 
1946, National Archives, Washington DC, RG 43, AACI, box 12, pp. 4.
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immigration be pushed forward as rapidly as conditions will permit.”43 
is was the conclusion that the committee came to not only because of 
a lack of other options but also because the committee genuinely believed 
that this was the truest expression of the Jewish DPs’ desires. “Further-
more, that is where almost all of them want to go. ere they are sure that 
they will receive a welcome denied them elsewhere. ere they hope to 
enjoy peace and rebuild their lives.” e committee based these ndings in 
part on surveys conducted among the DPs. However, the committee also 
rmly believed that based on what it had observed among the Jewish DPs, 
they were a group ardently preparing themselves for a Zionist future. While 
many among the DPs were seen as reluctant to work, “On the other hand, 
whenever facilities are provided for practical training for life in Palestine 
they eagerly take advantage of them.”44
As their stay dragged on in Europe, DPs staged mass protests condem-
ning the British blockade of Palestine, and participated in the illegal 
immi gration (aliyah bet) movement to Palestine, most noticeably in the 
Exodus Aair of 1947. Eventually, the United Nations Special Committee 
on Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended that the problem of the 250,000 
Jewish Displaced Persons be dealt with through the partition of Palestine. 
Following the passage of the UN partition plan (November 29, 1947) and 
the creation of the State of Israel in May 1948, approximately two-thirds of 
the DP population immigrated to the new state, with a sizable percentage 
of the younger segment participating in the ghting in the 1948 war.45 Most 
of the remainder immigrated to the United States, which had only become 
a realistic immigration option following passage of the Displaced Persons 
Act in 1948 and the amended DP Act of 1950, which authorized 200,000 
DPs (Jewish and non-Jewish) to enter the United States. By 1952, over 
80,000 Jewish DPs had immigrated to the United States under the terms of 
the DP Act and with the aid of Jewish agencies. Almost all of the DP camps 
were closed by 1952.
43 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Report to the United States Government 
and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. Lausanne, Switzerland, April 
20, 1946, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/dbq/res/israel/TrumanIsrael_resources. 
pdf, accessed November 1, 2017; see also YIVO Library.
44 Ibid.
45 For a more detailed discussion of the role of survivors in the creation of the State 
of Israel, see Patt. Finding Home and Homeland, chapter 5.
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e situation of the Jewish refugees before and during the war, and 
then the Jewish Displaced Persons in postwar Europe, constituted a unique 
challenge to understandings of citizenship and statehood in the mid-twen-
tieth century. e centrality of citizenship to the organization of modern 
states was a fundamental component necessitating the repatriation of refu-
gees in postwar Europe. is certainly had an impact on the formation 
of a new national identity among the Jewish Displaced Persons and its 
ready acceptance by the Allied occupying powers. e story of the Jewish 
Displaced Persons represented a prime example of the unacceptability 
of statelessness within the international ling system of citizenship and 
pointed to various possibilities for dealing with this situation. 
NO PLACE FOR THE DISPLACED: THE JEWISH REFUGEE CRISIS
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   121 12.02.2018   15:59:46
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1945
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   122 12.02.2018   15:59:46
Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke
Introduction
is chapter examines how governments, intergovernmental organiza-
tions, religious organizations, and NGOs responded to the refugee crisis 
following the Second World War; examining their successes and short-
comings, it raises questions about what lessons can be learned from this 
experience.
Dan Plesch, in his insightful presentation on the history and organi-
zation of two international organizations—UNRRA and the UNWCC, 
which were born during the Second World War and have made their mark 
on the postwar world—provides much food for thought. Two examples of 
eective approaches, one from each organization, yield useful guidance for 
the present. Refugee camps under UNRRA were infused with the prin-
ciple of self-government, oering a potent antidote to the powerlessness 
that had marked the lives of their inhabitants and providing, according to 
Plesch, a key to UNRRA’s success. Similarly, the UNWCC’s example of an 
“international legal response to human rights abuses” based on the agency 
of victims and witnesses conrms the proper and powerful role of the indi-
vidual as opposed to unenforced platitudes of statesmen.
Juliane Wetzel provides a thorough examination of what she terms the 
“liberation phase,” which should, she argues, be considered as a separate 
historical period and not simply the end of the period of Nazi rule. During 
this time, the territory of Germany was home to millions of Displaced 
Persons, whose numbers were increased over time by the arrival of expel-
lees and refugees. Does this period of history, with its monumental chal-
lenges, oer any insights into the current refugee situation? Can we draw 
any lessons from this history given that it played out in the wake of total 
defeat and in the context of the emerging Cold War?
Carl J. Bon Tempo describes the signicant change in the refugee policy 
of the United States. Essentially closing its doors to European refugees before 
the war, the US admitted only an estimated 250,000 from 1933 to 1945—a 
small fraction of those who wished to go there. America’s postwar refugee 
record tells a completely dierent story, with the doors being opened wide. 
Bon Tempo traces the development of American refugee policy through 
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the Cold War and into the present, and addresses how this history might 
inform the contemporary refugee situation. Although there are deep struc-
tural and philosophical forces that suggest a stability in America’s response 
to refugees, he argues that the Trump administration has taken the US into 
“uncharted waters.” 
Several parallels have already been drawn both in national and inter-
national media between the current situation and the situations before, 
during, and immediately aer the Holocaust, a comparison that to some 
extent makes good sense. As the two American historians Richard E. Neus-
tadt and Ernest R. May argue in what is now a classic read for many histo-
rians, inking in Time: e Uses of History for Decision-Makers, in order 
to make better decisions, politician and policymakers must include histor-
ical experience in their decision-making process. e three presentations 
provide ideas and questions that could help us understand the challenges 
we face today. e past does not provide us with a detailed map, but may 
supply helpful road signs along the way. 
CECILIE FELICIA STOKHOLM BANKE
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Dan Plesch 
Aftermath: Institutional Responses to Displaced 
Persons and Refugees after 1945
As the Axis countries were defeated, the United Nations sent help to the 
liberated areas of Europe and Asia. is saved millions of lives, resuscitated 
national economies and provided the foundation for today’s UN organiza-
tions. Forty-four nations created the United Nations Relief and Rehabilita-
tion Administration (UNRRA) in 1943. By 1946 it had become the largest 
single exporter in the world, shipping supplies to devastated areas in Asia 
and Europe. An international sta administered UNRRA’s expenditure of 
$4 billion from a budget built of national contributions. Two prominent 
New York liberal politicians directed it in succession: Herbert Lehman of 
the banking family, and New York Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia. 
Plans for the liberation included famine relief, disease control as well 
as the post-conict reconstruction and development of agriculture and 
industry. From July 1945 to March 1946 UNRRA provided an average of 
1,150 calories per person in Greece, half the theoretically available total 
calories.
e new organization had to put up with waiting until the needs of 
the military had been met and with waiting for a resolution of conicting 
pressures of global politics in the mid-1940s. UNRRA itself was seen by its 
creators as an example and rst stage in a spectrum of global civilian opera-
tions. It originated in separate discussions in London and Washington and 
although UNRRA was never intended to be permanent, many regarded 
its dissolution in 1948 as premature. In the view of one of its advocates, 
President Harry S. Truman killed UNRRA to make room for the Marshall 
Plan of 1948. UNRRA opponents in the US considered it not a moment too 
soon to shut what they regarded as a proigate example of the “globaloney” 
New Deal policies of the Roosevelt era. Today, the Marshall Plan has totally 
eclipsed UNRRA in the history of the immediate postwar period.
UNRRA’s resources included member state donations of commodities 
such as food and textiles as well as cash. Its bureaucratic costs were low. 
Administrative expenses were 1.18 percent and operating expenses 3.41 
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percent. In comparison, the US Agency for International Development 
and associated economic development programs had, in 2010, a budget of 
around $17.5 billion with administrative expenses in 2009 of $348 million, 
around two percent, or nearly double the administrative costs of UNRRA.
e lessons to be learned from UNRRA extend beyond administrative 
prudence to include the democratic self-management of refugee camps. 
at refugees should elect their own representatives and operate their own 
camps is an idea that is alien to the US and the UN alike in the twenty-
rst century, despite the rhetoric of the export of democracy and nation 
building, whereas in the 1940s it was part of the operating manual for both 
the US military government and UNRRA. 
e UNRRA remains among the most important co-operative inter-
national postwar aid and reconstruction eorts that has ever existed. In 
the 1940s, government planning for the postwar world built on what was 
done by the US government and private organizations at the end of the First 
World War. Famine and disease had spread across the war-aected areas 
at the end of the 1914–18 war. Armies consumed huge quantities of food, 
kept men from farming and laid waste to the productive land in the war 
zones. en the inuenza pandemic of 1918 killed 40 million people, many 
of whom were too weakened by malnutrition to resist the disease.
America had been at the forefront of food aid during and aer the 
1914–18 war. Under Herbert Hoover, the US Food Administration helped 
people in German-occupied Belgium until the US entered the war in 1917. 
Later he led famine relief to Russia in the years aer the 1917 revolution. 
When Germany again conquered Belgium and then most of Europe in 
1940, aid from the still neutral US did not reach those under Nazi rule. 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill refused to allow neutral ships through 
the British eet blockade around the shores of Europe. He argued that 
nothing should be done to ease the burden of Nazi occupation, hoping 
to foment revolt against the Nazis. On August 20, 1940, during the Battle 
of Britain, Churchill declared in Parliament his policy on relief to those 
under occupation:1 “Let Hitler bear his responsibilities to the full, and 
let the people of Europe who groan beneath his yoke aid in every way the 
coming of the day when that yoke will be broken. Meanwhile we can and 
1 House of Commons. Ocial Report, 1940. HC Deb 20 August 1940 vol. 364 cc1132-
274, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1940/aug/20/war-situation, 
accessed November 1, 2017.
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will arrange in advance for the speedy entry of food into any part of the 
enslaved area when this part has been wholly cleared of the German forces.” 
Planning to prepare to feed people in the liberated areas of Europe began 
in London. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, the government’s Chief Economic 
Advisor, chaired a group of exiled governments in a committee that moni-
tored the suering on the continent and mapped out the minimum needs 
of relief once liberation came. is Inter-Allied Committee on Postwar 
Requirements was created on September 24, 1941 at the same meeting that 
endorsed the Atlantic Charter. 
Churchill’s statement on refusing to let supplies into occupied Europe 
when Britain itself faced the threat of occupation was an act of bravado. 
And the creation of this Committee on Postwar Requirements was an act 
of optimism bordering on fantasy, for Hitler was at the peak of his power 
and liberation seemed a distant dream. 
e Soviet Union was the rst to suggest a fully international relief orga-
nization. Dean Acheson acknowledged that: “In January 1942 the Russians 
tossed into the London arena the rst suggestion of an internationally 
controlled, manned and operated relief organization.” e State Depart-
ment presented the UK with an outline proposal for such an organization in 
May 1942. Eden’s positive response was based on the wider concern to build 
a postwar international structure:2 “It must be obvious that for the success 
of any postwar relief scheme the contribution of the United States will be all-
important. For that reason alone we should be well advised to fall in with the 
American proposals. But I fancy that there is much more than postwar relief 
in question. e United States Administration appear to be acting on the 
thesis that the more international machinery that can be got into operation 
with their participation before the end of the war, the greater the likelihood 
of American public opinion being ready to continue international cooper-
ation aer the war. It would perhaps be putting it too high at this stage to 
say that the Administration denitely intend to try and establish under the 
aegis of the ‘United Nations’ the embryo of the international organization of 
the future. American postwar cooperation in the international sphere being 
so vitally important, I submit that we must play up to any scheme of theirs 
tending to turn the United Nations into an operative piece of machinery.” 
As “machine operator” Roosevelt chose Herbert Lehman, one of 
America’s leading bankers and a former Democratic governor of New York 
2 U. K. National Archives, Eden Anthony, Cab/66/24/42 W.P. (42) 212, May 20, 1942. 
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State, meeting with him on November 11, 1942 just aer the mid-term 
elections and the landings in North Africa. Nevertheless, Roosevelt found 
the time to focus on postwar requirements. Roosevelt created a new State 
Department organization that Lehman was to head, the Oce of Foreign 
Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, which became the Foreign Economic 
Assistance Oce in March 1943.
e Roosevelt administration’s strategy was that these US organiza-
tions should form part of an international organization and not operate 
either by unilateral US actions in areas liberated by US forces or by a series 
of bi-lateral arrangements with individual allies. US power was such that 
it would have been easy for the US to make bilateral arrangements with 
individual states as it usually does today. Instead, the policy was to create a 
fully international agency that provided a collective forum for developing 
policy and sharing the burden or provision, while US power ensured that 
its desires usually prevailed.
Lehman initially sent help to refugees who had ed to North Africa 
from Europe. He chose men who had run welfare organizations in depres-
sion-hit American cities to lead this overseas work. e rst, William 
Hodson from New York, died in a plane crash. e second, Fred Hoehler 
from Chicago, began to manage the collection and distribution of food-
stus, medicines, and clothing.
Lehman had a ght on his hands to get the supplies through to Africa. 
Naturally enough, the military wanted all shipping to support the ghting. 
And many ships were still being sunk. e aid that did arrive went to 
camps run by the British in Palestine, Egypt, and Kenya. Distribution was 
hindered by the hostility between the national and political factions among 
the refugees. Greeks and Yugoslavs, communists, and royalists had to be 
separated to avoid ghting. 
e US nally convened a conference to create UNRRA for the autumn 
of 1943. e ocial New Zealand account records a skeptical response 
from smaller states, though they were reconciled to what had happened. 
“On 10 June [1943] the United States sent to all United Nations govern-
ments a dra agreement for UNRRA, with the signicant note that it had 
been approved by the big four and was to be published the following day. 
It was greeted with something like a chorus of protest by small European 
powers, who resented its ‘great power’ quality and criticized in partic-
ular the provision that its central committee should represent the big four 
only. ey evidently feared that this manner of doing things might become 
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the habit of the postwar world. Some small changes were made to meet—
though they by no means remove—small-power criticism and the United 
States Government sent out a nal dra on 24 September 1943. Even those 
who still felt uneasiness agreed with reasonable cheerfulness to accept it, 
specifying, in one case, that this was no precedent.“3
e Conference was held in Atlantic City, New Jersey. is seaside 
resort’s suering was limited by a lack of tourists in the war, and its mayor 
lobbied successfully for the UN conference to help ll the hotels. Dean 
Acheson chaired the conference, although, contrary to expectations at the 
time, it was Lehman and not Acheson who was chosen as UNRRA director. 
Acheson had the complex task of managing a conference of ocials from 
44 states, many with national and personal egos in inverse proportion to 
their size and resources. Arne ascribes much of the success of the confer-
ence to his kindliness, humor, and “patience of Job.” 
Time magazine gave insight into two of the most controversial issues:4 
“Into Atlantic City’s Claridge Hotel stalked trouble for the United Nations’ 
brand-new Relief & Rehabilitation Administration. For days India’s ocial 
delegate, mild Sir Girja Bajpai, had never dared bring up the bitter question 
of India’s right to petition UNRRA for desperately needed food in time of 
famine. Sir Girja knew that in Bengal this week there was no celebration 
of the bumper Aman crop (the December rice crop). ere was no celebra-
tion, only desolation, and silent villages ravaged mercilessly by hunger and 
disease. For there was no one le to harvest the Aman crop—the stricken 
peasants sat on doorsteps mourning their dead families, too tired, too sick 
to take courage from the ripening paddy elds. But J. J. Singh, president 
of the India League of America, moved into Atlantic City, called his own 
press conference, and forced the question into the open. Let UNRRA rush 
food to India at once. Chairman Dean Acheson and British Colonel John 
J. Llewellin demurred. UNRRA relief, said they, was only for areas liber-
ated from the enemy. Bluntly retorted interloper Singh: ‘If relief is for war 
victims, how can the United Nations refuse aid to famine-stricken India, 
where war has stopped all rice imports from Burma? e big nations, 
embarrassed but adamant, refused to reconsider. But the big nation dele-
gates could not succeed in shushing down small or poor nations on all 
3 Dan Plesch. America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and 
Forged Peace. London: I. B. Tauris, 2011, p. 122.
4 “Drama in Atlantic City.” Time, December 6, 1943.
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questions (each participating Government has an equal vote). When the US 
and Britain proposed that UNRRA relief be given free to postwar Germany 
if she was unable to pay, the small nations rose in storm. With a violent and 
tumultuous ‘no’ they voted down the proposal. Said they: Germany must 
pay for all the relief it gets’.” 
Of UNRRA, Acheson later remarked that it was “the John the Baptist 
of the Marshall Plan.” is version of events suited his political agenda 
rather than the reality of the shi from international to bilateral engage-
ment with the world. Part of the value of the international conference was, 
as Roosevelt, Hull, and Welles all intended, to build habits of cooperation. 
Acheson was joined by future diplomatic stars, including Jean Monnet of 
France, Lester Pearson of Canada, and Olivier Franks from Britain. 
e rst item of business on the table of the ag-bedecked ballroom 
of Claridge’s Atlantic City was, “Who will pay for the relief?” e basis 
agreed for the funding was that each member of the United Nations would 
contribute one percent of one year’s national income, a one-o payment. 
e Brazilians proposed instead that the percentage should be based on the 
pre-war trade a state had had with the countries to which assistance would 
be sent and the New Zealand government wanted a sliding scale with coun-
tries with higher per capita income paying more proportionately.
is one percent idea was rst proposed by Harry White, an American 
Treasury ocial also involved in the nancial discussions that reached 
fruition at Bretton Woods. e White Plan had the advantage that everyone 
was contributing what they could so that it was not simply a matter of US 
taxpayers subsidizing the world. e system had an obvious equality, a 
clear limit, and the avoidance of arguments over who was supplying how 
many tons of what foodstus, while still accommodating the reality of US 
wealth. At this time the USA produced over half of the world’s economic 
output. e adoption of this contribution system by the UNRRA Council 
imposed a non-binding obligation on governments and public opinion to 
equal what others were doing. 
e US contribution was over $2.6 billion of the $3.6 billion global cost 
of the program—however, one billion dollars was supplied by other coun-
tries, mainly by Britain and Canada (the UK contributing $600 million and 
Canada $137 million) and in small quantities by forty other members of the 
United Nations. Contributions included $24 thousand from Panama. e 
Dominican Republic increased its export tax and transferring the revenue 
to UNRRA. Brazil made the h largest contribution, with 40 million 
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dollars, nearly double the requested one percent of national income. At the 
time, Eire was neutral and so outside the United Nations, but nevertheless 
sent 285 tons of bacon and 8,000 beef cattle. Nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) also made contributions to UNRRA amounting to several 
million dollars worth of commodities. In the United States contribu-
ting NGOs included national patriotic organizations devoted to helping 
Czechoslovakia, China, Greece, Hungary, and Poland. In addition, 5,000 
tons of clothing were collected by Americans in 1944 alone. Americans 
contributed a further 70,000 tons to United Nations Clothing Collections 
by 1947. One well meaning, but senseless, initiative was to collect canned 
food in the US and ship it to the needy. La Guardia pointed out that these 
cans mostly contained water—especially the vegetables, but not before 
700,000 cans had been shipped out. La Guardia appealed instead for cash 
and nearly three million dollars was donated. ese early United Nations 
appeals paved the way for annual UNICEF appeals made on United 
Nations Day. Altogether, non-governmental contributions came to over 
$200 million.
In mid-1945 UNRRA had some 7,500 employees in purchasing oces 
across Latin America, the Middle East, and the Indian sub-continent and 
aid operations from China to Denmark. e resources came from volun-
tary national contributions of one percent of national income from the 44 
United Nations member states. Some of these purchases helped maintain 
demand for goods that had been destined for Lend-Lease and eased the 
loss of income to those producing them as the war ended. At that point, the 
liberated European states contributed what they could, with Czechoslo-
vakian contributions of sugar and Polish coal going to Austria and Yugo-
slavia. Helping people to help themselves was the motto and the practice.
Once the delegates in Atlantic City had agreed on the nancial issues, 
they had to decide what types of work could be funded, how to distribute 
resources, how the organization would work and who would benet. In 
addition to direct relief such as food and medicine the word “rehabilitation” 
was used. is was meant as an interim step before full-scale reconstruc-
tion. UNRRA’s guiding principle of “helping people to help themselves” 
meant that our came with seeds to plant the next year’s harvest, medi-
cine with medicine factories. Reconstruction was limited to, for example, 
xing an electricity generation plant rather than building a new one. e 
most famous reconstruction project was in China, where UNRRA helped 
rebuild the broken dykes along hundreds of miles of rivers.
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Some Allied governments were concerned that UNRRA would consti-
tute a dierent sort of invasion by the US and UK. Hence there was a 
requirement pressed by the Norwegians and French as well as the Soviet 
Union that the host government must authorize UNRRA operations.
Agreement at a conference was one thing; agreement by the US 
Congress to foot the bill, quite another. Lehman tried to convince Congress 
that the UNRRA project was “the rst great test of the capacity of present 
world partnership of the United Nations and associated governments to 
achieve a peacetime goal.” A strong lobby and public information eort by 
the administration and UNRRA itself was needed to secure Congressional 
approval of an initial $350 million. e complex US budgetary processes 
meant that a rst vote was not followed through by full implementation 
so that UNRRA purchases of supplied came to a halt late in 1945, with a 
further $550 million nally approved in mid-December 1945.
In London, Churchill and his cabinet were less than enthusiastic, 
although they ensured that the British nancial contribution was made 
punctually. British ocials grumbled that they were being asked to help 
people who had done little to ght the Nazis, and hoped that the British 
contribution would help rebuild trade with Europe. Churchill wrote to 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in August 1944 concerning a directive he 
was issuing to government ocials to detach good administrators to help 
UNNRA, “I have reluctantly initialed your dra directive. I am very appre-
hensive of Britain being overburdened aer the war, but still I recognize the 
force of your argument that since we have got into this we had better have 
as large a share of the personnel controlling it as possible.” 
Progress on implementation was slow even when the funds were 
approved. e military had priority on shipping until aer the war ended, 
and sought to retain it even then. e military authorities were permitted to 
bar UNRRA from liberated territories for up to six months aer they were 
free of enemy forces. And the military also had authority over UNRRA 
activities. By August 1945 UNRRA was still only working in ve countries, 
but one of them was Germany.
But by 1946 UNRRA operations had gathered momentum worldwide. 
From Lehman’s headquarters in the “at iron” building at Dupont Circle 
in Washington DC, he organized divisions to help with Displaced Persons 
(survivors of camps and slave labor), health, welfare, food, clothing and 
textiles, as well as agricultural and industrial rehabilitation and medical 
and sanitary supplies.
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e Displaced Persons (DPs) in Germany were the most obviously 
needy people in the aermath of the Nazi defeat. e UN relief planners 
estimated that 21 million people in Europe had been driven from their 
homes by 1943. In 2008, by way of comparison, there were around 45 
million DPs in 2008, of whom the UN High Commission for Refugees was 
assisting some 25 million worldwide, with an annual budget at a record 
high of two billion dollars in 2009.5 at snapshot of the world a decade 
aer the end of the Cold War presaged a spike in refugee numbers world-
wide a decade later.
Of the 21 million uprooted Europeans, about eight million had been 
taken as slaves, prisoners or forced labor to Germany and Austria and a 
further eight million were homeless in their own countries. 
UNRRA was a global—US led—multilateral agency supported by 44 
member states amongst whom the donor states committed one percent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Its refugee and DP operations operated 
within an UNRRA system that included food aid, public health, and agri-
cultural and industrial reconstruction. 
Most survivors found their own way home. However, by the end of 
1945, 750,000 DPs were being fed and housed mostly in the Western occu-
pied sectors of Germany.6 As people returned home others took their 
place. Eighteen months later the number had fallen to 640,000, of whom 
147,000 were Jews mostly hoping to go to Palestine. e new UN Interna-
tional Refugee Organization took over the task from UNRRA in mid-1947. 
By then a total of one million people had been helped home, half of them 
Poles.
A key part of the success of the process that enabled people freed from 
Nazi control to regain control over their lives was a system of self-govern-
ment. Part of UNRRA’s work was assistance to the millions of Displaced 
5 UNHCR. 2008 Global Trends, Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally 
Displaced and Stateless Persons, June 16, 2009, p. 2, http://www.unhcr.org/statis-
tics/country/4a375c426/2008-global-trends-refugees-asylum-seekers-returnees-
internally-displaced.html?query=2008, accessed October 10, 2017; UNHCR. 
Figures at a Glance, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c11.html, accessed 
October 10, 2017.
6 Woodbridge, George. e History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, 3 vols. is ocial 
history provides the data in the paragraph.
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Persons roaming Europe at the end of the war. UNRRA’s ocial history 
claims that UNRRA had been successful in ensuring that its camps were 
self-governing with elected councils, courts, and re services, which 
would not “have been possible if UNRRA had pursued a policy of ecient 
command.”7 “Although many leaders had been appointed at the begin-
ning of the operation by UNRRA or military ocials, by the summer of 
1946 almost all had been elected by the camp residents.”8
According to Woodbridge, the ocial historian of UNNRA, in his 
chapter on self-government, it was, “no exaggeration to say that it was the 
goal toward which all activities were pointed.”9 And the concept originated 
with the US Army, not with UNRRA. Eisenhower’s “Guide to the Care 
of Displaced Persons in Germany” stated that “displaced persons should 
be encouraged to organize themselves as much as is administratively 
pos sible.”10 According to Woodbridge, “each camp […] usually [had] a camp 
committee elected by the entire population, either at large, by nationality 
(if in a mixed camp), by area or block within the camp, or by some other 
means. is committee usually selected the camp a chairman or camp 
leader, although in some cases he was directly elected. is committee 
supervised all activities and represented the population in all dealings with 
outside authorities.”11 It was responsible for housing, catering, police, and 
re and courts depending on the size and longevity of the camp. is was 
the model, but practice was slow and imperfect.
Later, in 1946 and aerwards, the political character of the camps 
became part of both the emerging Cold War and the attempt of Jews to 
immigrate to Israel. at analysis emphasized the limits on UNRRA 
that are familiar today including subservience to national and military 
authority. Some of the context of the 1940s was very dierent today. ere 
is no parallel to the extermination and imported slave system operated 
by the Nazis, a context in which forced migration was sometimes seen as 
an international “good” under the banner of population transfer, where 
then as now some refugee populations included militia hostile to the new 
7 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 522.
8 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 516.
9 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 522.
10 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Guide to the Care of Displaced 
Persons in Germany, May 1945 revision, Part 1, Section 1, cited in ibid. 
11 Ibid.
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regime in their homeland. en as now attitudes among ostensible donors 
and hosts varied. 
Despite its integrated organization, UNRRA and especially its DP and 
refugee operations have attracted little recent study, although there was a 
great deal in the social science literature of the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
e International Tracing Service (ITS) in Bad Arolsen records have only 
recently become available to scholars; the USHMM has only recently digi-
talized sections of the UNRRA archives; and the records of the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) have only just been fully 
opened. e latter reveal that from 1944 onwards refugees and former Nazi 
prisoners provided evidence to support thousands of international crim-
inal indictments of their persecutors.
Preliminary conclusions for current practice include providing a 
formal process for refugees to lodge criminal complaints against their 
persecutors; the value of an integrated food, health, welfare, and recon-
struction organization to contain and reduce the wider social disrup-
tion from which refugees emerge; and the evaluation of democratic self 
management as a principle of organization.
UNRRA operations overlapped to some degree with those of the 
UNWCC. When it came to tracing individuals UNRRA focused on the 
International Tracing Service (ITS), while the UNWCC drew on the energy 
of refugees to propel what remains the world’s greatest international crim-
inal justice initiative.
e postwar system of human rights and security is under threat, and 
despite its aws, nothing better is on oer. It is very timely to discover that 
the postwar system of values rests on a far larger, richer, and more relevant 
paradigm than we normally understand. 
is was an initiative of refugees; of refugee governments from conti-
nental Europe working in Britain and in China; of resistance movements 
made of people displaced—indeed on the run—in their own nations; and 
of individuals giving evidence to their exiled governments, which set up 
systems to gather evidence as they made their way to freedom in Sweden, 
England or the Middle East. Aer the war, survivors emerging from the 
camps also provided evidence.
My recent analysis of the long-suppressed les of the 1943–1948 UN 
War Crimes Commission provides the evidence of the global eort to 
enforce Human Rights standards. is international body indicted 36,000 
Nazis and their allies as war criminals at the end of the Second World War, 
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resulting in over two thousand internationally supported trials before 
courts across Europe and Asia.12 
Ambassador Samantha Power nally released the records of this orga-
nization in 2014. ey provide an overwhelming amount of evidence both 
for use as precedent in today’s eorts to prosecute international crimes 
and to combat Holocaust denial. In the 1940s a few UNWCC cases were 
published and used as precedent in the Yugoslavia trials of the 1990s, vali-
dating the wider archive as legal sources.
Even while the Nazis still ruled, the resistance in occupied Europe initi-
ated war crimes indictments. ese included 1944 charges against Hitler 
himself for the extermination of the Jews at Treblinka and Auschwitz. 
ere were prosecutions of crimes including rape, attempted rape and 
forced prostitution, water boarding, and other torture along with mass 
murder and systematic terrorism.
Nevertheless, our historical memory is based on the narrow para-
digm of a few dozen top ocials tried before the international tribunals in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo. We all learned that despite heroic eorts of individ-
uals the Holocaust was never ocially condemned while it was underway, 
let alone prosecuted. is is false.
ese thousands of indictments were considered by a commission of 
seventeen allied nations—including the United States, China, and pre-
independence India, but not the USSR. Each state brought its national cases 
to the commission for approval; it acted as a pretrial examining magis-
trate. Although it drew up its charges in secret because of the pressures 
of war and could not therefore include neutral states let alone the enemy, 
the commission sought to apply the highest international standards of law 
and had diplomatic status as an international organization. Its chairmen 
were leading British judges of the day, Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst 
and Lord Robert Alderson Wright, and the commissioners included René 
Samuel Cassin. e United Nations War Crimes Commission was set up 
in 1943. 
Today, disillusionment with the baroque and biased practices of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) has led to renewed interest in the 
role of national courts in applying international criminal legal standards. 
e commission oers a model of a cooperative approach to justice and 
12 Plesch, Dan. Human Rights Aer Hitler. e Lost History of Prosecuting Axis War 
Crimes. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017.
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sovereignty where the international body advises and supports national 
eorts delivered with fairness, speed, and economy. Low-level soldiers did 
then and should now face trial along with their leaders.
Barrister Amal Clooney leads the call for justice for the crimes of 
Daesh and for the collection of evidence. is case is made more powerful 
by calling on the example of the UNWCC. For example, many members of 
the EU joined with China, India, and the US and UK to create a system for 
gathering war crimes evidence through debrieng refugees and released 
prisoners in the mid-1940s. As they could do that back in the 1940s with 
all the other pressures upon them, there are even fewer excuses now for 
inaction. UNWCC precedents on crimes of sexual violence as war crimes 
outside the context of Crimes Against Humanity are other examples of 
what can be applied today.
e work of the UNWCC also counters the intellectual trend to write 
of the end of human rights and at the same time to place the origins of 
those rights in the postwar period, sometimes as late as the 1960s or 1970s. 
e various arguments state that the postwar agreements were worth little 
more than the paper they were written on, that the writers of the texts were 
in any case Western intellectuals, or that human rights have a singularly 
Western and modern source. Samuel Moyn, Professor of Law and History, 
maintains that the texts of Raphael Lemkin on genocide and Hersch Laut-
erpacht on crimes against humanity were stillborn creations that had to 
be regenerated in the 1970s. e historian Lynn Hunt argues that human 
rights only started with the American-French political enlightenment. 
Yet the Golden Rule—“do unto others as you would wish them to do 
unto you”—encapsulates the core of human rights values and their impor-
tance in a just society. Pop into undergraduate classrooms, or indeed grade 
school classes on religion and civics, nowadays and you will nd a chart 
of this precept common to philosophies and religions around the planet. 
Many writers have detailed these globally socially embedded universal 
values of human rights. e political scientist Eric Helleiner and his 
colleagues provide a through overview of “e Neglected Southern Sources 
of Global Norms.” e connection of non-Western thinking and partic-
ipants in the postwar agreements described above also has been illumi-
nated in an elegant article by Bertrand Ramcharan, a former director 
of the UN Human Rights Division, in which he details the people from 
outside the West who shaped key components in the modern human rights 
agreements. 
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e UNWCC agreed on a denition of Crimes Against Humanity 
proposed by the US Ambassador Congressman Herbert Pell as early as 
March 1944, though he failed to gain support from his own State Depart-
ment, more than a year before its supposed inception in a Cambridge 
garden in a conversation between Lauterpacht and US Justice Jackson. 
In general terms though, Anglo-American leaders had begun to speak 
of crimes against humanity in response to the Armenian massacres and 
then in response to the crimes of Nazi Germany. ey adopted the term 
humanity as a diplomatic replacement for Christianity in deference to 
Jewish sensitivities in the 1940s; in this, they echoed the actions of British 
and French diplomats who, in their 1915 response to the unfolding Arme-
nian genocide, persuaded their Russian allies to replace the condemna-
tion of crimes “against Christianity and civilization” with the universal 
term “against humanity and civilization,” in order to be more sensitive 
to potential Muslim allies in the conict. us, on two occasions when 
Anglo-American ocials had to form policy in response to atrocities, they 
found it necessary to move beyond Christianity to an all-encompassing 
description of humanity. ere was a clear operational need to provide a 
universal discourse that required a shi in language from specic protec-
tion of “Christians” to a broader notion of “humanity.”
e foundational and operational role of China and India in the 
UNWCC’s debates and decisions, and the engagement of Ethiopia and the 
Philippines, provide further reinforcement of non-Western activism in 
agreeing upon and enforcing international human rights standards. 
is denial that scholars and politicians from the Global South helped 
create and value human rights is also extremely dangerous. It permits a 
ow of self-serving political thought amongst Western elites. Just as seri-
ously, it provides legitimacy for repressive governments outside the West to 
denounce human rights as imperial impositions. I characterize the argu-
ment this way: “We are civilized, they are barbaric, so when faced with 
barbarism we too must from time to time lower our civilized standards—
but we get to decide when that is.”
is is the road to the water-torture at CIA-run black sites, and was part 
of the rationale for letting key Holocaust perpetrators go free in the 1950s on 
grounds of political expediency as well as for the suppression of the UNWCC 
records to supposedly enable the rebuilding of Germany and Japan. 
In the 1940s, the US, largely in the form of the State Department, 
did its best to stop any war crimes eort. It was only the isolated eorts 
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of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Ambassador to the UNWCC, 
Congressman Herbert Pell, that created the conditions in which President 
Truman summoned Justice Robert Jackson to convene what became the 
Nuremberg trials. Nuremberg is usually presented as a lone star of inter-
national justice; it is better to see it as the jewel in the crown of the global 
movement. With the war over and rebuilding Germany and Japan taking 
priority, the State Department along with Allen Dulles acted to shut the 
commission down and have its archives sealed. Senator Joseph McCarthy 
led a campaign to vilify the prosecutors and release imprisoned Nazis. By 
the late 1950s all imprisoned Nazis had been “liberated.”
A fundamental and positive shi in understanding the role and poten-
tial of human rights aer Hitler comes from understanding the work of the 
UNWCC. Let us compare the UNWCC to the Nuremberg Tribunal, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Genocide Convention:
- e Genocide Convention was put into cold storage by the major 
powers almost as soon as it was created in 1948. It has only been in 
recent decades that it has provided the basis for prosecutions. 
- e Nuremberg International Military Tribunal tried twenty-four 
people and set the example for the subsequent trials at Nuremberg 
and for those conducted for crimes in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the 
former Yugoslavia, and the eventual creation of the ICC.
- e Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a standard, a 
norm that human rights advocates can use.
- e UNWCC facilitated the conviction of thousands of war criminals, 
developed a system of global criminal justice, and helped provide the 
intellectual, institutional, and political momentum that contributed to 
the creation of all three of the above, with exemplary economy of time 
and money.
For US ocials opposed to interventions to protect universal human rights, 
the crippling and then closure of the UNWCC, and its erasure from polit-
ical memory, were a triumph, while non-binding declarations and unrati-
ed treaties were a far lesser problem.
Consider the counterfactual: a well-resourced UNWCC continuing 
into the 1950s with the Genocide Convention reinforcing the pursuit of 
all those indictments processed by the commission. Would such processes 
have undermined democracy in West Germany and driven German elites 
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into Stalin’s arms? at is hard to imagine, and it is far easier to see this 
encouraging human rights globally. Roosevelt’s anti-colonial policy abroad 
and the related issue of African-American civil rights could have grown 
from this too. During the war, African-Americans had campaigned on the 
“Double V,” signifying the victory of “Democracy at Home and Abroad.” 
Membership in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) had grown y-fold to 500,000, and black voter registra-
tion in the South from two percent to 18 percent. e continuation of pros-
ecutions outside America for human rights abuses would have likely fed 
back positively into US politics in the manner feared by the Republican 
Henry L. Stimson, who argued against the category of Crimes Against 
Humanity on the grounds that this could be used by foreigners to prose-
cute the US for lynchings.
We should now recall the value of the UNWCC, having shed it out 
of the Orwellian “memory hole” into which its contemporary detractors 
cast it, and reect upon the missed opportunity of the last seventy years, to 
bring its values and prototypes to life in order to inspire a new generation. 
e international legal response to human rights abuses was and 
can still be the achievement of victims and their witnesses, and was not 
and should not be the preserve of great powers, great leaders, and great 
thinkers. It was and can still be the creation of ordinary people in abhor-
rently extraordinary conditions.
Auschwitz was not, and should not be regarded as, beyond human 
response, as negating the human condition. It was, with the other death 
camps, responded to as best they could by victims, and government o-
cials high and low in peril of their lives and in the relative safety of missile-
bombarded London.
“We” did know, “we” did condemn, “we” did indict and “we” did pros-
ecute. e argument that “we” did not know and so could not condemn or 
act until it was too late is shown conclusively to be a lie that suits those who 
did not care and wished an opportunity to join forces with the perpetrators 
against what they saw as the greater enemy—communism. e critiques of 
the 1940s human rights agreements as stillborn, or solely Western-driven, 
are founded on a narrow view of that inheritance.
e most important lessons from the experiences of UNRRA and the 
UNWCC are that refugees were important and at times powerful actors—
not mere subjects of administration—and that empowerment was an 
objective of multilateral agencies.
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Juliane Wetzel 
On the move
Postwar German territory as a transit area for survivors, 
displaced persons, refugees and expellees
Given the crimes of National Socialism, historians’ attention was focused 
for many years on a reappraisal of the years 1933 to 1945. Little emphasis 
was given to researching the period of liberation following the Nazi geno-
cide of the European Jews. Only in the last 25 years have scholars inves-
tigated the liberation phase as an historical event in its own right—seen 
not just as the end of the Nazi era but as a separate chapter that played a 
central role in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany and in the 
historical consciousness of the Allied powers, as well as for the founding 
of the State of Israel. e focus of today’s historical research is not just the 
liberation itself but also the inuence that visualized contemporary pres-
entations have on the “collective memory” and the history of the survivors 
who lived as displaced persons in the Allied occupation zones of Germany, 
Austria, and Italy.1 
Beginning in the early 1960s, the documents, photographs and lms 
about the liberation of concentration camps became increasingly associ-
ated with the Nazis’ murder of millions of European Jews. In 1945, very few 
people made this connection. At the time, the Allies as well as the interna-
tional press viewed the circle of victims of National Socialism primarily as 
1 Academic benchmarks that treat liberation as well as the inheritance for the survi-
vors and their collective memory are: Abzug, Robert H. Inside the Vicious Heart: 
Americans and the Liberation of Nazi Concentration Camps. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985; Dachauer Hee—Die Befreiung [Liberation], vol. 1, 1985; 
Barnouw, Dagmar. Germany 1945: Views of War and Violence. Bloomington/
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2008; Dinnerstein, Leonard. America and the 
Survivors of the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982; König-
seder, Angelika & Juliane Wetzel. Waiting for Hope. Jewish Displaced Persons in 
Post-World War II Germany. Evanston/Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
2001; Zelizer, Barbie. Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through the 
Camera’s Eye. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
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political opponents of the system or as members of particular nationalities. 
is not only hindered the perception of the unprecedented nature of the 
genocide of the Jews but also had a negative inuence on the living condi-
tions of Jewish survivors in the hastily installed Displaced Persons Camps 
in the immediate postwar period. 
Most of the former concentration camp inmates who were interviewed 
by the international press and thus became “voices” of the liberated camp 
inmates had been political prisoners whose physical and mental condition 
was better than that of most Jewish survivors. Few of the latter had a chance 
to speak, and the political prisoners either had little to say about Jews or, 
as did many Poles, showed open contempt for them. Since the voices of 
the Jewish survivors─people who could have reported credibly not only 
about their odyssey through dierent concentration and extermination 
camps but also about the sites where the genocide took place─were rarely 
heard, this source of knowledge about the extent of the genocide remained 
hidden for years. At the time, the Allies missed the opportunity to present 
the international public with authentic witnesses of the National Socialist 
mass murder of the Jews.
In the rst weeks aer liberation, the Allies did not recognize the Jews 
as a separate group. Nor did they consider them a nationality. is had 
far-reaching consequences because it meant that camps that housed only 
Jewish Displaced Persons (DPs) were the exception and that Jews who had 
suered persecution were oen forced to live in camps alongside their 
former tormentors, including concentration camp guards. It is dicult to 
gauge the psychological eects of this new form of humiliation. Forcing the 
Jews to share quarters with non-Jews caused major psychological problems 
for the Jewish survivors, especially since many non-Jewish DPs made no 
secret of their antisemitism and worked to make life in the camps as di-
cult as possible for the Jews, who were in a weakened state and desperately 
trying to nd out whether any of their relatives were still alive. Another 
bitter experience for the survivors was the fact that they would not receive 
help from Jewish relief organizations from abroad until late summer 1945. 
e rst “free” Jews whom the survivors encountered were military chap-
lains and soldiers serving in the Allied armies. Because Jewish relief orga-
nizations arrived late on the scene and had to clear a number of bureau-
cratic hurdles before they could begin their work, Jewish soldiers played 
an especially important role. ey were oen familiar with the mentality 
of their co-religionists, understood their language, and were therefore of 
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inestimable value in helping survivors rebuild their lives. e “surviving 
remnant,” the She’erit Hapletah as they called themselves, became represen-
tatives of Jewry in the world, and through their personal eorts managed 
to create a sense of hope among the DPs in a Jewish future. ey supported 
the initiatives undertaken by survivors to take over responsibility for their 
future lives.2
In 1945, the Allied armies liberated 6.5 to seven million Displaced 
Persons (some sources speak of ten to twelve million) in the area that would 
later become Germany’s three Western occupation zones. e 50,000 to 
75,000 Jewish survivors who had been freed either from concentration 
camps, evacuation transports or the death marches heading towards Tyrol 
made up a comparatively small group of DPs. To a lesser extent, troops in 
Austria and Italy were confronted with a similar situation of DPs from the 
dierent categories.
e DPs included all those who had ed or been expelled or deported 
from their homes as a result of the war. In practice, DP status was given to 
former slave laborers and concentration-camp inmates, as well as prisoners 
of war and Eastern Europeans who had either voluntarily supported the 
German economy aer the war began or ed from the Soviet Army aer 
1944. German refugees and expellees did not fall into this category.
In the American zone of Germany and Austria, DP status was given 
to people who were located on American-occupied territory before August 
1, 1945. However, an exception was made for those who were persecuted 
on racial, religious or political grounds, who were still recognized as 
“displaced” even if they had reached Germany only aer their liberation. 
e British military authorities generally refused such a status to all those 
who crossed into their zone aer June 30, 1946. In the French occupation 
zone, there was a comparatively small number of DPs, among them a few 
thousand Jews. e Soviet occupation power generally denied DP status 
entirely. 
e number of DPs liberated by the Allied armies suggests the dimen-
sions of the problems faced by the liberating troops. Yet, in spite of all 
the diculties involved in transporting and providing for this mass of 
humanity in war-ravaged Europe, the military managed to repatriate 
2 Mankowitz, Zeev W. Life between memory and Hope: e Survivors of the Holo-
caust in Occupied Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
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over four million DPs3 by the end of July 1945 and nearly six million by 
September 1945.4 ere were around one million DPs who, for one reason 
or another, could not be repatriated. ese people may be roughly divided 
into three categories: (1) non-Jews from Poland and the USSR whom the 
Nazis had forcibly brought to Germany to be used as slave laborers but who 
did not wish to be repatriated because of their political dierences with 
the new regimes in their home countries; (2) Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, 
and people from the Baltic States who had willingly come to work for the 
Germans during the war and were for the most part sympathetic to the 
Nazi regime, oen volunteering to join the SS. ese individuals feared 
being prosecuted for treason or war crimes in their countries of origin and 
felt more secure living in the chaotic conditions of postwar Germany than 
in their homelands; (3) Jewish DPs,5 who were totally debilitated, having 
survived the horrors of the concentration camps or, more rarely, lived out 
the war in hiding.
However terrible the fate of non-Jewish Displaced Persons may have 
been, it does not compare to the tragedy of the Jews. Millions of non-Jewish 
slave laborers and POWs at least had the option of returning to their homes 
and families aer the war, whereas Jewish DPs were completely cut o from 
their roots and had nowhere to go.
Fear of the “other”
e Western Allies not only had to organize room and board for Jewish 
survivors, former forced laborers, and other groups persecuted by the 
Nazis but also for German citizens arriving from the former German terri-
tories in Poland and Czechoslovakia. At the end of the Second World War, 
the large numbers of refugees, displaced persons, expellees, and prisoners 
of war caused a huge demographic shi. e ight of the German popu-
lation from the former German territories in the East initiated the largest 
3 J.  J. Schwartz, DP Report, August 19, 1945, p. 1, Institute for Contemporary 
History, Munich, Fi 01.76. For the history of the Jewish DPs in Germany see König-
seder & Wetzel. Waiting for Hope.
4 Dinnerstein. America and the Survivors of the Holocaust, p. 9.
5 Pinson, Koppel S. “Jewish Life in Liberated Germany: A Study of the Jewish DPs.” 
Jewish Social Studies 9, no. 2, April 1947, pp. 101–102.
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mass migration at the end of the war. Before the beginning of 1945, four to 
ve million German civilians ed to the West from the Warthegau, East 
Prussia, Danzig, Pomerania, Silesia and East Brandenburg. In the space 
of only a few months aer the end of the war, a total of 11.7 million of the 
16.5 million Germans who still remained in the “Oder-Neisse” territories, 
Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, Danzig, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia 
and Romania arrived in the West through ight or expulsion.6
In the fall of 2015, aer the large stream of refugees had reached 
Germany, the journalist Carsten Hoefer in the newspaper Die Welt remem-
bered the period immediately aer the Second World War and pointed out: 
“e rhetoric that greeted German expellees aer 1945 is quite similar to 
the slogans of the Pegida7 movement.”8 e co-founder of the “Bavaria 
Party,” according to Hoefer, in 1945 Josef Fischbacher demanded “e 
refugees must be expelled.” Michael Horlacher, the then president of the 
Bavarian Parliament and a co-founder of the conservative Bavarian party 
CSU, came up with the slogan “Bavaria for Bavarians.” A member of the 
“Bavaria Party” complained about the “foreigners” and incited the popu-
lation. e fact that the process of learning from the period 1933 to 1945 
or a critical examination of the Nazi-past had not even begun is clear from 
his diatribe. “Pogroms” would be needed “in order to restore justice,” he 
stated. Up to 1950, Bavaria took in 1.8 million refugees and expellees—
6 Mannes, Stefan. “Demographische Verschiebungen und Vertriebene in Deutsch-
land 1945. Flüchtlinge—Vertriebene—Displaced Persons” [Demographic Shis 
and Displaced Persons in Germany 1945. Refugees—Expellees—Displaced 
Persons]. Zukun braucht Erinnerung, 26.  10.  2004, http://www.zukun-
braucht-erinnerung.de/demographischen-verschiebungen-in-deutschland-1945/, 
accessed March 15, 2017.
7 Pegida—acronym for “Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Aben-
dlandes” [Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident/West]. 
is is a German nationalist, far right, anti-Islam/anti-Muslim political move-
ment, founded in Dresden 2014. When since summer 2015 thousands of refugees 
from Syria and elsewhere came to Germany the Pegida movement, which in the 
meantime had lost attractiveness, became in vogue again for those people who are 
against the newcomers.
8 “Die Flüchtlinge müssen hinausgeworfen werden” [Refugees must be thrown out]. 
Die Welt, October 12, 2015, https://www.welt.de/geschichte/zweiter-weltkrieg/
article147487793/Die-Fluechtlinge-muessen-hinausgeworfen-werden.html, 
accessed March 15, 2017.
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many more than would arrive there in 2014/2015.9 Nevertheless the debates 
and argumentation in public and in some parts of society concerning the 
refugees coming from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, supported by a certain 
media coverage today, are not to be equated with but may be compared 
with the late 1940s in Germany.
A 2005 exhibition about “Flight, expulsion, integration” in the “House 
of the History of the Federal Republic of Germany” in Bonn showed the 
dierent aspects of the ight from former German territories and the prob-
lems such expellees had to face when they came to the Federal Republic in 
the 1940s and 1950s. From a radio broadcast the visitors of the exhibition 
could hear a voice saying: “lousy refugee scum─if we could only hold them 
o our necks.”10 In its review of this exhibition, the weekly liberal news-
paper “Die Zeit” referred to the expellees as agents of modernization of the 
Federal Republic. Aer all, large numbers of people with dierent faiths 
from the local population had settled in confessional homogenous regions 
of Germany.11
Repatriation
A Soviet-American repatriation agreement from February 11, 1945, had 
stipulated that all DPs located in the future occupied territories should be 
sent back to their homelands; a similar agreement was reached with France. 
Initially, the Western Allies tolerated the forced repatriation of Soviet DPs, 
with all the consequences for the aected parties, but they soon recog-
nized the controversial nature of the agreements and backed away from 
them. e Soviets, for their part, insisted on the agreement’s enforcement. 
Finally, a UN resolution of February 1946 established that the agreements 
should only be voluntary. By the end of June 1945, the non-Jewish DPs from 
the Western states had already been repatriated. However, diculties arose 
9 Ibid. 
10 Press clippings of the exhibition (Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung, December 13, 
2005): http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/sites/default/les/documents/presse_
ausstellung_bonn_0.pdf, accessed May 22, 2017.
11 Lau, Jörg. “Ein deutscher Abschied.” Die Zeit, December 8, 2005, http://www.zeit.
de/2005/50/Heimat_II/komplettansicht, accessed May 22, 2017.
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with the repatriation of former slave laborers and concentration-camp 
prisoners from the Eastern-bloc countries.
e rst directive addressing the treatment of displaced persons, the 
so-called “Outline Plan,” was issued by the Supreme Headquarters of the 
Allied Expeditionary Forces (known as SHAEF) shortly before the landing 
of Allied troops in Normandy in early June 1944.12 Because Allied intel-
ligence services had predicted that there would be millions of DPs, it was 
necessary at rst to ensure that the expected refugee ows would not inter-
fere with military operations. e DPs should be concentrated tempo-
rarily in “assembly centers” and quickly returned to their home countries. 
SHAEF’s Administrative Memorandum No. 39 of November 18, 1944, and 
its revised version of April 16, 1945, which dened the liberating, assisting 
and repatriating of DPs as an important Allied goal, determined the direc-
tion the issue was to take. France, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Denmark agreed to cooperate with 
SHAEF in repatriating the DPs, while Greece and Czechoslovakia also 
signaled their willingness to do so.13 Yet in view of the enormous dimen-
sion of the DP problem, SHAEF faced a huge logistical challenge, especially 
since the exact number of DPs could neither be foreseen nor statistically 
established aerwards. In the postwar chaos, the uctuation of refugees of 
many dierent origins hampered any precise numerical count. In addition, 
many previous concentration camp prisoners and slave laborers—partic-
ularly Western Europeans—had set o on their own for their home coun-
tries aer their liberation, without being registered at a collection center 
or transit camp. erefore, only estimates of the total number of DPs are 
possible. ese estimates amount to approximately 10.8 million people.14
Aer the autumn of 1945, the number of liberated people who refused 
to be repatriated to their home country grew. Many Ukrainian DPs as well 
as Baltic DPs (Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians) rejected repatriation. 
Since the British and Americans did not ocially recognize the annexa-
tion of the three Baltic States by the Soviet Union, a forced repatriation was 
12 See more in depth: Jacobmeyer, Wolfgang. Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum heimatlosen 
Ausländer. Die Displaced Persons in Westdeutschland 1945–1951 [From Forced 
Laborer to a Homeless Foreigner. e Displaced Persons in West Germany 1945–
1951]. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985, p. 23.
13 Ibid., p. 32.
14 Ibid., p. 41.
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precluded. Only the French regime classied the Baltic DPs as Soviet citi-
zens. e decision of the British and Americans was even more contro-
versial because of the suspicion that there were numerous collaborators 
among the Baltic DPs, including war criminals and members of non-
German Waen-SS groups.
At the end of 1946, despite all the repatriation eorts of the military 
administrations and aid organizations, 914,997 DPs were still living in 
Germany’s three Western occupation zones. Of these, Western European 
DPs made up a comparatively small percentage; of the 507,012 DPs from 
Eastern Europe, 293,086 were from Poland and 186,692 from the Baltic 
countries. ere was also a large group of 167,722 Jewish DPs who had 
arrived aer the mass exodus from Poland.15
One survivor described the experience: “e Jews suddenly faced 
themselves. Where now? Where to? For them things were not so simple. 
To go back to Poland? To Hungary? To streets empty of Jews, towns empty 
of Jews, a world without Jews. To wander in those lands, lonely, homeless, 
always with the tragedy before one’s eyes […] and to meet, again, a former 
Gentile neighbor who would open his eyes wide and smile, remarking with 
double meaning, ‘What! Yankel! You’re still alive!’”16
The changing history of the camps
People who lived in huts—the “Homo Barackensis”—became the symbol 
of the immediate postwar period. First of all accommodations had to 
be found for those DPs who could not be repatriated and remained in 
Germany, Austria, and Italy. A DP status conferred care, extra provisions, 
clothing and accommodations in specially created camps—the DP camps 
or “assembly centers.” ey varied in size from sites with y people to 
camps housing over 7,000 persons and were set up in tent or Nissen hut 
cities, hotels, apartment buildings, garages, stables, monasteries, hospitals, 
sanatoriums, schools, housing estates for industrial workers and former 
barracks as well as prisoner-of-war and slave-labor camps, but also occa-
sionally on the sites of former concentration camps. For example, aer 
15 Numbers from statistical data, see ibid., p. 122.
16 Schwarz, Leo W. (ed.). “Homecoming in Israel.” e Root and the Bough: e Epic of 
an Enduring People. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1949, p. 310.
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the liberation of Buchenwald and until its takeover by the Soviet Army in 
July 1945, it served as a DP camp. Here emerged the rst Zionist training 
farm in postwar Germany: “Kibbutz Buchenwald.” From April 1946 to the 
end of 1947, the former Flossenbürg concentration camp, located in the 
Upper Palatinate district near Weiden, which aer the liberation had been 
converted into a camp for prisoners of war, was used to house Polish DPs. 
On the site of the former Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, the DP camp 
Belsen-Hohne arose, in which 27,000 DPs were temporarily housed.17
At Salzgitter, 25,000 former inmates of concentration camps, forced 
laborers and prisoners of war who had worked for the “Reichswerke 
‘Hermann-Göring’” (a state-owned company of steel plant) were liberated. 
ey immediately got DP status and stayed in the former camp barracks, 
which had become so called assembly centers organized by the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Aer most 
of the DPs had le for their homelands the barracks were rededicated and 
were now used as camps for refugees from East Prussia and from the terri-
tories east of the Oder-Neiße border. 
Another example for the reallocation of the camps, which at the same 
time symbolizes the change of inhabitants of dierent origins and desti-
nies—prisoners of war, forced laborers, DPs, expellees—is Ziegenhain/
Trutzhain. In 1939 the Nazis opened the prisoner of war camp “Stalag IX 
A” at Ziegenhain, around 45 km south of Kassel. It was the biggest one on 
the territory of Hesse with temporarily over 10,000 inmates. ough many 
nationalities were represented there, from Poland to the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Great Britain, Yugoslavia (Croats / Serbs), the Soviet Union, and 
Italy, the majority of inmates were French, including François Mitterand, 
later French president.18 Aer liberation by the US-Army the barracks 
were repurposed for one year to a civil-internment-camp (CIC 95) for high-
ranking Nazis and members of the SS as well as soldiers of the Wehrmacht 
17 Wetzel, Juliane. “Die Barackenstadt. Arbeit und Leben im Lageralltag” [A City of 
Barracks. Work and Daily Living in a Camp]. In: Benz, Wolfgang (ed.). Salzgitter. 
Geschichte und Gegenwart einer deutschen Stadt 1942–1992 [Salzgitter. History 
and contemporary life in a German city 1942–1992]. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1992, 
pp. 282–311.
18 Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Hessen [Oce for Political Education 
Hesse], http://www.hlz.hessen.de/themen/ref-iii-erinnern/gedenk-uebersicht/ged 
enk-trutzhain0.html, accessed May 17, 2017.
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and the Waen-SS. From August 1946 until November 1947 Ziegenhain 
was repurposed again, becoming a DP camp (95-443) for Jewish survi-
vors who had escaped antisemitism in postwar Poland. Aer 1948 German 
expellees from the East were housed in the barracks. ey decided in 
1951 to found a new village on the territory—barracks included—named 
“Trutzhain.” anks to a good settlement policy, the “refugee settlement” 
quickly developed into a thriving cras, commercial and industrial loca-
tion. Some of the former barrack buildings still exist today. e structure 
of the former camp is still well recognizable and was declared a protected 
monument in 1985.19
In the Western occupation zones, responsibility for the DPs rst was 
assumed by the armies of the respective zones. Beginning in the fall of 
1945 or the spring of 1946, under the auspices of the military administra-
tions, responsibility shied to the aid organizations of the United Nations, 
the UNRRA or, starting in July 1947, the International Refugee Organi-
zation (IRO). At the end of 1945, the UNRRA was responsible for 227 DP 
camps in the territory of the future Federal Republic and 25 in Austria; 
by June 1947, the number of DP camps under their purview had risen to 
762: eight in Italy, 21 in Austria, 416 in the American zone of Germany 
and 272 in the British zone. On July 1, 1947, there were still 611,469 DPs in 
Germany: 336,700 in the American zone, 230,660 in the British and 44,109 
in the French zone. Of these, 168,440 were Jewish survivors. e rest were 
mostly Christians from Poland and the Baltic states (196,780 and 157,859 
respectively).20
At rst, the DPs were organized in the camps according to their 
national origin. is meant, for example, that Jewish survivors had to 
accept being quartered with their Polish, Latvian and Ukrainian coun-
trymen, who had not infrequently aided and abetted the National Socialists 
19 Memorial site Ziegenhain/Trutzhain, http://www.gedenkstaette-trutzhain.de/gesch 
ichte/, accessed May 17, 2017; Brandes, Karin & Hans Gerstmann. Gedenkstätte 
und Museum Trutzhain. Vom Stalag IX A Ziegenhain zur Gemeinde Trutzhain 
[Memorial Site and Museum Trutzhain From Stalag IX A Ziegenhain to the 
Local Community Trutzhain]. Begleithe zur Ausstellung 18. Mai bis 4. Juni 
2000 [Booklet for the exhibition May 18 to June 4, 2000]. Schwalmstadt: Self-
publishing, 2003.
20 Wetzel, Juliane. “‘Displaced Persons’. Ein vergessenes Kapitel der deutschen Nach-
kriegsgeschichte.” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das 
Parlament, B 7-8/1995, February 10, 1995, pp. 34–39, here p. 36.
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in their persecution. us, the Jewish survivors’ original feeling of joy and 
relief over their liberation quickly gave way to one of resignation. Tensions 
also arose because neither the army personnel nor the hastily erected DP 
camps oered the special assistance that the Jewish survivors could have 
expected. Only gradually did their living conditions improve, especially in 
the American zone, when, beginning in the fall of 1945, a separate Jewish 
DP status was introduced and camps were set up exclusively for Jewish DPs. 
In the British zone, Jewish survivors continued to be denied such a specic 
status.
Consequences of the Pogroms in Central and Eastern Europe 
In September 1945 in the West-Slovak city of Topoľčany saw one of the rst 
pogroms in postwar Europe. is was only the starting point: e climax 
of rioting was reached in the summer of 1946. In Bratislava, the Jewish 
population, which had survived the Nazi persecution, was harassed for 
several days. In Romania too, Jewish survivors were exposed to a series of 
pogroms. From 1945 to 1948, Hungary recorded at least 250 antisemitic 
incidents. Here, too, the antisemitic attacks reached their climax in the 
summer of 1946. In Austria, the attitude was spread that the “emigrants” 
had made a beautiful life abroad, in contrast to the “home-dwellers” who 
had to experience war and hunger. ere was no call for return either in 
Austria or in Germany. is lack of an inviting gesture also continued in 
other countries.
In the summer of 1946, when a massive stream of refugees eeing 
pogroms in Poland and other central and eastern European countries 
headed for the Western Zones of occupation in Germany and Austria 
and the number of Jewish DPs tripled, aid organizations and the mili-
tary governments were faced with another seemingly intractable problem. 
Given the restrictive policy of the British in their zone, most of the refugees 
headed for the US-Zone. New DP camps were set up, and existing camps 
were expanded. 
e spring of 1947 saw a ood of refugees from Romania: the “Roma-
nian Exodus.” In all, some 30,000 Romanian Jewish arrived in Austria, 
eeing antisemitism, the catastrophic economic conditions and starvation 
in that bitter cold winter of 1946/47. Initially, the illegal aid organization 
Bricha held back, not granting the assistance that they had provided to Jews 
ON THE MOVE
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   151 12.02.2018   15:59:47
152
eeing pogroms in Poland in the summer of 1946. ough, Romanian Jews 
were le on their own at rst, later they, too, got support for their illegal 
escape to the West. Aer General Lucius D. Clay, Military Governor of the 
US occupation zone of Germany had determined that refugees who entered 
the occupation zone aer April 21, 1947, would no longer be admitted to 
the UN-supervised DP camps, the stream of refugees from Romania was 
diverted to Austria.21
By mid-August 1946, the US Army Advisor for Jewish Aairs, Philip S. 
Bernstein, headed for Italy in order to ask its government to admit 25,000 
Polish refugees from German and Austrian DP camps. e Italians turned 
down the proposal on the grounds that the country had already done its 
part to solve the DP problem, having already taken in 25,000 refugees. 
Bernstein tried to make a deal with them, reducing the number of proposed 
refugees to 10,000. Failing again, he turned to the Vatican, in the hopes that 
it would inuence the Italian government. Bernstein met with Pope Pius 
XII on September 11, 1946, in Castel Gandolfo. e Pope agreed to speak 
with the Prime Minister. Another topic Bernstein raised was the pogrom 
of Kielce, which the Pope described as “horrible”; but he refused to deliver 
a rm condemnation. In the end, the discussion had no eect; the Italian 
government did not change its position.22
No Welcome Culture
Ultimately, the Italian leaders behaved no dierently from those in many 
other European countries. Survivors were not welcome, even those who 
had been citizens of the respective countries before the Second World War. 
When survivors returned from exile or concentration camps or death 
camps, the local population felt threatened. Many had enriched themselves 
on the property of the Jews, taken over their apartments or houses, and 
had long since forgotten about or suppressed the guarantees they had given 
to former neighbors to take care of property. When the original owners 
unexpectedly returned, they wanted their property back and could not 
21 Genizi, Haim. “Philip S. Bernstein: Adviser on Jewish Aairs, May 1946-August 
1947.” Simon Wiesenthal Annual 3, Chapter 6, part 2, http://motlc.wiesenthal.
com/site/pp.asp?c=gvKVLcMVIuG&b=700853, accessed May 11, 2017.
22 Ibid.
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believe that they were greeted with hate and anger. Reports from the Neth-
erlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia collected in 
the book “e Jews are coming back” (edited by David Bankier) all show a 
more or less similar pattern of rejection of returnees.23
In Germany, where people tried to repress or even forget the crimes 
against European Jews committed by Germans and their collaborators, 
the returning of displaced Jews showed them quite plainly their liability. 
erefore, there was almost no contact between survivors and the German 
population. is was not only the case in the country responsible for the 
Holocaust; there was also little enthusiasm for the returning Jewish citi-
zens, and a systematic refusal to recognize the Jewish fate in other Western 
European countries like the Netherlands, France, or Belgium.24
In Germany and Austria, in addition to the fear of having to return 
looted property, there was a suppression of guilt over the Holocaust. One 
way of dealing with this guilt was to project it onto a “foreign group.” e 
suggestion that “the Jews” were responsible for the black market turned the 
perpetrator-victim role upside down; it is a guilt-suppressing strategy that 
functions to this day. 
e German population brought considerable prejudices to their 
encounters with DPs. Exaggerated rumors about alleged looting by DPs 
were a carryover from Nazi propaganda against “subhumans”: e National 
Socialists stigmatized Poles and Soviet citizens in addition to the Jews. 
Xenophobia and the rejection of any responsibility to help the victims of 
the Nazi regime were combined with old prejudices: e result was a belief 
that criminality was especially high among Jewish DPs, despite the fact 
that investigations by the military authorities found no basis for this belief.
Displaced Persons as “Homeless Foreigners”
On February 9, 1950, the Allied High Commission ocially informed the 
Federal Government of Germany that on June 30, 1950, it was to assume 
the administrative and nancial responsibility for the DPs still living in 
23 Bankier, David (ed.). e Jews are coming back. e Return of the Jews to eir 
Countries of Origin aer WW II. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2005.
24 Ibid.
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Germany.25 e Federal Government declared its readiness as of June 30, 
1950, and conrmed that it would clarify the legal status of the DPs—here 
described for the rst time as “homeless foreigners.”
at population still amounted to more than 100,000 people. On April 
25, 1951, the Bundestag nally passed the “Law pertaining to the Legal 
Status of Homeless Foreigners,” placing the DPs largely on equal footing 
with German citizens as regards the acquisition of property, the rejection 
and recognition of examinations, free access to the practice of liberal profes-
sions, social and unemployment insurance, public welfare and taxation. 
“Homeless foreigners” could only be expelled for reasons of public secu-
rity and order, but not to a country where they would be subjected to polit-
ical persecution. e German authorities should have taken into account 
the special fate of former victims of persecution in applications for natural-
ization. However, the former victims of persecution were not equated with 
German refugees and displaced persons, who beneted from emergency 
aid and burden sharing. Unlike German citizens, “homeless foreigners” 
needed a visa for foreign travel because they did not have German pass-
ports. e legal status of the “homeless foreigner” was passed on to any 
children born in Germany, but this status expired upon the acceptance of 
German citizenship or a change of nationality. Naturalization was possible 
on request. But to this day, some Jews living in Germany who were born 
in DP camps do not wish to accept German nationality due to the experi-
ences of their parents. ey remain stateless, and require a visa each time 
they cross a border.
Some of those who were aected lived for decades in the camps—even-
tually under German administration—until they moved out, mostly into 
subsidized housing. e DP camp in Hanover-Buchholz was not closed 
until 1967. In the 1950s, its large barracks housed some 1,200 DPs, most 
of them Polish but also Czechoslovakian, Latvian, Ukrainian and some 
Russian; in 1956, these DPs were joined by refugees from Hungary. In 
the 1960s the population dropped to 500–800. Contact with the outside 
German world was limited to economic matters; children had greater 
interaction with their German peers, since they attended school together. 
e religious and cultural heart of the camp was the very popular Catholic 
church. e Ukrainians later established their own church. In 1965, subsi-
dized housing was built in the area and the former DPs gradually moved in. 
25 See Jacobmeyer. Vom Zwangsarbeiter, pp. 220–229.
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It wasn’t until 1967—22 years aer the end of the war—that the DP camp’s 
last residents moved out.26
e last operating Jewish DP camp—Föhrenwald near the city 
of Wolfratshausen, south of Munich—closed in February 1957.27 Its 
remaining 789 Jewish DPs were then housed in apartments in various 
German cities. For the majority of the Jewish DPs only this marked the end 
of their fate during the Holocaust.
26 “Displaced Persons—Ein Problem der Nachkriegszeit” [Displaced Persons—a 
Problem of the Postwar Period], http://www.geschichtsatlas.de/~ga2/, accessed 
May 21, 2017.
27 See more on Föhrenwald Königseder & Wetzel. Waiting for Hope, pp. 95–166.
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Carl Bon Tempo
The United States and Refugees after 1945
Refugees are a constant presence in global aairs in the early twenty-rst 
century, just as they were through most of the twentieth century. As this 
volume, and the conference that begat it, demonstrates, scholars from 
multiple disciplines have brought a variety of perspectives to the study 
of refugees. Historians have been a vital part of this eort.1 In general, 
historians tell stories about the past. ey have to explain why they tell 
particular stories in particular fashions. And very ambitious historians 
try to explain why their stories about the past should matter to the contem-
porary world. Broadly speaking, these goals lie at the heart of this essay, 
which addresses the United States’ engagement with refugees in the post-
1945 era, when the basics of American refugee policy and laws came into 
focus and matured.
So, what is the big story about the United States and refugees in the 
decades aer 1945? It is the growth of an American commitment to help 
refugees, and to bring them to the United States in ever-larger numbers. 
e numbers tell the story. In the 1930s, the United States too oen shut its 
doors to both immigrants and refugees. With the 1920s national origins 
quota laws fully in eect, the US admitted about 350,000 Europeans during 
the 1930s. Refugee admissions in that decade are harder to track because 
“refugee” was not yet a category in immigration law, and those eeing perse-
cution arrived via regular immigration procedures. e historian David 
Wyman estimated that between 1933 and 1945 at most 250,000 European 
refugees escaping the Nazis made it to the US, a small percentage of those 
hoping to leave. Equally important, eorts to win special legislation or poli-
cies to admit refugees failed through most of the decade, as did proposals to 
modify immigration law to make it more welcoming to refugees.2 
1 Gatrell, Peter. e Making of the Modern Refugee. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013; Bon Tempo, Carl. Americans at the Gate: e United States and Refu-
gees during the Cold War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
2 On the 1920s national origins laws Ngai, Mae M. Impossible Subjects: Illegal 
Aliens and the Making of Modern America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   157 12.02.2018   15:59:47
158
By the early post-1945 period, however, the United States began to 
open its doors to refugees. Between 1948 and 1957, the Displaced Persons 
Program, the Refugee Relief Program, and the Hungarian Refugee Program 
brought about 650,000 refugees to the United States. (Other programs and 
policies in those same years brought much smaller numbers.)3 ese 
ad hoc programs—developed in response to refugee ows caused by the 
Second World War and the Cold War—mainly admitted European victims 
of communism. But they also represented a rmer commitment to the 
admission of refugees than seen earlier in the twentieth century. is 
Cold War, anti-communist emphasis continued in the 1960s as the Cuban 
refugee ow began, and the United States admitted nearly all of the mostly 
white escapees from Castro’s communist experiment on the island. 
In the late 1970s, that commitment changed again—becoming more 
substantial and less overtly ideological. With passage of the Refugee Act 
of 1980, the United States began permanent annual admissions of about 
50,000 refugees each year. Moreover that law, as well as the Indochinese 
Refugee Program, dropped—at least in name—the Eurocentric and anti-
communist focus from refugee programs.4 is annual commitment to 
Press, 2004. On 1930s European immigrant admissions, see: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1950. 
Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Oce 1950, https://www2.census.
gov/library/publications/1950/compendia/statab/71ed/1950-03.pdf, accessed 
May 13, 2017. On the 1930s and refugees, see Wyman, David. Paper Walls: America 
and the Refugee Crisis, 1938–1941. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1968, pp. 217–219; Lichtman, Alan & Richard Breitman. FDR and the Jews. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2013; Porter, Stephen. Ben Benevolent Empire? 
U.  S. Power, Humanitarianism, and the World’s Dispossessed. Philadelphia PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016. Porter (p. 59) largely arms Wyman’s 
numerical tally of the number of refugees admitted to the U. S. from Nazism.
3 e best histories of the Displaced Persons Program are in Dinnerstein, Leonard. 
America and the Survivors of the Holocaust. New York City: Columbia University 
Press, 1982 and Cohen, G. Daniel. In War’s Wake: Europe’s Displaced Persons in the 
Post-War Era. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011. On the Refugee Relief 
Program and the Hungarian Refugee Program, see Bon Tempo. Americans at the 
Gate, chapters 2 and 3. 
4 On the United States and refugees in the 1970s and 1980s, see Bon Tempo. Ameri-
cans at the Gate. On refugees in the post-1990 period, see García, María Cristina. 
e Refugee Challenge in Post-Cold War America. New York, NY: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2017.
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refugee admissions is still in place today and the arguments surrounding 
it—until about 2015, with the rise of Donald Trump and a strongly nativist 
faction in the Republican Party—were not about annual admissions, but 
rather about which refugees should receive those coveted visas allowing 
them to enter the United States.
It should be noted that during these decades the United States made 
substantial nancial commitments to international governance organiza-
tions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) charged with caring 
for refugees and the displaced. ese nancial outlays thus grew in tandem 
with refugee admissions. For example, during the Second World War and 
in its aermath, the United States funded about three quarters of the budget 
of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 
the most important refugee NGO of the mid-1940s. e US then funded 
about half of the budget of UNRRA’s successor, the International Refugee 
Organization.5 rough the rest of the century, the US continued contrib-
uting monies to refugee relief eorts, a nancial commitment that remains 
in place today. In attempting to ameliorate the refugee crisis produced by 
the Syrian civil war, for example, the United States has spent about $5.5 
billion from 2011 through 2016.6 
is story of an expanding commitment to refugees is not meant to be 
triumphal. Indeed, even as admissions expanded, it is fair to ask whether 
the United States did enough to help refugees in this period. e country, 
as the globe’s pre-eminent superpower, had resources and riches beyond 
compare. It also loudly trumpeted its political ideals and cast itself as a 
world leader. For these reasons, one could argue (and quite fairly) that 
the United States should have been far more generous with admissions. 
e other problem with triumphalism is that it makes this history appear 
pre-ordained and a likely outcome of the United States’ role as a global 
5 ese gures come from Bon Tempo, Carl. “e United States and the Forty 
Years Crisis.” In: Frank, Matthew & Jessica Rheinisch (eds.). Refugees in Twen-
tieth Century Europe: e Forty Years’ Crisis. New York: Bloomsbury Press, forth-
coming 2018.
6 For this gure, see “U. S. Surpasses Refugee Goal Set by Obama.” e Washington 
Post, September 27, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-surpasses-syrian-refugee-goal-set-by-obama-expects-more-next-
year/2016/09/27/59cedeb8-84e7-11e6-ac72-a29979381495_story.html?utm_
term=.776af07b4265, accessed August 22, 2017.
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superpower in the Cold War. But it was far from pre-ordained and, given 
the political, policy, and social constraints inherent in American society, 
somewhat remarkable that the United States embraced refugee admissions 
at all. 
Why, then, did this commitment to refugees emerge, and why did it 
emerge in the ways it did? ree factors working in concert with each other 
birthed and grew a series of refugee programs in the post-1945 era. US 
foreign policy objectives relating to the Cold War were the most important 
factor in creating and craing refugee admissions programs. American 
leaders viewed the entry of refugees as a diplomatic maneuver that would 
reassure allies, as a public relations victory that would advertise Amer-
ican ideals and compassion to the globe, and oen as a necessary action 
to produce regional economic, political, and social stability (or, in some 
cases, foment instability.) Nothing better illustrates these dynamics than 
the decision, beginning in 1959 and continuing until 1973, to admit about 
700,000 refugees from Cuba and place them on the path to citizenship. 
Leaders from both parties supported this program, viewing it as a way to 
destabilize Cuba, demonstrate American support for anti-Castro Cubans, 
and illustrate both the evils of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the essen-
tial empathy and attractiveness of American political ideals. All of this, 
of course, makes sense only when considered in the larger picture of the 
global Cold War.7 Most important, the Cuban case was not an anomaly. 
Refugee admissions in the 1950s—of Germans, Italians, Hungarians—and 
in the 1970s—of Chileans, Soviet Jews, and the Indochinese—reected 
foreign policy considerations related to the Cold War. In the former case, 
the American goal was to support containment policy, while in the latter 
case, the aim was to show American delity to human rights.
Secondly, America’s greater openness to refugees occurred against 
the backdrop of massive changes in American political culture, mainly 
a rethinking of the nation’s identity. e change began in the era of the 
Second World War, when scientic racism and the eugenic thinking so 
prevalent in pre-war America (and so vital to the politics of newcomers) 
came to be linked with Nazism. At the same time, Americans came out of 
the war, as the historian Liz Borgwardt notes, with a stronger commitment 
7 On the Cuban refugee admissions, see Bon Tempo. Americans at the Gate, chapter 
5. e 700,000 gure comes from Daniels, Roger. Coming to America: A History of 
Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life. New York: Perennial, 20022.
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to pluralism and a more cosmopolitan outlook.8 e limits of this cosmo-
politan pluralism were quite clear in the mid-1940s, but those barriers 
continued to drop as the postwar era stretched on. Quite simply, a capa-
cious denition of citizenship based in politics and the language of rights—
fueled largely by the rights revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s, but also by 
the Cold War—slowly replaced a narrower ethno-national and racialized 
citizenship in postwar America.9 
is broadening of how Americans thought about who could and 
should be a citizen set the stage for a more open door for refugees. It was 
clear in the ways that Americans thought and spoke about refugees. In 
the 1930s, fears ran high that refugee admissions would ood the country 
with Jews and/or those with inferior ethno-national backgrounds. By the 
1950s, many Americans saw refugees as embracing political ideas so inte-
gral to American citizenship. One advocate happily highlighted “the sort 
of people we would be taking in”: individuals and families who had escaped 
from communism over the Iron Curtain and thus understood—and prac-
ticed—the nation’s most important political ideals.10 By the 1970s, refugees 
deserved help because they were rights-holding individuals who deserved 
protection from persecution.11
Finally, in the realm of American politics, it is important to recall that 
refugee admissions garnered bi-partisan support. roughout the twentieth 
century, refugee and immigration policy was built upon coalition politics 
that brought together elements in both parties, even when they had dierent 
agendas at stake. is bipartisanship was true of those advocating a more 
open door for refugees. In refugee aairs, a great example emerged in the 
late 1970s when President Gerald Ford, a Republican, supported Indochinese 
refugee entry out of a sense of responsibility to anti-communist Vietnamese 
who had allied with the Americans, while Democratic senator Ted Kennedy 
highlighted Vietnamese refugee admissions as a human rights issue.12 e 
8 Borgwardt, Elizabeth. A New Deal for the World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005.
9 On this story of American identity, see Gerstle, Gary. American Crucible: Race and 
Nation in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
10 Bon Tempo. Americans at the Gate, p. 43.
11 Ibid., chapter 6.
12 On the bipartisan nature of immigration and refugee politics, see Tichenor, 
Daniel. Dividing Lines: e Politics of Immigration Control in America. Princeton, 
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larger point is that aer the Second World War, refugee programs almost 
always benetted from support from both parties. us, the situation in the 
last few years—with the vast majority of Republicans marching in lockstep 
against refugee admissions and practicing anti-immigrant politics—is actu-
ally an historical anomaly.
If these elements made admissions possible, three other factors made 
the entry of refugees more challenging. First, a signicant anti-newcomer 
bloc existed in American politics throughout the twentieth century. Public 
polling reveals that since 1965 at least one-third of the public has wanted 
immigration to the United States decreased, and the size of that anti-
immigration bloc was oen larger. Moreover, a slightly higher percentage 
of Americans believed that immigration should be held at current levels, 
a challenge to refugee advocates who wanted to increase refugee admis-
sions.13 is anti-newcomer bloc surely existed in refugee aairs. Just one 
example: In 1951, a poll revealed that nearly 70 percent of Americans did 
not want to send refugees from the Soviet Union and eastern Europe back 
across the Iron Curtain to their communist homelands, but 40 percent 
of Americans did not want to see those refugees come to the US (roughly 
the same percentage—43 percent—who supported admission).14 More-
over, if the political strength of refugee advocates was bipartisanship, 
the same observation could be made of the anti-refugee bloc: A partner-
ship of Democrats (certain minorities, working class voters, and southern 
conservatives from the 1940s through the early 1960s) and Republicans 
(ethno-nationalists concerned about the arrival of so-called un-American 
newcomers, and national security conservatives worried about the back-
grounds of refugees) worked to shut out refugees.
Secondly, the passage of a law or creation of a policy to admit refu-
gees was only part of the battle: e program still had to be administered 
to actually bring refugees to the US. Here, opponents could put up signif-
icant roadblocks to prevent refugee entry. In the early Cold War, refugees 
had to run through a series of security and background checks as well as 
deliver proof of a job and housing before admission could be granted. is 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002. On the Indochinese refugee crisis, see Bon 
Tempo. Americans at the Gate, chapter 6.
13 See Gallup’s research on historical attitudes towards immigration, http://www.
gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx, accessed January 11, 2017.
14 Bon Tempo. Americans at the Gate, pp. 40–41.
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“mystic maze of enforcement,” as one critic memorably described it in the 
1950s, only cracked under sustained pressure from supporters of these 
admissions at the highest levels of government. Since 2001, these barriers 
have made a comeback of sorts, with the United States reinstating di-
cult admissions standards that have slowed the entry of Iraqi, Afghani, and 
Syrian refugees.15
irdly, economic conditions proved an enigmatic factor in refugee 
admissions and the political debates surrounding them. In short, support 
and opposition to refugee entry did not track neatly with the health of the 
American economy. To be sure, in the 1930s, as the Depression threw tens 
of millions of Americans out of work and into poverty, the poor economy 
fostered anti-refugee (and anti-immigrant) sentiments. e same could 
be said of the less severe but still deeply dicult economic conditions in 
the United States aer 2008 that empowered anti-newcomer forces. On 
the ipside of the coin, the relatively good economic conditions of the 
late 1940s and 1950s helped ease refugee admissions. e story becomes 
more complicated, though, when one considers the 1970s and early 1980s. 
In those years, the postwar growth of the American economy ended in a 
stew of ination, unemployment, and lagging productivity. Yet, the United 
States brought hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees, as well 
as tens of thousands of Cuban and Haitian refugees, to its shores. While 
economic troubles during those years produced some vocal opposition to 
these newcomers, ultimately the United States still permitted them to enter. 
Economic conditions, then, were not determinative of refugee admissions, 
but they did shape them at important moments. 
ese challenges could be, and oen were, surmounted. But other short-
comings, based largely in the political and foreign policy roots of the orig-
inal commitment to help refugees, profoundly shaped the entire American 
eort to help refugees. Born out of the political and policymaking process, 
refugee programs were then subject to—and colored by—those same polit-
ical and policy pressures. For instance, interest groups in American politics 
oen played an outsized role in determining the shape of a policy. A strong 
interest group like the Cuban American community kept the doors open for 
their compatriots, while refugees who lacked a strong organizational pres-
ence in the United States, such as Haitians, faced a tougher road. A similar 
15 Ibid., chapter 2 (for the “mystic maze of enforcement”) and epilogue (for the post-
9/11 refugee regime.) 
THE UNITED STATES AND REFUGEES AFTER 1945
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   163 12.02.2018   15:59:48
164
dynamic arose regarding the inuence of foreign policy. If the United States’ 
foreign policy orientation greatly determined its refugee policies, this meant 
that some refugee crises received attention while others were le wanting. It 
is no coincidence that refugee ows in Africa since the 1960s have resulted 
in paltry admissions when one considers the low priority of African aairs 
in broader US foreign policy. Indeed, even those countries that received 
admissions—Somalia and Ethiopia, for example—prove the point as they 
managed in the 1980s and early 1990s to climb on to that policy agenda. e 
larger point is that if American refugee policies are determined by domestic 
political and foreign policy concerns, those concerns cast an outsized 
shadow over the larger commitment to refugees, sometimes placing unwar-
ranted emphasis on certain refugee ows and neglecting others. If refugee 
admissions were humanitarian, this humanitarianism was deeply tempered 
by the realities of domestic politics and foreign policy.
Does this history shed any light on the contemporary refugee situa-
tion? In the long run, the dynamics discussed in this essay hold regardless 
of who is in power in the United States because they are based on larger 
historical and structural forces. at said, the United States has entered 
uncharted waters with its latest presidential administration. President 
Trump and his supporters have played on white racial resentments more 
than any politician and political movement since the late 1960s. Equally 
important, they have empowered opponents of legal immigration in ways 
not seen since the 1920s.16 Scholars and journalists are still far from under-
standing the beliefs of Trump supporters, but some early research indicates 
a large degree of cultural anxiety among white Trump voters relating to 
immigration, race, and the country’s ideals. Put another way, this research 
suggests that Trump voters support retreating from the more capacious 
denitions of “American” that emerged in the post-1945 period.17 
16 On the empowering of immigration restrictionists in the Trump administration, 
see this Washington Post story on December 19, 2016, available at https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/aer-years-on-the-outside-foes-of-legal-immigra-
tion-nd-a-louder-voice-with-trumps-election/2016/12/19/952421b6-bbcf-11e6-
91ee-1adddfe36cbe_story.html?utm_term=.8eb68282678d, accessed August 22, 
2017.
17 See the work of the Democracy Fund, especially its recent report “Stranger in My 
Own Country: Populism and Nativism in America,” available at http://democra-
cyfundvoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/DFV-Stranger-Presentation-Web.
pdf, accessed August 22, 2017.
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If you add in President Trump’s unclear ideological predilections, his 
dicult political calculus (in his own party and in the general electorate), 
and his decit of policy knowledge, the ground in immigration and refugee 
politics and policymaking may shi more dramatically in the next four 
years than at any time in the last y years. Indeed, his Executive Orders 
on refugee and immigration policy—both the late January order blocked 
by the Courts and the order of early March partially permitted by the 
Supreme Court in June 2017—indicate his interest in recasting the United 
States’ policies towards newcomers, and especially refugees.
With this admittedly large caveat, a few historical lessons for contem-
porary refugee issues appear relevant. First, the American commitment to 
refugees has been—and will remain—a product of multiple factors working 
in concert. us, for refugee advocates it seems important to articulate a 
multi-pronged but easy to understand rationale for refugee admissions that 
involves foreign policy calculations, domestic political considerations, and 
links to so-called American ideals and principles. Justications for refugee 
admissions in the United States have always been both highly idealistic and 
very realistic—and likely will continue in those veins. Secondly, refugee 
admissions have been—and will remain—the product of the hard work of 
politics and policymaking that must be tended to carefully. Here, it seems 
important to recruit members of both parties, and especially those in both 
parties who are skeptical of but not opposed to refugee admissions. Finally, 
the history of refugee policies makes clear that there will be set-backs for 
refugee advocates, either in winning passage of laws, approval of policies, 
or the implementation of both. e longer historical arc bends slowly in the 
direction of refugee admissions, but it arrives via many twists and turns, 
achievements and failures. e next few years may be ones of defense and 
some failures, but the ground should be laid for what comes later.
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Robert J. Williams
Contemporary Challenges
e 1951 United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees emerged under the shadow of the Holocaust and the massive 
population displacements brought about by the Second World War. It is the 
foundation document for the UN High Commissioner on Refugees and the 
standard by which national governments and the international community 
distinguish between refugees and other migrants. Following a revision in 
1967 to remove the geographic and time-limited restrictions of the original 
1951 version, the Refugee Convention has continued to mandate protec-
tions for individuals who leave their country of origin “owing to well-
grounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”1 
At times, the imperative that led to the Refugee Convention seems to 
have become lost, subsumed under a swell of global and local problems that 
include, but are certainly not limited to, climate change, socio-economic 
strife, broad-scale violence, war, and human rights atrocities. e traumas 
experienced by refugees only come to the fore for many when media focus 
on moments of particular sorrow, such as the death of three-year-old Alan 
Kurdi in September 2015, or when the swell of refugees presses up against 
nations and policies unable or unwilling to care for them, such as has 
happened all too frequently since refugees eeing conicts in Syria or the 
threat of ISIL began appearing along European borders. 
It is dicult to deny that many governmental responses to refugees fall 
short of the Refugee Convention and Article 14 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, i. e., the armation that “everyone has the right to 
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”2 Responses 
1 United Nations, General Assembly. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees,” New York, January 31, 1967. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 
606, no. 8791, p. 267 and United Nations, General Assembly. Dra Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, December 14, 1950, A/RES/429(V).
2 United Nations, General Assembly. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Paris, December 10, 1948, 217 A, as at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=A/RES/217(III), accessed October 23, 2017.
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generally fall into a few categories: those state and international bodies 
that welcome refugees in keeping with commitments, those states that 
begrudgingly welcome refugees while simultaneously seeking to dissuade 
them from entering, and those states that eschew any responsibility for 
refugees within their borders. ere is also the fact that the majority of 
received refugees remain in countries that are closer to regions of out-
migration in the global south.3 Regardless, a politics of fear has reemerged 
in the Atlantic World, broadly dened, whereby populist and nationalist 
rhetoric has led to electoral gains for parties that seek to weaken interna-
tional commitments, retreat inward by focusing on domestic concerns, 
and seek solutions to secure what is a coherent national identity, variously 
dened. ese reactions hint at something familiar in the recent words of 
Suketu Mehta: perhaps our societies are “being destroyed, not by migrants 
but by the fear of migrants.”4 
is challenge is all the more acute when one realizes that the number 
of migrants across the world has tripled since 1967. Today, there are approx-
imately 244 million migrants, of whom 65.3 million classify as forcibly 
displaced.5 Seen another way, the world’s refugees and forcibly displaced 
are roughly equal in number to the population of Great Britain. e causes 
for the considerable growth of contemporary refugee populations include 
political strife, societal collapse, mass violence, genocide, and ecological 
devastation. Yet there are also many migrants who do not qualify as refu-
gees under the terms of the Refugee Convention. Many endure similarly 
high levels of risk to their wellbeing and their lives, but without the same 
3 See UNHCR. Mid-Year Trends 2016, February 17, 2017, as at http://www.unhcr.org/
statistics/unhcrstats/58aa8f247/mid-year-trends-june-2016.html, accessed Octo- 
ber 23, 2017.
4 Mehta, Suketu. “is Land is their Land.” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2017, http: 
//www.foreignpolicy.com/201709/12/this-land-is-their-land-america-europe-fear 
-of-migrants-trump, accessed October 5, 2017. Please note that Mehta’s original 
quote is somewhat limited for it references only the destruction of the West by this 
fear.
5 Connor, Phillip. “International Migration: Key Findings from the U.S., Europe, 
and the World.” Pew Research Center, December 15, 2016, as at http://pewrsr.
ch/2gPAs8t, accessed October 20, 2017 and UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced 
Displacement in 2015. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
2016, p. 6.
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protections or recognition under international law.6 To these categories one 
should add the increasing number of persons forced to migrate due to the 
results of climate change.7 Should we then conate overlapping refugee and 
migration crises? Where do we focus our eorts? Aer all, millions are 
in states of transition across the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. 
ere are also millions moving across the Americas, or eeing atrocities 
and collapsed states in West and East Africa, and in Asia, where there are 
similarly large transitions occurring, most notably among the hundreds of 
thousands of Rohingya who have ed their homes in Myanmar’s Rakhine 
state. 
e papers presented in this section raise issues that are critical to 
understanding and addressing today’s overlapping crises of refugee ight 
and mass migration. Each does so in a manner that touches upon distinct 
aspects of the crisis as it aects Europe, and each points to particular chal-
lenges and methods of response. 
Stefan Lehne focuses on the European Union. He notes that current 
structures have not suciently addressed the challenges of massive waves 
of migrants seeking to enter Europe in a very short period. As he argues, 
there are six primary causes for the crisis in Europe. ey are not just the 
well-known and commented upon political cultural dierences between 
EU member states; rather, they include dynamics unique to the EU and 
a number of structural shortcomings. e ability of EU member states 
to exercise exible policies became increasingly restricted, since many of 
them have fallen back on all manner of measures to restrict the inow of 
migrants while rising populist-nationalist movements place additional 
pressure on domestic policies. As Lehne suggests, inward-looking perspec-
tives have largely exacerbated the challenges facing Europe as it comes to 
terms with its growing responsibilities as a site for immigration. Perhaps 
the solution rests on nation-building, on forging alliances with non-Euro-
pean states, and on devising policies that focus on the wider phenomenon 
6 See Oberman, Kieran. “Refugees & Economic Migrants: A Morally Spurious Distinc-
tion.” e Critique, January 6, 2016, as at http://www.thecritique.com/articles/refu-
gees-economic-migrants-a-morally-spurious-distinction-2/, accessed August 15, 
2017.
7 Warren, Philip Dane. “Forced Migration aer Paris COP21: Evaluating the 
‘Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility’.” Columbia Law Review 
116, no. 8, December 2016, pp. 2103–2144.
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of immigration and refugee care in Europe, and not just on the extraordi-
nary cases of the past several years. 
Kristina Touzenis reminds us that the international response is 
dictated by agreements forged within a global political culture created by 
the multilateral fora that have developed since 1945. She notes that today’s 
refugees and migrants are (or at least should be) protected by a number of 
rights, that states have legal obligations towards these persons, and para-
doxically state decisions to revert to national law during times of refugee 
and migration crises contribute to the decline of these cooperative agree-
ments. More important, perhaps, such actions diminish civil society’s 
recognition of the moral imperative to act and, in her words, to remember 
that we are all equally deserving of protection from oppression and risk to 
life. is leads to a sobering argument that it is our collective duty to speak 
against immoral practices by the state or multistate actors. If we do not, we 
become complicit in the erosion of the human rights systems that emerged 
out of the shadows of the Holocaust. e challenge, of course, is to convey 
this to the electorate, and her proposition that one should personalize the 
experiences of refugees and migrants seems to be a sound approach toward 
reaching this goal. 
Monsignor Dal Toso outlines four points: the humanitarian impera-
tive to act out of compassion for the needs of the migrants; assuring the 
delicate balance between integration of migrant communities and building 
respect for their traditions; addressing the causes that compel people to 
leave for new environs; and harnessing the will of powerful nations to aid 
those less fortunate. He implores the reader to remember that migration 
is a human act, part of the social-cultural reality of human existence. Any 
society that does not recognize this acts in a manner contrary to the inter-
national good, as well as in an ahistorical and amoral way. 
Finally, Mukesh Kapila provides us with a glimpse into the intricate 
and sometimes multigenerational experiences of some refugees. His words 
give a sense of the overlapping refugee and migrant experiences, which can 
inform the development of cross-cultural exchange between migrant and 
refugee groups while also setting into place hierarchies of non-nationals in 
foreign lands. Kapila notes that when refugee groups are placed into situ-
ations of shared asylum, even if the groups are culturally dissimilar, they 
share experiences that form new bonds. At the same time, however, these 
experiences point to the Janus-faced nature of refugee protection—the 
disincentives that some try to build into care and maintenance programs, 
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as well as the development of bureaucracies that do not recognize certain 
refugees, owing to limited standards built on models that are several 
decades old.
ese papers cause us to reect on shortcomings of and solutions to 
our collective and national responses to migration and refugee crises. If 
we are more aware of some of these causes, it nevertheless follows that we 
have done little to compel our co-nationals and the international commu-
nity to do more than just witness passively as our societies backslide into 
the trap of believing that our national cultures and ethno-particular-
isms are immutable. More work is necessary to make intelligible to the 
broader public the fallacies of a strident national identity. It is important 
to remember that our political, cultural, and social realities are creations; 
or, to echo Benedict Anderson, that we live in “imagined communities” 
that are the result of shared similarities, such as language or culture, and a 
belief in some degree of kinship.8 Here, in the Atlantic World, we live in 
relatively new states, borne of a mixture of the Reformation, the Enlighten-
ment, the American and French Revolutions, 1848, 1917, World War II, the 
Cold War. is diversity is mirrored (and sometimes more profound) else-
where. And whether they were the Latins, Falisci, and innumerable others 
who became Romans, or the indigenous peoples, Europeans, Africans, and 
Asians who became Americans, it is important to remember that we are 
all the products of and have benetted from ethno-cultural heterogeneity. 
Some of this is known, of course, and it is clear that there is at least 
notional agreement that we have learned something from previous migra-
tion and refugee crises. Why, then, do our national governments and 
our international institutions oen handle refugee response so irregu-
larly? Part of the problem rests with a less than nuanced understanding 
of borders. Now, there are always good reasons to control one’s borders. 
Doing so limits pressure on the state and provides some measure of secu-
rity. Yet if people are eeing desperate conditions, those who are able to 
help must do so. At times, inuential segments of our societies nd reasons 
to eschew this responsibility. To take one historical example, there were 
some in the early twentieth-century United States who believed that certain 
national, ethnic, and religious groups, including Roman Catholics and 
Jews, could not assimilate properly into American life. is became one of 
8 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983, 1991, 2006.
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the arguments behind the 1924 Immigration Act, which remained largely 
in eect until 1965. It limited the numbers of immigrants from countries 
in Eastern and Southern Europe, restricted the immigration of Africans, 
and eectively barred immigration from Asian countries. e numbers 
of those who sought to ee oppressive regimes in these regions between 
the 1930s and mid-1960s will remain largely unknown, but we can assume 
safely that many people might have been saved were policies more open. 
So what do we do? We could start by looking inward. e philosopher 
Michael Blake, for example, recently posed a series of questions that urge 
us to recognize the imperative to accept refugees and to demand moral 
leadership in the face of such crises.9 More than that, however, we must 
educate ourselves. We must glean lessons from major traumas of the recent 
century, notably the Holocaust and immediate post-Holocaust era. is 
is not to suggest that we restrict education to youth. Aer all, education 
on the Holocaust has become almost standard across the West. Where it 
is lacking is among professionals. Civil servants, diplomats, and human 
rights leaders, in particular, must be more aware of lessons that one can 
glean from the Holocaust that may be relevant to their own work, if only 
to allow for opportunities to reect on how better to respond to migration 
and refugee emergencies. 
Finally, we must recognize that governments alone cannot respond 
adequately, and so it is our responsibility to build and encourage more 
grassroots approaches by civil society. To take one example from the period 
immediately before the start of the Second World War, a couple from Phil-
adelphia, Gilbert and Eleanor Kraus, undertook an individual mission in 
1939 with the support of the local Jewish community, to rescue Jewish chil-
dren in Austria from a life that was becoming more onerous under Nazi 
rule. ey faced enormous challenges, not the least of which were restric-
tions on the number of visas available for persons to enter the US. Yet, with 
ingenuity (through the identication of previously claimed but unused 
visas) and the ability to form coalitions with diplomats in the US govern-
ment, they rescued 50 children from Vienna in the spring of that year. 
Brought to the States, these children went on to have successful lives. Some 
of their parents were able to reunite with the children in America. Many 
9 Blake, Michael. “Philosophy & the Refugee Crisis: What are the Hard Questions?” 
e Critique, January 6, 2016, as at http://www.thecritique.com/articles/philos-
ophy-the-refugee-crisis-what-are-the-hard-questions/, accessed August 25, 2017.
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others could not. But these children survived because a few people recog-
nized a tragedy in the making, and then decided to act.10 
Today, there are a number of established NGOs, including the Hebrew 
Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) and the International Rescue Committee, 
engaged proactively in such work. Immeasurably more organizations and 
religious continue to seek meaningful ways to address these crises. So, too, 
are there some remarkable individuals—including Regina and Christopher 
Catrambone—whose Migrant Oshore Aid Station Foundation works to 
save migrants and refugees from drowning. en, and now, people were 
aware. ey acted. is leads us to ask: If they could, why can’t we? 
10 Pressman, Steven. 50 Children: One Ordinary American Couple’s Extraordinary 
Rescue Mission into the Heart of Nazi Germany. New York: HarperCollins, 2014.
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Stefan Lehne
The EU and the Refugee Crisis of 2015–2016
Introduction
During 2015 and 2016, the European Union (EU) experienced the greatest 
ows of refugees seen in Europe since the Second World War, roughly 
double the number of refugees from the Balkan Wars in the 1990s.1 In 
2015, 1.3 million people seeking protection entered the EU. In the following 
year, 1.2 million applied for asylum. Most of the refugees had escaped from 
the Syrian civil war, but there were also many arrivals from Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Pakistan, and in 2016 increasingly also from Africa. 
is sudden upsurge and the chaotic manner in which hundreds of 
thousands of refugees made their way through European countries dealt a 
profound shock to the EU and its member states. Initially sharply divided on 
the right approach, the EU eventually reached agreement on the urgent need 
to stem the inows. e closure of the Balkan route and the EU-Turkey agree-
ment of March 2016 sharply reduced arrivals from Turkey, but no similar 
success could be achieved on the route from Libya to Italy. As EU member 
states increasingly resorted to reimposing border controls to manage the 
ows, the Schengen space of passport-free travel ceased to function properly. 
During 2016, the EU developed its instruments for strengthening 
control over the external border and cooperating with third countries and 
upgraded its institutions by setting up a European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency. But little progress was achieved on the question of burden sharing 
among the member states, or on more harmonized asylum and migration 
policies. is article analyzes the weaknesses in the EU’s crisis manage-
ment eorts, explores the external and internal dimensions of the chal-
lenge, and sets out some ideas for the further development of the union’s 
asylum and migration policies.2
1 “Asylum Statistics.” Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/Asylum_statistics, accessed August 25, 2017.
2 is text is partly based on articles written by the author that were previously 
published by Carnegie Europe, http://carnegieeurope.eu. 
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Six Reasons for Initial Failure
e crisis of 2015–2016 hit a badly prepared EU. Six factors in particular 
prevented the EU from managing the crisis eectively:
1.  The EU Asylum System and the Schengen Travel Zone Turned Out to be
  Fair-Weather Constructions
By guaranteeing the freedom of movement of EU citizens and by estab-
lishing an area of passport-free travel, the EU had created a common 
state-like space, while leaving most decision-making powers regarding 
migration and refugee ows to individual member states. e economic 
logic driving these projects—completing and strengthening the internal 
market—obscured their far-reaching political implications. By disman-
tling their internal borders, member states abandoned control over who 
enters and leaves their territory, a control that always has been a core 
element of state sovereignty.3 is revolutionary step should have been 
accompanied by eective common arrangements to secure the external 
borders, integrate migration and asylum policies, and set up robust insti-
tutions with executive mandates. e EU members acknowledged these 
needs in several programmatic documents, but when it came to negoti-
ating concrete implementing measures, many of them refused to transfer 
further responsibilities to Brussels. us, the legislation remained patchy 
and the institutional infrastructure too weak to cope with massive inows 
of migrants and asylum seekers.
2. Decits of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy
From the beginning, the EU failed to develop a credible approach to the 
Syria crisis. Extrapolating from the toppling of other authoritarian leaders 
during the Arab Spring, EU leaders called at an early point for the departure 
of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, but did little to achieve this apart from 
adopting economic sanctions. When, thanks to its regional allies and the 
support of Russia, the Syrian regime proved more resilient than expected, 
and when the US failed to exercise decisive leadership, the EU turned 
more and more into a passive bystander. Certainly, the EU contributed 
3 Lehne, Stefan. “Will Europe Follow Trump on Migration?” Carnegie Europe, 
March 7, 2017, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/03/07/will-europe-follow-trump-
on-migration-pub-68197, accessed August 25, 2017.
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signicant humanitarian assistance, both to displaced people inside Syria 
and to the refugees who had ed to Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. But this 
engagement fell far short of what was required. One of the triggers of the 
mass departure of refugees to Europe in 2015 was the insucient funding 
of the UN-led humanitarian operations in these countries, which in some 
instances resulted in cuts in the daily food rations for refugees. With better 
intelligence and planning, these shortfalls could have been avoided. A 
fraction of the resources later used in dealing with the inux into Europe 
would have greatly improved the conditions of the refugees in the region, 
thus making their departure unnecessary. 
3. Weakness in Executive Action 
e EU has always been primarily a normative power. Its strength lies in 
patiently negotiating rules and in building consensus among partners with 
divergent interests through long technocratic deliberations. Managing 
sudden mass migration ows, however, requires urgent executive action. 
e EU’s collective institutions in this area, FRONTEX, dealing with 
border control, and the European Asylum Support Organization (EASO) 
lacked the capacity and the mandate to take the lead. In what has become 
the pattern over past years, the European Council took over as chief crisis 
manager. While the heads of state and government assembled in this forum 
certainly have the necessary authority, their lack of expertise sometimes 
hindered decision-making. A more systematic involvement of ministers of 
the interior might have had better results. 
In operational terms, the European Commission struggled to coor-
dinate the deployment of nancial and human resources to the countries 
where most of the refugees rst arrived. ose member states with the 
necessary institutional capacity used it mainly for their own immediate 
interests and were oen not quick and generous enough to make the neces-
sary assets available to others. erefore, it took far too long to build the 
capacity needed to receive and register asylum seekers in Greece and Italy.
4. The Dublin Rule Proved Unfair and Pitted the Member States 
 Against Each Other
e EU’s Dublin regulation places the responsibility for registering asylum 
seekers and processing their application on the country of rst arrival. is 
rule has always been problematic as it puts a disproportionate burden on 
Greece and Italy—the EU’s “so underbelly”—where most asylum seekers 
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enter the EU. It reected the interests of the Northern countries, which had 
little trust in the capacities of their Southern partners for managing their 
borders and wanted these countries also to deal with the consequences 
of illegal inows of migrants. When appeals from the Southern member 
states to modify the rule fell on deaf ears, they became increasingly lax in 
implementing it, allowing new arrivals to move on to the EU country of 
their choice.
is “wave on” policy was tolerated as long as it involved a trickle of 
refugees. But when it turned into a ood, the situation became unsustain-
able. e states of rst arrival (Greece and Italy) refused to accept the burden 
that the Dublin regulation inicted on them and allowed the arrivals to go 
north. e transit countries (including Slovenia, Croatia, and Hungary) 
passed the refugees along as quickly as possible or deected the ows to 
other states. e states of nal destination (particularly Germany, Sweden, 
and partially Austria, which was also a transit country) pleaded for Euro-
pean action to halt the inow and demanded burden-sharing arrangements.
5. Contrasting Attitudes
e clash of interests between the member states was aggravated by 
contrasting societal attitudes toward the refugees. Germany led the camp 
of the Willkommenskultur (“welcoming culture”), which initially also 
included Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and Austria. ese govern-
ments took the view that the acute humanitarian needs of the refugees 
trumped all other concerns. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s leader-
ship in this regard was motivated by Germany’s history, but her slogan Wir 
schaen das (“We can manage”) also expressed the self-condence of an 
economically booming country. Initially the welcoming attitude of these 
governments was also underpinned by a massive mobilization of civil 
society to provide support for the new arrivals. Other Western European 
countries such as France and the UK reacted far more cautiously, and the 
new Central European member states displayed a very restrictive attitude 
from the start. 
is dierence in approach has historical roots. Western European 
societies that have long had large foreign-born populations on their terri-
tory nd it easier to adjust to the inux of migrants than do societies that 
have lived in relative isolation for many decades. is division became 
particularly acute on the issue of burden sharing. Prompted by Germany, 
the commission proposed a scheme to distribute a large number of asylum 
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seekers from Italy and Greece to other EU member states.4 e initiative was 
voted through against massive resistance from some of the Central Euro-
pean states. Implementing the scheme proved extremely dicult and slow. 
6. Member States Revert to National Action 
During 2015, the inow of migrants and asylum seekers constantly increased, 
primarily on the Central Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy; from late 
spring onward more and more also from Turkey to the Greek islands; and 
from there through the Balkans to Northern Europe. When despite inten-
sive crisis management meetings, and a spate of new commission initia-
tives, eective EU solutions proved elusive, the most aected member states 
increasingly reverted to national action. ey reimposed border controls, 
built fences, and dened ceilings for the intake of refugees. 
e political dynamic of crisis management here was distinctly 
dierent from management of the Euro crisis. During the latter, the 
member states had been badly divided over the austerity policies dictated 
by Germany and its allies, but the common enemy of the nancial markets 
and a strong technocratic institution, the European Central Bank, enabled 
them to overcome their dierences. us, the crisis resulted in a signi-
cant strengthening of the institutional architecture of the euro zone. In 
the case of the refugee crisis, by contrast, the EU institutions were weak 
and member states fell back to defending their interests by national means. 
Also, the political forces most opposed to the inow of refugees were 
oen also instinctively skeptical towards a stronger EU. ey rst blocked 
common action at the EU level and then blamed the union for not control-
ling the EU’s external border more eectively. is crisis therefore did not 
result in greater unity, but in a weaker and more divided EU. 
The Closing of the Balkan Route
During the initial months of the crisis the EU was sharply divided, with 
some countries advocating open and welcoming policies towards asylum 
4 European Commission. Questions and Answers: Commission Calls for Renewed 
Eorts in Implementing Solidarity Measures Under the European Agenda on Migra-
tion. Press Release, March 2, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
17-349_en.htm, accessed August 25, 2017. 
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seekers and others demanding restrictive policies. However, in the nal 
months of 2015 even the most refugee-friendly states changed their 
approach. Sweden, which had received by far the largest number of refu-
gees on a per capita basis, introduced tough restrictions in November. 
As the public mood darkened and security concerns increased, even the 
German government came to the conclusion that reducing the numbers of 
arrivals would now have top priority. 
is new restrictive approach led to two initiatives to cut the inows 
on the Balkan route. Some Central European countries and Balkan states 
moved towards closing the Greek-Macedonian border in February 2016. A 
parallel initiative led by Germany and the European Commission resulted 
in an agreement with Turkey in March 2016. Accordingly, Turkey agreed 
to take back all asylum seekers arriving in the Greek islands. In exchange, 
the EU committed to resettle an equivalent number of Syrian refugees 
directly from Turkey. In addition, the EU promised substantive nancial 
assistance, a visa free regime for Turkish citizens, and the acceleration of 
Turkey’s stalled accession talks.5 
Both measures reduced the entry of migrants and asylum seekers on 
that route in 2016 by 80 percent compared to the previous year. However, 
since then, a number of elements of the agreement with Turkey have not 
or have only been partially implemented. e return of refugees to Turkey 
and the resettlement program to the EU are held up by slow procedures 
and lack of trust on both sides, and the entire arrangement with Turkey 
remains fragile due to the dicult political relations between the two part-
ners following the failed coup attempt of July 2016 and the increasingly 
authoritarian turn of Turkish politics. Also, a large number of refugees 
remain stranded in miserable conditions on the Greek islands.
Struggling with the Libya-Italy Route
While the EU nally managed to check the inow from Turkey to Greece, 
no similar progress could be achieved on the Central Mediterranean route. 
In the political chaos in Libya with its competing governments and with 
5 European Council. EU-Turkey Statement. Press Release, March 18, 2017, http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-state-
ment/, accessed August 25, 2017.
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most real power being held in the hands of the militias, the EU lacks a reli-
able partner for any arrangement to manage the situation. Consequently, 
people smuggling continues unabated and the number of people having 
crossed from Libya to Italy reached 181,000 in 2016, which is 20 percent 
more than in 2015. e rst months of 2017 saw a rise of 40 percent in the 
number of boat people. 
Almost all migrants now crossing from Libya come from African 
countries. With the exception of Eritreans and Somalis, the vast majority 
are considered by EU member states to be economic migrants and have 
little chance of being granted asylum. 
Although the Syrian refugee crisis dominated the headlines in 2015–
2016, it was always clear that irregular migration from Africa would consti-
tute the much greater challenge in the longer term. According to UN esti-
mates, the African population is expected to more than double by 2050.6 
Many African countries remain poor, and some are suering from internal 
strife and bad governance. Also, there is a long tradition of large population 
movements in many parts of the continent. Even the rising incomes now 
achieved in many African states oen result at rst in increased migra-
tion ows. Sizable diasporas that already exist in Europe, together with 
the closer connectivity achieved through modern media, make crossing 
the Mediterranean seem more feasible and attractive. As journalist James 
Traub put it: “[T]he barometric pressure of a poor and growing continent 
next to a rich and shrinking one cannot be sustained forever.”7
e route from Libya to Italy is the frontline of irregular African 
immigration to Europe. Reducing this inow is now at the top of the EU’s 
agenda. In the absence of a “silver bullet” analogous to the EU-Turkey 
deal, EU leaders support a variety of measures, including the training and 
equipping of the Libyan coast guard, strengthening the border control 
in the South of the country, improving the reception capacities in Libya, 
6 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Aairs, Population Division. 
World Population Prospects: e 2015 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables. 
Working Paper no. ESA/P/WP.241. New York: United Nations, 2015, https://
esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/les/key_ndings_wpp_2015.pdf, accessed 
August 25, 2017.
7 Traub, James. “Europe Wishes to Inform You at the Refugee Crisis Is Over.” 
Foreign Policy, October 18, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/18/europe-
wishes-to-inform-you-that-the-refugee-crisis-is-over/, accessed August 25, 2015. 
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and supporting schemes for the voluntary return of migrants to their 
home countries. Measures and programs undertaken by the EU as such 
complement bilateral arrangements between individual member states and 
various players in Libya. Particularly Italy is trying to exert its inuence on 
the various players in the country.
e EU’s most signicant involvement in this situation is the Euro-
pean Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med), also known 
as Operation Sophia. Its mandate includes combating the smuggling of 
people and arms, and training the Libyan coastguard. But fullling these 
tasks is dicult without dependable partners on the shore, so European 
ships that patrol close to the Libyan coastline function also as a search-and-
rescue mission, picking up people from dinghies and other unsafe boats 
and transferring them to Italy. is eort is complemented by a number of 
ships operated by NGOs.
Paradoxically, an operation designed to ght the smugglers thus eec-
tively facilitates their business. e rescue eorts make crossing the Medi-
terranean somewhat less risky and much cheaper. Smugglers no longer 
need to use seaworthy vessels, but just take migrants in rubber dinghies a 
few kilometers out at sea, leaving it to EU and NGO ships to take care of the 
rest of the journey. 
But even the humanitarian dimension of the international eorts is not 
a full success. Despite the best eorts of the EU and NGOs, the number of 
drownings rose to nearly 4,600 in 2016,8 an unprecedented level.9 Sadly, 
the European public and the governments seem to have grown accustomed 
to the massive loss of human lives in the Mediterranean. Whereas in 2014 
and 2015 mass drownings in the Mediterranean led to public uproar and a 
strengthening of rescue eorts, today the even higher death rate is barely 
mentioned in Western media. 
By contrast there is huge public concern about the continuing inow 
through the Central Mediterranean route. In fact, this ow represents only 
a minor part of the overall irregular immigration. Many more people every 
year enter legally and then overstay their visas. But this ongoing migration 
8 European Commission. Questions and Answers. 
9 Oce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights—Bureau for 
Europe. Desperate Journeys. Refugees and migrants entering and crossing Europe 
via the Mediterranean and Western Balkans routes, February 2017.
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remains largely invisible, whereas the boat people are highly visible and 
trigger a far stronger emotional response. 
e current approach of the EU, and in particular its naval operation, 
is therefore coming under increasing criticism. But it is dicult to come 
up with a credible alternative. One idea that receives increasing atten-
tion concerns the external processing of asylum requests. is means that 
asylum seekers would have to wait in camps outside the EU—for instance 
in Egypt, Tunisia or even in Libya itself—while their applications are 
processed. Only those whose claims were accepted would be admitted to the 
EU. But this concept roughly modeled on the Australian approach to illegal 
immigration poses enormous legal, political, and practical diculties.
In the short term, this leaves only two plausible courses of action: 
rst, to continue to support eorts to restore stability and governance in 
Libya, and to cooperate with ocial and informal actors in Libya to ght 
the smuggling and improve the treatment of migrants in the country; and 
second, to work with other countries in the region to reduce the number of 
migrants reaching Libya.
Better External Migration Management
Signicant migration into Europe and in particular from Africa will 
continue for many years. But if it is to be mutually benecial and avoid 
political disruptions, migration needs to be managed responsibly through 
close cooperation across the Mediterranean.
Such cooperation on migration has long been on the agenda between 
Europe and Africa, on both a regional and a bilateral level. e last compre-
hensive migration initiative—launched against the background of the 
current crisis—culminated in the Valletta Summit of EU and African 
leaders on November 11–12, 2015. Aer dicult negotiations, delegations 
arrived at a declaration and action plan that present a balance of the two 
sides’ divergent interests.10 e documents deal with development, legal 
migration, and mobility but also with reductions in irregular migration 
10 European Council. Valletta summit on migration, 11–12 November 2015—action 
plan and political declaration. Press release, November 12, 2015, http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/12-valletta-final-docs/, 
accessed August 25, 2017. 
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and tracking, as well as returns and readmissions of irregular migrants. 
An increase of EU assistance in the shape of a new Euro 1.8 billion ($2.0 
billion) trust fund was a further part of the bargain.11 
In early 2016, the Valletta framework for cooperation on migration was 
still new and untested, but a number of EU governments, led by the then 
Italian Prime Minister Renzi, already were pushing for a more ambitious 
approach that would focus more on the bilateral relationships between the 
EU and individual African countries. In June 2016, the European Commis-
sion responded by submitting a communication on establishing a new Part-
nership Framework.12 is document exudes a dierent spirit from those 
adopted in Valletta. e EU’s interests are laid out in clear terms: to reduce 
the number of deaths in the Mediterranean, to increase the rate of returns 
to countries of origin and transit, and to enable migrants and refugees to 
stay close to home and avoid dangerous journeys. e Union and member 
states would pool instruments, tools, and leverage to reach comprehensive 
migration partnerships (known as compacts) with third countries. All the 
EU’s policies, including trade, assistance, education, and research, would 
be deployed to mobilize maximum leverage, which would include positive 
as well as negative incentives. e Commission mentions the desirability 
of creating legal pathways for migration only in very general terms. Once 
again, nancial assistance is envisaged as the main positive incentive.
Apart from Jordan and Lebanon, with which similar compacts were 
already in the making, the Commission identied ve African countries—
Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal—with which the EU should 
agree on migration partnerships as a matter of priority. is selection 
aimed at a mix of countries of origin and of transit, but probably also at 
a combination of low-hanging fruit with which rapid progress could be 
expected, and hard cases with which it could not. Some important actors 
11 European Commission. European Commission—Fact Sheet. A European Union 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, November 12, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-15-6056_en.htm, accessed August 25, 2107.
12 European Commission. “Communication on establishing a new Partnership 
Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration.” 
COM(2016) 385, June 7, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/home-aairs/sites/homeaf-
fairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-imple-
mentation-package/docs/20160607/communication_external_aspects_eam_
towards_new_migration_ompact_en.pdf, accessed August 25, 2017.
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on migration, such as Eritrea and Sudan, were omitted, as the relevant 
governments do not at present appear suited for any kind of partnership. 
e communication was not well received by NGOs, which criticized 
the document’s heavy emphasis on deterrence, returns, and conditionality; 
its insucient concern for protection and human rights; and its subordina-
tion of development policy to migration management.13 Yet the European 
Council highlighted precisely these points when it endorsed the partnership 
concept in June 2016.14 Cooperation on readmissions and returns would be 
the key test of the partnership, and all the EU’s policies, instruments, and 
tools would be deployed to create and apply the necessary leverage.
e EU’s migration partnership concept certainly has merits. It recog-
nizes that the migration challenge can be managed only through coop-
eration with African countries, and it sensitizes African partners to the 
urgency of the issue in Europe. It also promises to step up coordination 
between member states and the EU institutions. Finally, the concept of 
partnerships with individual African countries is convincing, as it allows a 
exible approach tailored to specic local situations.
However, conceived in a situation of political emergency in the EU, the 
approach focuses almost exclusively on keeping people out and sending 
them back. e nancial incentives suggested are hardly generous or cred-
ible enough to have the desired impact. Moreover, the concept fails to take 
suciently into account the concerns and interests of governments on the 
other side of the Mediterranean and the needs of the people who are the 
subject of this policy.
e EU institution’s progress reports in 2016 and early 2017 revealed 
the diculties of implementing the new approach.15 Certainly, there was 
limited progress in a number of countries—most clearly in Niger—where 
13 Oxfam International, et al. Joint NGO statement ahead of the European Council of 
June 28–29 2016—NGOs strongly condemn new EU policies to contain migration, 
June 24, 2016, https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/ngos-strongly-condemn-new-
eu-policies-contain-migration, accessed August 25, 2017. 
14 European Council. European Council conclusions. Press Release, June 28, 2016, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/28-euco-
conclusions/, accessed August 25, 2017. 
15 European Commission. “ird Progress Report on the Partnership Framework 
with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration.” COM(2017) 205, 
March 2, 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/les/com_2017_205_f1_report_
from_commission_en_v8_p1_880005_0.pdf, accessed August 25, 2017.
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the departures towards Europe could be signicantly reduced. Projects 
supporting migration management nanced from the new Trust Fund for 
Africa have been initiated in a number of countries. But on the key objec-
tives, stemming the ows of illegal migrants and to improving the rate of 
returns to the countries of origin, little success could be reported. 
Over the past months, it has become obvious that the approach doesn’t 
adequately take into account the fundamental dierences between Euro-
pean and African attitudes to migration. e economic case is simple: As 
remittances amount to three or four times the overall amount of develop-
ment assistance, most African countries consider emigration a vital source 
of income. Given the high levels of unemployment in Africa, migration 
also oers a safety valve, as many young people who could otherwise pose 
a threat to domestic stability leave the country. 
e Commission envisages mobilizing eight billion euros ($8.7 billion) 
in support of the partnerships by 2020.16 However, this will be accom-
plished primarily by redirecting existing development funds. So rather 
than making additional commitments, the EU would just make parts of 
existing funding conditional on cooperation on migration.
Potentially more signicant is the proposed establishment of an 
External Investment Plan designed to address the root causes of migra-
tion. Modeled on the European Commission’s Investment Plan for Europe 
(known as the Juncker plan aer the Commission’s president, Jean-Claude 
Juncker), the proposal aims at using about four billion euros ($4.4 billion) 
from the EU budget and a similar amount from member states as guar-
antees to mobilize private investment of more than 44 billion euros ($48 
billion). However, this scheme is still at the stage of preparation and given 
the uncertain investment climate in Africa it remains unclear whether the 
private sector will suciently engage in the implementation.
The Internal Impact of the Crisis
e refugee crisis had a signicant impact on the political climate in 
Europe. In many countries, populist forces gained ground and drove main-
stream politicians and governments towards harsher policies concerning 
16 European Commission. Communication on establishing a new Partnership Frame-
work.
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migrants and refugees. e links between Islamist terrorism and the ow 
of refugees further burdened the atmosphere. Asylum conditions and 
procedures became more restrictive in many countries. e reassertion of 
national sovereignty during the crisis also prevented signicant progress 
towards more integrated and harmonized migration and asylum policies. 
Proposals by the Commission to li border controls and return to a fully 
functioning Schengen system by the end of 2016 were not enacted. 
While the EU has been successful in 2016 in reducing the inow of 
people, it remains far from achieving sustainable policies. While progress 
has been made on the control of the external border and on cooperating 
with third countries, not much forward movement was possible on the key 
problems on the internal front. e patently unfair Dublin rule remains in 
place, burden-sharing projects remain blocked by the Central European 
countries, and very little has been achieved on the needed harmonization 
of asylum and migration rules. 
e political fall-out from the crisis in terms of growing xenophobia 
and increasing nationalism has made it more dicult to move towards 
these goals. e member states mainly agree that the inows need to be 
massively reduced and that illegal migrants should be sent back, but they 
are more reluctant than ever to give up sovereignty and transfer further 
powers to Brussels.
An exclusive focus on deterring further asylum seekers will also make 
the successful integration of those already in Europe more dicult. e 
wish to prevent and sanction abuses of the asylum protection has triggered 
a race to the bottom in terms of protection standards and reception condi-
tions. Many member states have cut nancial assistance, curtailed freedom 
of movement, and made the access to social services and the labor market 
more dicult. 
Making the lives of asylum seekers unattractive might deter some 
people from coming to Europe, but the same policies greatly impede the 
chances for a successful integration of the people who are already there. 
ere is little point in preaching the necessity of adjusting to the values 
and to the way of life of the host countries, when the same governments are 
making it ever more dicult for migrants to lead normal lives. 
e terrible risk of the spreading anti-migration feeling is that it can 
easily turn into a self-fullling prophecy. ose who claim that Afri-
cans and Muslims have no place in Europe, and who blame migrants for 
crime and terrorism, create a social and political climate that hampers the 
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integration of migrants already in Europe. Negative attitudes towards non-
native residents will contribute to their alienation, separate them from their 
host society, and radicalize a number of them. And as problems with immi-
grant communities increase, hostility towards them will also be ramped 
up in a vicious circle. is rise of xenophobia will not only aect relations 
with minorities and migrants. It will invade the entire political space and 
poison all aspects of public life. It will divide communities, spread intoler-
ance, foment tensions, and oen trigger violence. Mobilizing against these 
tendencies while there is still time is therefore not a mere humanitarian 
concern but an act of self-defense by a decent and open society. Populist 
demagogues claim to defend the achievements of Judeo-Christian civili-
zation, yet the opposite is true. e real defense of this civilization consists 
precisely in resisting nationalism and xenophobia.17 
Conclusions
European political leaders need to embrace Europe’s ethnic and religious 
diversity. Hate speech and aggression towards migrants and refugees 
must be rmly rejected. However, tolerance is not enough. If newcomers 
feel welcome, they will nd their place in society much more easily. Polit-
ical elites need to make the case that a rapidly aging and demographi-
cally declining continent requires the inow of young people and has 
much to benet from their energy and ideas. Leaders will only gain public 
support for these views, however, if they manage migration responsibly, 
and if shocks such as the 2015–2016 refugee crisis are not repeated. is 
presupposes not only more control over the EU’s external border, eective 
arrangement with countries of transit and origin, and responsible returns 
policies, but also better legal pathways for migration and programs for the 
orderly resettlement of refugees.
European governments need to acknowledge that, unlike the United 
States or Canada, European societies are not naturally congured to facili-
tate immigration. To make it a success requires much more active govern-
mental involvement, in particular massive investment in education and 
training. It will also mean reviewing long-established practices designed to 
17 Lehne. Will Europe Follow Trump on Migration?
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protect the interests of existing stakeholders. Structural reforms are indis-
pensable for successfully integrating large numbers of immigrants.
Political elites have to resist current tendencies toward renationaliza-
tion. Attempting to handle refugee ows and migration through national 
means alone would result in fragmented and incoherent policies that pit 
EU member states against each other. Instead, EU member states should 
move toward stronger common rules on asylum and immigration, better 
collective action to engage with neighboring regions, greater solidarity on 
burden-sharing, and more robust and eective institutions.18
e key priority of responsible politicians would be to develop a 
comprehensive strategy for coping with refugee ows and for sustainable 
migration management. is would encompass better control over external 
borders, fair burden-sharing between member states, progressive harmo-
nization of policies and laws and stronger institutions. On the external side 
the EU would have to develop equitable arrangements with third coun-
tries that include signicantly upgraded nancial assistance but also legal 
pathways for migration such as temporary work, educational visas, schol-
arships, and visa facilitation. It should also place a stronger emphasis on 
the protection of vulnerable people by oering humanitarian visas and 
programs for the resettlement of refugees. And all this would have to be 
combined with energetic eorts in the UN and other multilateral forums 
to develop eective global regimes to deal with these issues.
Migration is likely to top the EU’s agenda for many years. Given the 
turmoil in its neighborhood, further refugee crises are highly likely. No 
other challenges pose similar risks to the survival of liberal European 
democracies and of European integration. However, if handled correctly, 
immigration also oers great potential for the success of an open and 
dynamic Europe in a globalized world. e stakes couldn’t be higher.19
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid.
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Kristina Touzenis
International Law and Migration—the importance 
of the multilateral system for all of us
is presentation is by a lawyer who “happens” to work in an international 
organization—not by an international relations expert or an historian 
focusing on the role of international organizations. As such it is given by a 
“lay” person considering the “international organizations’ role” as well as 
the role of the multilateral system today. My expertise is the legal frame-
work and the rights and obligations this framework creates for individ-
uals and states. As such I work on one of several “objectives,” “outputs” or 
“results” that international organizations create. My thoughts on the role 
of international organizations today are thus based upon my experience in 
the implementation of international norms, or the lack of—or at times even 
resistance to—these standards and particularly in the context of migration. 
So, with that as a background I’d like to focus perhaps not so much 
on what international organizations can do today in the face of migration 
“ows” and “crisis,” but rather on what we have, what we are facing and 
what we risk if we forget how we got here. And perhaps to an extent on our 
failure to communicate these points to a wider audience. 
Historically, legislation related to migration has fallen entirely under 
state sovereignty, and to a great extent “migration” is still very much an 
issue that states regulate as they see t. It is very much up to states to deter-
mine rules on entry and stay of non-nationals on their territory—apart 
from certain people who have specic protection needs. Historically, inter-
national norms and standards did not generally “infringe” upon absolute 
state sovereignty with very few exceptions. However, International Law has 
developed signicantly over the past 100 years or so. It is now accepted that 
the international community sets international standards that states must 
follow in their dealings with individuals, including migrants, in their juris-
diction or on their territory. is is very clear in relation to Human Rights 
Law, International Humanitarian Law, as well as International Labor Law. 
Transnational Criminal Law also sets up standards for cooperation as well 
as legislative criteria inuencing national systems. is all has a direct 
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impact on migration, migrants, and the parameters for how states exercise 
their sovereignty in relation to migration matters as they have to conform 
to international standards. Furthermore, as migration movements have 
changed in scale and pattern, the need for further cooperation among 
states to manage global and regional migration became apparent. Based 
on cooperation, international law sets up a basis for better global, regional, 
and bilateral migration governance. is development has evolved rapidly 
over the last couple of decades and continues to develop along with the 
ongoing need for cooperation and the demand for legal guidance on the 
matter.
Rather than a branch consisting of a set of migration-specic legal 
instruments, International Migration Law (IML) is an umbrella term used 
to describe the body of laws, principles, and norms that together regulate 
the international rights and obligations of states related to migrants.
One of the main branches of law we need to focus on when discussing 
migration is human rights law—since migrants are human beings, just like 
any other human being. 
Human rights are the fundamental rights that every person enjoys 
regardless of nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, 
color, religion, language, or any other status. Human rights empower and 
protect individuals against actions that interfere with fundamental free-
doms and human dignity by delimiting state power as well as obliging states 
to take positive measures to guarantee that these rights can be enjoyed by 
everyone on their territory.1 International human rights law legally guar-
antees human rights whose core principles are:
-  Universality & Inalienability: All persons enjoy human rights and they 
should never be taken away from a person except in specic situations 
and according to due process. is is reected by the fact that all states 
have ratied at least one, and the majority of states have ratied four or 
more, of the core human rights treaties. 
-  Interdependency & Indivisibility: Human rights are dependent on 
others’ fulllment in order to be exercised. For example, certain social 
rights such as health and education may be necessary in order to take 
1 Oce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights & Inter-
Parliamentary Union. Human Rights: A Handbook for Parliamentarians. France, 
2005, p. 1.
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advantage of certain civil and political rights and a violation of one 
right might result in violations of several related rights.
-  Equality & Non-discrimination: States must ensure that human rights 
are applied and respected without any discrimination based on any 
grounds, including but not restricted to sex, race, color, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
membership in a national minority, property, birth, age, disability, 
sexual orientation and social or other status.
Although there are several actors in the world today who have both a posi-
tive and negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights of individ-
uals (e. g. organized criminal groups, businesses and corporations, armed 
groups, and international and non-governmental organizations) the obli-
gations rest with states who are the primary duty-bearers. e obligations 
of states consist of three categories: the duties to respect, to protect and to 
fulfill.
And I would like to pause for a moment with the fact that rights are 
due to migrants. Migrants’ rights and states’ obligations towards anyone 
and everyone on their territory or under their jurisdiction can be found 
in a number of international instruments: including but obviously not 
limited to International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions and 
transnational criminal law treaties, rules in International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) and the Law of the Sea. ese have many important aspects 
in common—but one perhaps particularly merits underlining: ey are 
all negotiated outcomes with binding eect upon signatory and ratifying 
states. eir implementation may be progressive in some cases and we may 
need to focus our attention on how best to implement them in meaningful 
ways—but let us never doubt that the individuals concerned are guaran-
teed the rights found in these negotiated outcomes; that would be legally 
faulty.
Another point that may merit underlining is that—as negotiated 
outcomes—international treaties, like national legislation, are not utopian, 
nor do they depart from reality in the requirements of the duty bearers. 
Law, also international law, is pretty rmly rooted in reality and feasibility. 
So, if we start with the sound legal basis that we are bound by the trea-
ties we have signed or ratied, we can move on to look at the various issues 
we witness today where implementation seems to pose real challenges. 
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Migration being one of them—as evidenced by the very event we are all 
attending today. 
ere is one more basis for eective, long-term and sustainable 
migration governance that takes into consideration the needs and rights 
of migrants as well as the needs and competencies of states—and I, by 
the way, think we may want to move away from thinking those two are 
opposed! at basis is that no person is more “deserving” of protection or 
of being safe, warm and fed than others. We in this room do not have our 
rights respected because we deserve it—but because we are rights holders 
as human beings. No one deserves that more or less than others. And any 
discussion of “deserving” of protection implies an opposite “undeserving,” 
which goes fundamentally against the values and principles not only of 
human rights but—I would think—also of “humanity” itself.
e fact that it is legitimate to want to manage our borders and our 
migration “inux” does not mean that closing our borders is a legitimate 
way of doing so. Management of entries and stay is legitimate when put 
into a broader perspective of true migration governance set within the 
framework of the Rule of Law—derived both from the International Legal 
framework and from regional and national structures. is means having 
sensible, long-term policies that actually correspond to the labor market 
needs of countries of destination as well as live up to our obligations to 
protect individuals in danger and in need—even if only for a time neces-
sary to get that individual back on his or her feet. And—talking about 
the broader pictures—it also means regulating said labor markets so that 
no workers—nationals, migrants, regular or irregular—are exploited or 
abused. 
Prohibitive measures, closed borders and fences will only feed the 
smuggling market, eectively causing a loss of control over who enters 
and who stays and endangering lives in the process—and consequently 
undermining the Rule of Law generally. at does not have the ring of a 
“win-win-win” situation, does it? If we instead take as a central concern 
the rights of migrants, the benets of well-governed processes and the 
pragmatism we nd in the existing legal frameworks and create innova-
tive regulated mobility options that truly correspond to both the drivers 
and the pull factors, then this will incentivize migrants to avoid having 
recourse to irregular channels that by their very nature undermine legality 
and the rule of law. And the rule of law based on international standards 
and anchored in national legislation should be a safeguard for all of us—no 
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matter where we are from or where we are. We need to move away from this 
current trend sooner rather than later or we may see ourselves at a point 
from which it will be dicult to return.
If we are serious about securing our own human rights, won over centu-
ries of debates and of developments of hard law and enshrined in today’s 
international treaties as well as in many regional and national instruments, 
we cannot sit back and witness, or even actively take part in, the erosion of 
the respect and protection of rights of those who are eectively under our 
jurisdiction. To do so would be to put in jeopardy the very foundations—
legal as well as philosophical—on which our societies—national, regional 
as well as international—are based. And if we start showing persistent 
disrespect for the legal rights of some, it is but a small step before we erode 
the rights from which we benet. I mentioned earlier that we must move 
away from any discussion about people “deserving” of protection and those 
who by exclusion then seem to be “undeserving” and realize that while not 
all migrants are vulnerable, we can all be in situations of vulnerability if 
and when our rights are threatened or not guaranteed. And whereas not all 
migrants may be vulnerable, it is most certainly true that even if people on 
the move are not “forced” in the classical sense of the term such as when 
we speak about refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs)—then it is 
most certainly as true that most people on the move today do not “decide” 
to move just because it sounds like a jolly good idea to do so. ey are not 
all forced by conict or persecution—but if you have no livelihood or no 
prospects then your decision process may not be entirely based on a “volun-
tary” choice to move along and try something better. Unfortunately, we 
also witness how many migrants become vulnerable, in large part due to 
policies that take away their resilience and make them vulnerable, and we 
see evidence of and evident lack of guarantees of their rights every day. 
What we have is an area of multilateral fora, the UN being the Big One 
and the Primary One. I happen to believe in these fora—while recognizing 
and seeing on a daily basis that they are by no means perfect! ose fora did 
not come about one day because someone had a hilarious idea—they were 
created as a reaction to experiences of strife and war and general human 
misery. In the hope that creating such mechanisms those in power would 
be held in some sort of check—that they would turn to negotiations before 
aggression, that they would follow certain rules when it came to the treat-
ment of subjects, that they would follow certain standards when it came to 
governing. Rights—and here I am thinking all possible sort of rights we as 
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individuals have (and benet from) that are derived from numerous inter-
national instruments, national laws and constitutions and longstanding 
legal traditions, have been codied in their present form because of our 
form of government/state system—rights, laws and the rule of law are not 
abstract notions. Not principles to aspire to. For centuries—if not longer—
it has been a recognized fact that individuals need a degree of protection 
from those in power, and that those in power need to be held accountable 
and to uphold certain agreed-upon standards. 
e rights we all benet from have been fought for and won with sacri-
ce over centuries. If one studies legal history there are traces of treaties 
or legal thinking on individual rights and accountability of those with 
much more power than the average person dating back thousands of years. 
Today we have a set of treaties and we have a set of international fora that 
were created to form a guarantee of those rights. Have they always been 
successful? No. Are they awed? Yes. Would we be much worse o without 
them? I would say so. And we need to communicate better to the people 
we, in the multilateral system, aim at protecting and serving, why it is the 
system that protects them. Each and every one of them. I have had my 
rights respected all my life. I have never gone hungry, I have never feared 
arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, I have always had access to health 
care and education. Why? One simple chance […] a freak accident if you 
want […] where and when I was born. Human Rights, be they enshrined in 
an international instrument, or in the national laws that protect us all every 
day, are there to make that freak accident a little less signicant. To even 
out the chances for everyone just a bit. And if we do not protect that system, 
if we do not protect the rights of all people, if we do not stand up for the 
judiciary, if we do not realize that rights are not automatically granted just 
because we’ve benetted from them, or that no one deserves rights more 
than others—then we put ourselves in jeopardy. Now migrants—a group 
that legally has rights—seem to be legitimate target; if that continues then 
who will be next? 
As we speak, there are a number of photos circulating in the media. 
Of people huddling in the cold. At a fence. ey seem familiar, those faces. 
And they are. We have seen them before. More than once. One of those 
times was about 70 years ago. ese days the fences are there to keep them 
out. But the fence is there. And so are the huddled, freezing people. So, 
what is dierent today? Or rather what could be dierent? What is dierent 
is that those people have rights, based on the aforementioned negotiated 
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outcomes. And that states have obligations—legal obligations—towards 
them. In Europe particularly, it can be seen at the European Court of 
Human Rights that these are not only empty words. And still we see a great 
problem when it comes to implementation. Particularly in countries that 
for decades, if not centuries, have portrayed themselves as rights cham-
pions in one language or another. 
We may be standing at a crossroad here. And we may have to be very, 
very attentive to how states treat the non-nationals who are seeking protec-
tion, decent work, decent lives. Why? Because if we stop respecting the 
legal standards protecting the rights of one group, then it is only too easy to 
imagine that this will only be the rst group to see its rights eroded. If we 
start ignoring the fact that protection of rights creates a society in which we 
are all safe and in which we can all live peacefully then we are on a road that 
endangers all of us. And that is something we need to be able to commu-
nicate better: that international law and standards are not abstract notions 
but relevant for all of us. at once we start thinking “us” versus “them” 
then very easily we can become one of “them.”
e international organizations in existence today must be more than 
the sum of their membership. ey must be there to recall that the Rule 
of Law applies to everyone, that there are standards—legal standards—
of accountability and conduct that states can be asked to uphold. When 
working on migrant’s rights it happens that states very oen show reluc-
tance in upholding the rights they have signed up to respect; the experience 
in that eld should rst of all show us that the multilateral system has a very 
important role to play. Secondly, we need to work so that this changes—
before it becomes a general trend of undermining rights across the board.
It is probably true that we have failed to explain why rights found in 
numerous international instruments, created in negotiations far removed 
from the general public, are relevant to that general public. Lawyers like me 
most oen speak in paragraphs and articles and talk about “non-refoule-
ment obligations” and obligations to respect and fulll—and that is neces-
sary. But it may also be necessary now to look at history and show why the 
rights codied in international, regional, and national law today must be 
maintained, upheld, and respected. It may be time to get passionate about 
why the law is relevant to all—and to explain it much better. ose faces at 
those fences are a sign that we failed in explaining this so far. 
Let me end on a positive note: e state is not only the Central Govern-
ment—it is also local authorities, civil society organizations, the judiciary, 
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the people—and around the world these entities are doing an enormous 
amount of work to ensure the rights of all individuals on their territories. 
And the rights we see enshrined in international instruments are very oen 
found in greater detail in national legislation—which is being upheld by 
both law enforcement and judiciary. ese are strong foundations for a 
future with respect for the rights of every individual. 
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Giovanni Pietro Dal Toso
The Holy See
ank you for the invitation to take part in this distinguished assembly. 
I was asked for a speech on the Holy See’s current activities, in particular 
regarding the situation of refugees in the Middle East. Aer a brief exposi-
tion of the situation, I will present four key areas for an interpretation of the 
phenomenon and then describe some concrete prospects from the point of 
view of the Holy See.
The Situation 
Migration is as ancient as humanity, and it has not always amounted to 
forced migration. At present, the most consistent ows are those towards 
North America, and those moving towards Europe from Africa and the 
Middle East. In this case, we are talking for the most part about forced 
migration. In fact, in the Middle East we can observe the following trends:
-  Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan are countries with high rates of emigra-
tion. e rst two also have a high number of internally displaced 
persons. e gures are impressive: among those arriving in Greece in 
2016, 46.5 percent were Syrian; 24.2 percent were Afghans; 15.2 percent 
were Iraqis (totaling 85.9 percent)1; in the United States, 30 percent of 
refugees who arrived in 2016 were from those three countries.2
-  In the Middle East, there are countries with a high level of reception: In 
Lebanon, there are ocially 1.1 million refugees (in fact, they are many 
more); in Jordan, there are 664,000 refugees; in Turkey, 2.5 million 
1 International Organization for Migration (IOM). Mixed Migration Flows in the 
Mediterranean and Beyond, 2016 Overview.
2 Pew Research Center, Key facts about U. S. refugees, January 30, 2017, http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/30/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/, 
accessed January 28, 2018.
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refugees; in Iran, approximately one million. To these, we must add all 
those refugees who for decades have been residing in these nations.
-  Finally, we must not forget that there is the vast phenomenon of silent 
migration towards the Middle East and in particular to the Arabian 
Peninsula, of those in search of a job and well-being, especially from 
India, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, as results 
from data referring to one of the Gulf States (Kuwait).3
Analysis of the Situation
In my opinion, in order to better understand the problem we should break 
it down into at least four components.
1.  ere is a humanitarian aspect, to which even the Holy Father has very 
oen referred, which results in the reception and welcome of those in 
need of immediate help. We as Christians have a moral duty to assist 
those in need, and I feel I can say that the Catholic Church is at the fore-
front—even in countries where Christians are a minority—in helping 
the needy. For the Catholic Church, it is perfectly clear that this must be 
done in accordance with the respective governments of the host coun-
tries. ere are also international humanitarian laws binding govern-
ments to do their part in this process of reception. Based on the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, the Church is willing to do its part in this process, 
asks to do so, and even asks to take into consideration in particular 
those needs, such as spiritual needs, that would otherwise be easily 
overlooked.
2. Once a refugee or migrant is welcomed as such in a hosting country, we 
must consider the cultural aspect of the matter, which in turn presents 
two dimensions. e rst is the integration of migrants through 
proper education and training, and, at a later moment, the search for a 
job and economic livelihood. We cannot therefore reduce refugees or 
migrants to beggars, but rather we must give them the opportunity to 
3 Totaling 1,415,519 persons—cf. “e Demographic and Economic Framework of 
Migration in Kuwait.” Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM), no. 1, 2013, 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32155/GLMM%20ExpNote_01-
2013.pdf, accessed October 10, 2017.
GIOVANNI PIETRO DAL TOSO
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   200 12.02.2018   15:59:49
201
develop their talents, to integrate, and put themselves at the disposal 
of the society in which they live. is phase integrates the initial one 
of reception and opens up the future for the person welcomed, thus 
avoiding the creation of ghettos. e second dimension of the cultural 
aspect is just as important and concerns the arriving populations: ey 
must share the values and basic norms of the welcoming community. 
ere is a path of reciprocal acceptance that calls for the responsi-
bility of those who are being accepted. In his address to the Diplomatic 
Corps on January 11, 2016, the Holy Father stated: “e acceptance of 
migrants can thus prove a good opportunity for new understanding 
and broader horizons, both on the part of those accepted, who have the 
responsibility to respect the values, traditions and laws of the commu-
nity which takes them in, and on the part of the latter, who are called 
to acknowledge the benecial contribution which each immigrant can 
make to the whole community.”4 
 is aspect should not be overlooked, because extremism and populism 
oen feed on fear of the “other” and thus on the fear of being overrun 
by people with whom we are not acquainted. It is in this light that we 
can comprehend the reaction of some European nations that have 
resisted the presence of migrants, claiming they do not want to create 
cultural imbalances in their own countries. e relationship between 
rights and duties must not be ignored. In fact, no society can survive if 
it is focused only on personal rights and fails to take into account the 
duty of contributing to and respecting the common good. is duty 
falls on each individual.
3.  ere is also a political aspect of the matter, and I am referring in 
particular to Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, which are to a great extent 
countries of forced migration due to their political instability. We 
cannot focus our attention on the consequences of the problem without 
considering its source. If the international community had promptly 
taken fairer action in Syria or Iraq, millions of people would not have 
been forced to unwillingly leave their homes and their country. Even 
4 Address of his Holiness Pope Francis to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps 
Accredited to the Holy See for the Traditional Exchange of New Year Greet-
ings, Sala Regia, January 11, 2016, http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/
speeches/2016/january/documents/papa-francesco_20160111_corpo-diplo-
matico.html, accessed October 11, 2017.
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now, the anxiety over nding a solution to the refugee problem in 
Europe and other countries must not mislead us to forget the cause 
of this exodus, which is war. Aer so many years, why have we been 
unable to nd a peaceful solution for Syria, or political stability for 
Iraq, while they continue ghting unnecessary and bloody wars at the 
expense of the defenseless population? Why did it take the Paris bomb-
ings of November 2015 to bring home the fact that the Islamic State is 
a real threat, which requires more determined opposition? 
4.  Finally, there is an even more global aspect of the matter: the equal 
distribution of goods on this earth. In the fall of 2015, I was very much 
impressed when the force of the masses swept over national borders 
on the Balkan route. In a certain sense, vital energy had imposed itself 
over an alleged order, however necessary, that consisted of borders and 
police. In other words: If the Western world fails to implement serious 
policies of sharing, the poorer peoples will come to take what they need, 
and what we have experienced so far will have been just the beginning of 
a much more complex and painful process. For this reason, Popes have 
always stressed the importance of the integral development of the entire 
person and of every person, because without real and equal distribution 
of property, inequality will only trigger violence and revenge. is is not 
only a moral appeal; it reects the realization that we will be increas-
ingly forced to transform our states into systems of control, repression, 
and defense if we do not rethink our model of development using a 
truly universal point of view. is year we are celebrating the 50th anni-
versary of the Encyclical Populorum Progressio. Even back then, Paul 
VI said: “is duty concerns rst and foremost the wealthier nations. 
eir obligations stem from the human and supernatural brotherhood 
of man, and present a threefold obligation: 1) mutual solidarity—the 
aid that the richer nations must give to developing nations; 2) social 
justice—the rectication of trade relations between strong and weak 
nations; 3) universal charity—the eort to build a more humane world 
community, where all can give and receive, and where the progress of 
some is not bought at the expense of others. e matter is urgent, for on 
it depends the future of world civilization.”5
5 Populorum Progressio. Encylical of Pope Paul VI on the Development of Peoples, 
March 26, 1967, http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/encyclicals/documents/
hf_p-vi_enc_26031967_populorum.html, accessed October 11, 2017, no. 44.
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Prospects
1.  In the rst place, there are political responsibilities that should compel 
the international community to nd a solution to the many existing 
conicts. If a large part of the refugees comes from politically unstable 
countries, then clearly there can be no solution to the problem without 
seeking peace and order in the various countries. e Holy See has 
oen been actively involved in this aspect. 
2.  I would also like to mention the great contribution of the Catholic 
Church through its various charitable organizations, and also through 
the Dioceses and religious communities, in assisting displaced persons 
and refugees. Over the past two years, our Dicastery carried out a 
survey to assess working areas, subjects reached, money spent by the 
dierent actors of the Catholic Church involved in the crisis in Syria 
and Iraq. A number of facts of great interest emerged. What distin-
guishes the involvement of the Catholic Church is the breadth of its 
actions both in terms of geographical distribution and in terms of 
personnel engaged in responding to emergency situations.6 
 From a geographical point of view, the actions of the Church network 
cover a wide geographical area: almost all crisis areas and regions 
where migrants are eeing to neighboring countries. ere are also 
multiple actors, each with their own uniqueness, engaged on-site, 
directly or through local institutions. Currently the Church network 
includes more than 4,000 sta members and more than 8,000 volun-
teers involved in on-site aid activities (to which we must add priests 
and other clergy). e large number of volunteers reveals the impor-
tance of the daily commitment of local volunteers in the charitable 
eld. 
6 Ponticio Consiglio “Cor Unum”. Dati sull’aiuto umanitario delle entità eccle-
siali nel contesto della crisi Siriana e Irachena 2014–2015, 17 settembre 2015, http://
www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontical_councils/corunum/corunum_it/iniz-
iative/rc_pc_corunum_doc_20150917_focal_point_dati_siria_it.html, accessed 
October 11, 2017; “Cor Unum: Fih meeting on the humanitarian crisis in Syria 
and Iraq.” Bulletin of the Holy See Press Oce, September 27, 2016, https://press.
vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2016/09/27/160927b.html, 
accessed October 11, 2017.
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 Based on our survey over the past few years (2014–16), the Church 
network—made up of charitable agencies, some Catholic Dioceses in 
Syria and Iraq and religious institutions operating locally—has mobi-
lized more than $530 million in three years as a response to the human-
itarian crisis in Iraq and Syria. 
 We must mention in greater detail the priority areas on which the 
Church network focused its attention in 2016. From the total sum of 
the funds mobilized—some $200 million—about $42 million (over 22 
percent of the total) were used for food aid, particularly in Syria; about 
$34 million were used for projects in education, especially in Lebanon 
and Jordan; $31 million were divided between Syria, Iraq, Jordan, 
and Lebanon for projects in the health sector; and over $15 million 
were allocated to non-food items. Among these areas of intervention, 
education and health are considered a priority. 
3.  An element that is dear to the Holy See is the concept of the “right to 
return,” which should be formally and legally declared. I would like 
to mention the statement of the Secretary of State, Cardinal Pietro 
Parolin, on the situation of Christians in the Middle East during the 
Ordinary Public Consistory on the Middle East of October 2014: “In 
clearly condemning such violations not only of international human-
itarian law but of the most elementary human rights, we rearm the 
right of refugees to return and to live in dignity and security in their 
own country and environment. It is a right that must be supported and 
guaranteed by the international community as much as by the states 
of which the displaced persons or refugees are citizens. At stake are 
fundamental principles such as the value of life, human dignity, reli-
gious freedom, and the peaceful and harmonious coexistence between 
persons and between peoples.”7
 is enables me to also say a few words on the presence of Christians 
in the Middle East, which has been fundamental to the growth and 
cultural development of these countries. e frequent and vigorous 
appeals of the Holy See in favor of the permanence of Christians in 
that region are not dictated only by the rightful concern that holy sites 
7 Concistoro ordinario pubblico sul Medio Oriente. Intervento del Card. Pietro 
Parolin, Secretario di Stato, October 20, 2014, http://www.vatican.va/roman_
curia/secretariat_state/parolin/2014/documents/rc_seg-st_20141020_parolin-
concistoro-medio-oriente_it.html, accessed October 11, 2017.
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risk being turned into cemeteries, being deprived of the daily presence 
of the faithful who live there, but also by the fact that the social fabric of 
those countries has greatly beneted from the presence of Christians: 
Just think of all the schools and system of education. 
4.  Finally, I would like to rearm that we need to take a clearer look at 
the link between war and political instability and forced migration, 
and between migration and under-development. Only a clear-minded 
gaze can help us positively govern the problem of migration, which 
cannot be solved by rounding up refugees in camps that may turn into 
permanent residences,8 but rather by allowing people to live in peace 
and freedom, clearly in compliance with the established law and order. 
And I would like to close this speech with this concept, because men 
and women move in the name of personal freedom. During one of my 
visits in Lebanon, I asked a group of Syrian and Iraqi women if they 
would have liked to return to their home countries. e majority said 
that no, they would not, because in Lebanon they had experienced 
freedom. is is what we mean when we advocate putting the person 
at the center of our action. is is the only way a society can hope to 
change without resorting to violence: by educating people to respon-
sibly exercise their freedom and enabling them to do so. e Church’s 
role in the eld of education is recognized by all, and her commitment 
to this eld remains unaltered. 
 e search for peace, humanitarian assistance, the right to return, 
education for freedom in responsibility, are the prospects that I believe 
can contribute to shaping a lasting solution for the issue of refugees, 
especially in the Middle East. 
8 Pontical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People & the 
Pontical Council “Cor Unum”. Welcoming Christ in Refugees and Forcibly 
Displaced Persons: Pastoral Guidelines. Vatican City: Vatican Press, 2013, no. 44.
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Mukesh Kapila 
On the Road to Damascus
In preparing for my presentation on refugee perspectives, I wondered what 
Fatima would say if she could speak for herself. Fatima is a refugee and 
I met her in a freezing, ramshackle shelter in the Bekaa Valley, midway 
between Beirut and Damascus. Fatima squatted on the threadbare carpet. 
Outside, the wind howled and akes of snow pierced the torn canvas 
tent. Fatima looked much older than her y years and her toothless face 
beamed with love as she lied a baby out of harm’s way from the smoking 
stove. Surrounded by her seven grandchildren aged between nine months 
and thirteen years, she told me her story. 
“We had a nice life near Damascus but when the plane destroyed our 
house and killed my husband, I ran,” she said. She slipped across the border 
into Lebanon. “Allah be praised, a kind man let me stay on his eld and 
helped me build this home.” e kind Samaritan was Elias, a small-scale 
Lebanese businessman who owned the eld that now housed 200 refu-
gees. Earlier on, Elias had shown me around the camp. “ese are our 
own brothers and sisters and the eld was lying empty, anyway,” he said 
modestly. is was not a UN-recognized refugee camp and so not eligible 
for ocial help. But Elias had mobilized his local church to provide the 
necessities for living and local NGOs had also pitched in. 
Fatima served me tea and continued her story. “I had two sons. e 
elder and his wife died in an air attack in Aleppo; luckily the children had 
been at school. e younger was press-ganged into a militia and killed 
somewhere. I don’t know what happened to my second daughter-in-law.” 
Fatima described how she had gone back and forth across the border and 
crisscrossed several militia frontlines until she had rescued her scattered 
grandchildren, now clustered here like chicks around a mother hen. 
I marveled at her remarkable courage in facing the dangers she had 
encountered and her tenacious optimism despite the odds stacked against 
her. “You must be so very angry at the people who did this to your family. 
You must be wanting revenge,” I commented somewhat lamely. Fatima 
paused for a long moment. “Enough blood has been spilt. I want my grand-
children to have a better life. ey must be educated and get good jobs.” She 
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looked proudly at the eldest. “He is good at math and wants to be an engi-
neer. We will need many to rebuild our country.” 
Humbled into silence, I prepared to leave. But I had a nal job to do. It 
was almost Christmas Day and Elias had a huge bag of chocolates donated 
by the surrounding community. “Will you do us the honor to give them 
out?” he asked me. Under a tin shed which was the school created by the 
refugees who were also the teachers, several dozen kids shivered: Syria’s 
future engineers, teachers, nurses, and doctors. Perhaps also peace builders 
if Fatima was to have her wish. e last chocolate was for me to take for 
myself. “anks for coming and have a happy new year,” said Elias. A fund-
raising leaet on my car seat proclaimed, “It’s never cold with warm hearts.” 
* * *
at evening, I was invited to meet with friends in fashionable downtown 
Beirut. In the taxi, marooned in one of the city’s famous trac jams, were 
groups of Syrian refugees—mothers and children selling small items as they 
darted in and out of the slow-moving vehicles. Also, young Darfuri men 
appeared to have cornered the market in washing the car screens of reluc-
tant drivers. I did not see them as unfortunate victims but as enterprising 
and hopeful survivors. Fatima had changed my outlook. My benevolent 
thoughts evaporated as the taxi driver shooed away the refugees congre-
gating around the car. “ere are too many of them and they are so dirty,” 
he muttered. ere followed a familiar litany of complaints about jobs, cost 
of living, over-crowding in schools and hospitals, crime, and so on. All 
blamed on the foreigners. I asked him about his own family. Without irony, 
he said, “My mother is from Iraq. She ran away from Saddam many years 
ago. She married my Lebanese father and became Lebanese herself.” Lucky 
that it was that way around, as the converse would not have worked: A 
Lebanese woman marrying a refugee cannot confer her nationality on him. 
As I tried to get my head around such obvious inequities, my driver 
vented his opinions. I learned that not all refugees are equal. Aer seventy 
years, the Palestinian refugees were just about accepted. e large recent 
Syrian inux was beginning to strain the bonds of kinship. And the Suda-
nese were denitely unwelcome. A touch of racism perhaps, I wondered, as 
he added, “ey are not like us.” 
As I waited for my friends in a restaurant, I pondered over my taxi 
conversation. A staggering quarter of Lebanon’s population of six million 
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were refugees. e tensions articulated by my driver were not surprising. 
But they seemed to be much less here than in a hysterical Europe where refu-
gees were a tiny fraction of the total population despite the recent Syrian 
inux. It also struck me that the Lebanese themselves were great emigrants: 
ree times as many Lebanese lived outside than in their country of origin. 
ey were also savvy: e Lebanese friends whom I was awaiting all had 
second nationalities: Brazilian, US, Australian, French. Good insurance in 
times of trouble; and so, for them, identity was not a matter of sentiment 
but of practicality. Meanwhile, the Lebanese diaspora had spawned many 
artists, writers, businesses, Nobel Prize winners, and had even provided 
major political leaders in their new countries. e benets of migration cut 
both ways. 
* * *
e following morning, I went to a Palestinian Red Crescent hospital in 
central Lebanon. In the rehabilitation section, a Syrian mother recounted 
how her family had ed Homs. Her four-year old son had autism and the 
constant bombardments had so disturbed him that it had become impos-
sible to manage his disruptive behavior. I could see that for myself, as the 
little boy cowered between his mother’s legs but lashed out at anyone who 
came near. en, his therapist Bushra walked in and cajoled the boy to 
sit still and take a green toy from her outstretched hand. An hour later he 
could do it without scratching and snatching, and was duly rewarded with 
an apple. is was the culmination of two months of therapy where Bushra 
had spent many hours with the severely disturbed child. A true labor of 
love. 
Bushra spoke about herself. She was a highly trained speech and occu-
pational therapist but, as a Palestinian refugee, she was not allowed formal 
employment. She was in her late 20s, born in Lebanon’s oldest refugee camp 
for Palestinians, established in 1948. “I had the chance to go to Canada as 
they need speech therapists but I want to help my own people,” she said 
simply. Now her skills were also much needed by Syrian refugees. 
Bushra had never been to Palestine. Born in exile, she clung to her 
identities as both a Palestinian and a refugee. But on Bushra’s co-identity 
as a refugee, I was perplexed. Her grandparents may have been refugees, 
but why did that make her a refugee? Surely, refugeedom is not an inher-
ited condition! 
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I wondered if identity is just what you are labeled with by others to 
deliberately distance you. I had seen rst-hand the sinister consequences 
when that is taken to the extreme. I witnessed the Rwanda genocide in 1994 
when the Tutsis were murdered en masse by the Hutus and, in 2003-04, I 
had found myself, as head of the United Nations in Sudan, battling against 
the supremacist Arab regime in Khartoum doing the same against Darfur’s 
black African people. 
Bushra continued to brief me on what it was like to be a refugee—unable 
to live in dignity, make a proper living from her precious skills and talents, 
or to travel freely. She was quite matter-of-fact about it and I marveled at 
her tolerant attitude and the compassionate professionalism with which 
she went about her duties—treating Palestinian, Syrian, and Iraqi refugees 
without distinction. Neither did she turn away their equally poor Leba-
nese hosts. Bushra even bought apples with her own meager income to give 
out to the little ones! Her shi at an end, she asked me, “Do you want to 
see how refugees live?” As we awaited my car, Bushra introduced me to 
some people in the hospital foyer. ey were Palestinian and Syrian elders 
exchanging views. I understood that the Palestinians were doing what we 
call “knowledge transfer” in the development eld. e Palestinian refu-
gees had become expert at being a nation without a country; and now they 
were teaching the Syrians to do the same as no one knew how long their 
exodus would last. I was fascinated by the solidarity being displayed. 
* * *
We drove to a dilapidated old building, an ocial refugee center under 
UNHCR protection. Some 800 recent arrivals were housed in the cramped 
classrooms of what had once been a college. ree families—some een 
people—shared each room. Rivulets of lthy water meandered through 
the corridors. Smoky res glowed under the sheltered stairwells as people 
cooked their rations. 
We met up again with the Syrian mother and her autistic son, and were 
greeted by the rest of her family. All huddled under a quilt as heaters were 
not allowed in these living rooms due to the risk of re. A tattered bed 
sheet and a few pieces of cardboard were nailed to the broken windows in 
feeble defense against the icy wind that blew in. “Why hasn’t the glass been 
replaced in the windows? It’s easy and cheap to do, and would make a big 
dierence here,” I cried out. I was informed that the ocials in charge had 
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decreed otherwise. Apparently, they had said, “is is a temporary camp 
and we don’t want the refugees getting too comfortable here. ey may 
never leave then!” 
I was appalled. In a lifetime spent at the humanitarian frontlines of the 
world’s worst crises, I have never come across anyone who had willingly 
ed their own homes. And those that were pushed out either went back as 
soon as they could or toiled hard to make a better life for themselves. Yes, 
they could be stuck like the Palestinians in this region, or the Darfuris 
in neighboring Chad—sometimes for many, many years—due to circum-
stances outside their control. But nobody tarried longer than necessary in 
second-class limbo as a dependent refugee in a foreign land. 
I felt angry at the mindless bureaucrats who forced an uncompre-
hending autistic child to shiver in the bitter depths of winter when they 
could easily bring a modicum of the comfort that their humanitarian 
mission demanded. 
* * *
Today, the international humanitarian business—yes, that is what it has 
become—is valued at billions of US dollars providing employment to tens 
of thousands of workers in hundreds of organizations. Some say that it has 
become too large, and others that it is not big enough because humani-
tarian needs have expanded even further. Both views are right but, in any 
case, our methodologies do not know how to value compassion, and so 
the ocial statistics do not recognize the work of the likes of Elias and 
Bushra. at meant that no one had thought it worthwhile to plant any 
ag on Elias’s muddy eld, and the 200 refugees like Grandma Fatima had 
no formal status. us, they were not entitled to ocial assistance and 
protection as mandated by the 1951 Refugee Convention. ey relied on 
their own wits and the random kindness of strangers. When I had seen 
them, they had looked as happy and hopeful as anyone could be under 
the circumstances. I had felt good to be among them. In contrast, the 800 
people in the old college building were ocially recognized as refugees—
they had a blue ag ying on top—and were being cared for, aer a fashion. 
But they were also subject to the random meanness of the ocial humani-
tarian system, and looked miserable and hopeless. I had felt bad to be with 
them. I wondered what I would want if I were ever forced to choose where 
to go in my own darkest hour of need. 
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I had also seen how Fatima refused to become a victim of misfortune 
or to be bitter about the injustices inicted upon her. She was busy plan-
ning for the future and I learned from her the true meaning of resilience—a 
much-used buzzword in the humanitarian business. She also brought hope, 
conveyed a vision of the future she wanted, and expressed determination 
to shape it. All these are the essential attributes of a natural leadership. In 
another place with other opportunities, Fatima could easily head one of 
our numerous international humanitarian organizations. If that happens, 
I wonder what she would say to my prejudiced taxi driver—himself the son 
of a refugee migrant but now wanting to build a wall against today’s unfor-
tunate refugees. I also wonder what she would say to the leaders of our great 
humanitarian and political institutions—drunk on their own platitudes. 
Elias had reminded me that the humanitarian instinct is innate in all 
of us. He had also told me more about his church, which had rallied around 
the mostly Muslim Syrian refugees. It was in the Armenian Orthodox 
faith—catering for the spiritual needs of the descendants of the Armenian 
refugees that had ed the Ottoman Empire’s genocidal pogrom a century 
earlier. I could feel the connecting thread from Armenia to current day 
Syria. A crime against humanity in one place is a crime against humanity 
everywhere. I am not narrating an ancient parable. Mine was an actual, 
recent journey on the road to Damascus. Unexpectedly, it had turned out to 
be a crash course in the paradoxes of modern humanitarianism including 
how we deal with our refugees and displaced persons. On one hand, I had 
been greatly consoled by seeing how the milk of human kindness was still 
owing, and how the poorest people were also the most generous. But, on 
the other hand, I was also deeply disturbed by seeing how the humani-
tarian instinct was being frittered away or, worse still, stied by those who 
had turned humanitarian work into just a job. 
On balance, I learned from Elias and his community that kind-
ness still trumped cruelty. But this cannot be taken for granted, as I also 
learned from the Beirut taxi driver. Refugee perspectives are as varied as 
the contexts that generate forced migration. At the same time, as Fatima’s 
real-life story illustrates, all refugee experiences are marked by incredible 
endurance and resilience in the face of the persecution that compels people 
to ee. “Becoming a refugee” extracts considerable physical, psycholog-
ical, and social costs that have permanent impact on survivors—and their 
descendants. In seeking a place of safety, a refugee juggles many consid-
erations and makes many calculations that are not always self-evident to 
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others who are not faced with the same dilemmas. Information and misin-
formation are oen crucial in terms of choices made. 
In theory, there is a rules-based asylum system in place, but in prac-
tice its workings are arbitrary and unaccountable. e asylum seeker has 
to endure many insults and indignities. e magnitude of assistance they 
receive also varies and, with restrictions on employment and movement, 
their ability to earn a livelihood is severely constrained. is only serves 
to foster yet further dependency. In contrast, the net longer-term benet to 
societies from hosting refugees is hugely positive. Yet many myths prevail 
around so-called “refugee burdens.” However, public attitudes towards 
refugees are oen at variance with ocial government attitudes, setting 
up policy and practice contradictions. Attitudes are colored by muddling-
up the categories of migrants, including bona de refugees with those 
migrating for economic reasons. 
We have all heard and marveled over the many extraordinary stories 
of refugee endurance and resilience—suering incredible abuse and perse-
cution in their homelands, and displaying astounding courage in climbing 
mountains, crossing deserts, and swimming across seas—to nd a safe 
refuge. Refugees are special people. Refugees are a small proportion of the 
tens of millions of people who are “on the move” across the world. Many 
more are internally displaced within oppressive countries. Is it still fair to 
distinguish refugees from the internally displaced? e post Second World 
War international system for their protection and care has been over-
whelmed by subsequent trends. It is no longer trusted, not least due to its 
arbitrary nature. 
What would be the essential features of a new and fairer humanitarian 
system to help all forcibly displaced people—whether or not they cross 
borders? 
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Stephane Jaquemet
The Importance of Remembering
Both as a UNHCR ocial and personally, I felt at the same time humbled 
and very proud to address the conference on “Refugee Policies from 1933 
until Today: Challenges and Responsibilities,” organized by the Interna-
tional Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in cooperation with the 
Holy See, in Rome on February 16–17, 2016. Humbled because no contem-
porary refugee crisis, whatever tragedy and suering it has brought to 
millions of people, can be compared with the plight of those who tried─the 
vast majority of them unsuccessfully─to ee the Holocaust. Humbled also 
because as the former UN Secretary General Ko Annan said, “[T]he 
United Nations emerged from the ashes of the Holocaust.”1 And this gives 
us, as UN ocials, a huge responsibility. Very proud, because the survi-
vors of the Shoah themselves are guiding us and telling us that if there is 
any lesson to be drawn from their horrible and senseless suering, it is 
also to speak up in favor of today’s victims of human rights, any victim, 
whatever the violation. ough the degree of suering, of human rights 
violations does matter, it is not the focus. Any level of suering or human 
rights violation is unacceptable. By accepting or even tolerating it, we will 
help open Pandora’s box of human evil. e Shoah was unfortunately the 
culmination of hundreds of years of accepted discrimination, antisemitism 
and violence. As the Canadian Supreme Court reminded us in upholding 
the constitutionality of anti-hate legislation, “the Holocaust did not begin 
in the gas chambers—it began with words.”2 
e theme of the conference is particularly relevant because we nd 
ourselves at a perilous crossroad where antisemitism, anti-Islamism, racism, 
1 “‘Jews everywhere must feel that the United Nations is their home, too,’ Secretary 
General tells seminar on antisemitism.” UN. Press Release, June 21, 2004, www.
un.org/press/en/2004/hr4773.doc.htm, accessed August 24, 2017.
2 Quoted by Irwin Cotler, “Remembering the Holocaust: What Have We Learned? 
What Must We Do?” UN Watch, January 29, 2007, http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/dil070125_unhollocaust_/dil070125_
unhollocaust_en.pdf, accessed August 24, 2017. 
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hatred, bigotry, disregard for the most basic human decency are on the rise, 
with existing but insucient reaction from governments and civil societies. 
At a perilous crossroad where extreme right-wing parties and movements, 
sometimes with the tacit or explicit acquiescence of more mainstream 
political parties, are, unfortunately with some success, rewriting history 
and challenging our human rights culture. At a perilous crossroad where 
entire regions, in particular in Africa and the Middle East, are plagued by 
conict, war crimes, and “cleansing” of civilian population. New conicts 
have emerged while none of the “old” ones are close to a pacic resolution. 
Finally, a perilous crossroad where we have the largest number of refugees 
and internally displaced persons since the Second World War, some of them 
nding open borders and policies, others closed doors and closed hearts. 
Refugees eeing persecution and migrants leaving behind abject poverty 
and societies denying them a future are increasingly portrayed in extremely 
negative terms. e worst is that they are oen depersonalized and dehu-
manized. As Moshe Kantor, president of the European Jewish Congress, 
reminds us: “As long as we do not know names, identities, loves, fears, 
careers, relationships and experiences—as long as we cannot put a name or 
a picture to them—we cannot save them. ey are faceless, which is exactly 
what the killers intended. It is because of this that we have devoted this 
International Holocaust Remembrance Day, here in the European Parlia-
ment, in 2017 to Restoring Identities of those who were murdered.”3 
To understand today’s and tomorrow’s challenges and responsibilities, 
both in countries of origin aected by conict and human rights viola-
tions and in countries of asylum, where increasingly restrictive policies are 
adopted, it is essential not only to have a historical perspective but also 
to remember, because it is only through remembering that we can build 
the antidote against hatred, rejection, and discrimination. And this is the 
rst essential message given to us by Holocaust survivor Primo Levi: “We 
cannot understand, but we can and must understand from where it springs, 
and we must be on our guard because what happened can happen again. 
[...] For this reason, it is everyone’s duty to reect on what happened.”4
3 Quoted by IHRA, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, Media Room, 
January 26, 2017, https://holocaustremembrance.com/media-room/stories/inter-
national-holocaust-remembrance-day-2017, accessed August 24, 2017. 
4 Primo Levi, “If this is a man.” Cited by Bright, Martin. “We cannot make sense 
of this evil and anger.” Jewish Chronicle, March 30, 2017, https://www.thejc.com/
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In simple but very powerful words, teenager Charlotte Cohen, who 
was asked to join the British Holocaust Commission established by Prime 
Minister David Cameron, highlights the fact that the Holocaust is a 
“contemporary issue,” why it is so important to remember the Holocaust 
and how we can make sure future generations never forget: 
“e Holocaust [is] a contemporary issue because it demonstrates the 
atmosphere in which genocide can take place […]. ere remains in our 
society a degree of anti-Semitism, but furthermore levels of xenophobia, 
Islamophobia, a fear of the travelling community, of black and Asian 
communities […]. It is therefore important to remember the Holocaust 
because it is an example of how these trends could evolve into something 
far more threatening.”5 
e second message is that the Holocaust was not an accident of history, 
a “sudden” cataclysm. As the UN Secretary General, António Guterres, 
reminded us on January 27, 2017, during the observance of the Interna-
tional Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of Holocaust, “it 
would be a dangerous error to think of the Holocaust as simply the result of 
the insanity of a group of criminal Nazis. On the contrary, the Holocaust 
was the culmination of millennia of hatred and discrimination targeting 
the Jews─what we now call anti-Semitism.”6 
e third message, very much linked to the second one, is that between 
1933 and 1945, there were hard-core criminals operating, but above all the 
complicity of those who remained silent. Indierence, because it paves the 
way for the most brutal instincts to ourish, is a killer. During that period, 
indierence took many forms, including socially accepted antisemitism, 
which made the Holocaust possible. Elie Wiesel reminds us of how deadly 
silence can be: “I swore never to be silent whenever and wherever human 
beings endure suering and humiliation. We must take sides. Neutrality 
comment/comment/martin-bright-on-westminster-terror-1.435391, accessed 
August 24, 2017.
5 “e importance of remembering the Holocaust.” Jewish Chronicle, October 23, 2014, 
https://www.thejc.com/the-importance-of-remembering-the-holocaust-1.59585, 
accessed August 24, 2017.
6 Guterres, António. Remarks at Observance of the International Day of Commem-
oration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust, January 27, 2017, https://
www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-01-27/secretary-generals-memory-
victims-holocaust-remarks, accessed August 24, 2017.
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helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, 
never the tormented.”7
e study of European and German history, in particular the nine-
teenth century and the rst half of the twentieth century, the study of 
the twelve years the Nazi regime was in power, put us on two long roads 
where complacency, silence, and at best timid and unassertive objections 
to blatant antisemitism and persecution have led to a constant escala-
tion, which culminated with the Holocaust. e second half of the twen-
tieth century and the twenty-rst century are full of examples where geno-
cides (Rwanda and Srebrenica are very relevant examples─but not the only 
ones─of the excruciating complicity of a passive international community) 
and systematic human rights violations have been “building up” over the 
years, the tormentors taking advantage of weak reactions against abuses to 
become, as time passes, more abusive and less and less “constrained.” 
e fourth message is a particularly chilling fact. Jews were not only 
the victims of an extermination campaign, but the vast majority of them 
found closed borders when they tried to ee. And those closing the borders 
knew or should have known that closed borders meant extermination. So 
the Holocaust was also characterized by the international unwillingness 
and complete failure to protect. 
is complete failure to protect was evident during the 1938 Evian 
Conference on Jewish refugees: “During the Conference it became pain-
fully obvious that no country was willing to volunteer anything. e British 
delegate claimed that Britain was already fully populated and suering 
from unemployment, so it could take in no refugees […]. e French dele-
gate declared that France had reached the extreme point of saturation as 
regards admission of refugees. Myron C. Taylor, the American delegate, 
allowed that the United States would make the previously unlled quota 
for Germans and Austrians available to the new refugees. Only the Domin-
ican Republic, a tiny country in the West Indies, volunteered to take in 
refugees─in exchange for huge amounts of money.”8
7 e Nobel Acceptance Speech delivered by Elie Wiesel in Oslo on December 10, 1986, 
http://www.eliewieselfoundation.org/nobelprizespeech.aspx, accessed August 24, 
2017.
8 Shoah Resource Center, Yad Vashem, at http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/
Microso%20Word%20-%206305.pdf, accessed August 24, 2017; see Wyman, David 
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is unwillingness to oer sanctuary to persecuted Jewish refugees 
would be reected in the years to come in countless administrative or legis-
lative measures, or rejection at borders. Among those, we can mention some 
of the most infamous, such as the defeat of the Wagner-Rogers refugee aid 
bill in February 1939, which would have allowed the admission into the 
USA of 20,000 refugee children under the age of 14 from Germany; the 
935 passengers of the Saint-Louis who were denied entry into Cuban and 
American ports in spring 1939 and forced to return to European countries, 
most of them falling under Nazi occupation in the months to follow and 
245 dying in the Holocaust; and the attitude of neutral countries during the 
Second World War, which was dened by Ruth Fivaz-Silbermann, talking 
more specically about Switzerland, as being between active refusal and 
passive help.9
e sad irony of the 1938 Evian Conference is that one of its rare 
achievements was the establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee 
on Refugees (ICR), a predecessor of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR). But the ICR was unable to resettle Jewish 
refugees and whatever goodwill it may have had, it was never given the 
means to “succeed.”
Beyond its invaluable standard-setting dimension, the 1951 Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees, this now quasi universal treaty, is 
primarily the result of the failure to protect the refugees, mostly Jewish, 
from the Nazi persecutions. “e entire Refugee Convention came out of 
the Holocaust,” as Mark Heteld─chief executive the of Jewish refugee 
program Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS)─rightly said.10 And as 
S. Paper Walls. America and the Refugee Crisis 1938–1941. New York: Random 
House, 1985.
9 Fivaz-Silbermann, Ruth. “Ignorance, Realpolitik and Human Rights: Switzerland 
between Active Refusal and Passive Help.” In: IHRA & Corry Guttstadt & omas 
Lutz & Bernd Rother & Yessica San Román (eds.). Bystanders, Rescuers or Perpe-
trators: the Neutral Countries and the Shoah. Berlin: Metropol, 2016, pp. 87–99 
electronically available at https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/
publications, accessed August 25, 2017. 
10 Walker, Peter. “Holocaust survivors say Donald Trump’s refugee ban ‘tragically’ 
similar to 1930s.” e Independent, January 27, 2017, http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/world/americas/holocaust-survivors-donald-trump-immigration-
ban-not-put-america-rst-syria-refugees-fear-a7549286.html, accessed August 
25, 2017.
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already mentioned, this gives us─refugee practitioners and refugee protec-
tion ocers─a huge responsibility. 
e last message I would like to share with you is that most survivors 
of the Shoah and their descendants have spoken up against all forms of 
discrimination and hatred, and in support of all victims of hatred. Precisely 
because they had survived the most horrible form of suering and system-
atic annihilation, they stood up and keep standing up as soon as discrim-
ination and hatred are detected, because they know that discrimination 
and hatred are the beginning of a dangerous and slippery road where each 
additional curve brings additional suering. An example, among thou-
sands of others, of solidarity from Holocaust survivors and their descen-
dants with refugees comes from Milan’s Holocaust Memorial. In 2015, 
the Memorial started oering temporary shelter to migrants and refugees 
stranded at Milan’s central station. “Indierence” is the word engraved 
on the wall at the entrance of the Memorial and as Roger Cohen put it in 
his October 8, 2015, article in the New York Times:11 “So it was perhaps 
inevitable that when Roberto Jarach, the vice president of the Memorial, 
was asked if he could help with Milan’s refugee crisis, he saw that word 
ash through his mind. As hundreds of desperate refugees converged daily 
on Milan’s central station─opened during the rule of the Fascist dictator 
Benito Mussolini─the Memorial could not show “indierence.” Cohen 
continues: “ere is no direct analogy between the situation of millions 
of refugees today and the Jews who were deported from Milan’s Platform 
21 (as the Memorial is also known). e refugees are eeing war—not, in 
general, targeted annihilation […]. Still, there are echoes, not least in that 
word, indierence […]. Nobody saw the Jews. Nobody wanted to see them. 
Indierence kills. As Syria demonstrates.” 
But maybe the most simple and profoundly humane comment by one 
of the Holocaust survivors was made by Gene Klein, who said in a January 
26, 2016 appeal for Syrian refugees: “Almost seventy years later, as a US 
citizen and a veteran, I watch the struggle of today’s refugees on my tele-
vision screen, and listen to the politicians falling over themselves to outdo 
their rivals’ xenophobia. I cannot help but be reminded of how Jewish refu-
gees were turned away from these shores in the late 1930s and sent home 
11 Cohen, Roger. “Indierence Kills.” e New York Times, October 5, 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/opinion/a-refugee-lesson-for-europe.
html?mwrsm=Facebook&_r=0, accessed August 25, 2017.
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to be murdered in extermination camps. And yet I also remember how, 
a decade later, this country welcomed survivors like me with open arms. 
When I see German people lining the streets to greet Syrian refugees with 
shopping carts full of food, it is clear to me that the world can change for 
the better.”12
I would like to conclude by making reference to the opening of the 
new museum at the World Holocaust Remembrance Center Yad Vashem 
in March 2005, during which the director of Yad Vashem, Avner Shalev, 
said he was hoping the museum would inspire visitors to make moral 
choices.13 Aer twenty-ve years with the UNHCR and more than thirty 
years working with refugees, I am more and more convinced that beyond 
indispensable international protection standards, refugee protection lies 
in moral choices that need to be made, and in the moral compass that must 
guide us. e current refugee crises─I am using the plural because we have 
more than ten proper crises in parallel at the moment─need more than a 
humanitarian response, funding, and resettlement quotas. e latter are 
necessary but not sucient. Above all, we need to be vigilant, we need to 
proactively ght against any form of discrimination and any expression of 
hatred, because they may appear less serious today but they will be the seed 
for tomorrow’s atrocities. We all as individuals, associations, and govern-
ments must show daily solidarity, basic, simple human solidarity with refu-
gees. And we have to counteract, with all our strength and intelligence, the 
narrative of those revisiting history, challenging the human rights system 
and culture built during the last seventy years and portraying refugees as 
proteers or a threat to national identity. is narrative is highly toxic and 
we have to collectively ensure that as persons, society and community of 
states we refuse to be intoxicated.
I am glad that this conference has put us on this path of solidarity and 
of ghting indierence, which may well be the most essential contribution 
to refugee protection.
12 Klein, Gene. “Holocaust survivor appeals for Syrian refugees.” San Diego Jewish 
World, January 26, 2016, http://www.sdjewishworld.com/2016/01/26/66900/, 
accessed August 25, 2017.
13 Erlanger, Steven. “New Museum, Putting a Human Face on the Holocaust, 
Opens in Israel.” e New York Times, March 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/03/16/world/middleeast/new-museum-putting-a-human-face-on-the-
holocaust-opens-in.html, accessed August 25, 2017.
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Michael O’Flaherty 
Why the European Union is a Community of Values 
under Threat; and Why We Must Not Lose Hope
is conference is very timely, and not only because of the existence, the 
eminence, and the scale of the migration crisis we are facing. It is impor-
tant because of the critical need to learn from the past in order to shape 
our present. e Holocaust is one of the most horric occurrences to have 
taken place in human history, thus it is urgent that we learn from it—and 
learn the lesson well. 
Justice and equity are the essence of what we are seeking to honor. 
e European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights works across many 
issues relevant in this regard, but it must be said that responding to the 
migration crisis is one of our greatest preoccupations. We had sta present 
in the reception centers—the so-called hotspots—in Greece and Italy for 
most of 2016. Every month, we publish an analysis of the human rights 
situation of those arriving in the EU across fourteen EU member states. 
We have also delivered numerous opinions to the EU legislators, ensuring 
that planned revisions of asylum-related law are human rights compliant. 
For as long as we have been engaged with issues of migration and 
asylum, we also have been working on the issue of Holocaust remembrance 
and how this can be applied toward building respectful societies in Europe. 
e Holocaust has taught us that without respect for basic human rights, 
the unspeakable can become a reality. 
In this context, we deeply appreciate the close partnership of the 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) with the IHRA, an organization with 
which we have much in common. We would also very much like to inten-
sify our connection with our co-hosts today, the Holy See, as we want to do 
with all faith communities. Dialogue between faiths is more vital than ever 
if we are to nd sustainable solutions in the migration context. At the same 
time, we need to repopulate the very large area of common ground that we 
share in the pursuit of the protection and promotion of human rights.
I was asked to summarize the conclusions I took with me from this 
important and inspiring conference. 
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e rst conclusion is that those who contribute to policymaking and 
shaping must themselves learn from the past. I myself have learned two 
new things at this conference: I learned, or rather was reminded of, the 
extent to which we need to better develop our understanding of how to run 
a refugee facility, not least through the participation of residents in the deci-
sions about how that facility is managed and operated. I also learned about 
the care that must be taken in selecting the location of migrant and refugee 
facilities, for residents can easily be re-traumatized if placed carelessly in 
the wrong community settings. For example, the Fundamental Rights 
Agency knows of LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) people who 
were forced to ee their home countries because of homophobic practices 
there, only to be placed in camps with exactly the same population compo-
sition as the countries or regions from which they ed. 
e second lesson: We must become better listeners. is emerged 
strongly in Mukesh Kapila’s memorable contribution, and we would do 
well to consider this point in greater depth. Here in Europe we must become 
more humble. We need to recognize the extent to which other parts of the 
world have been contending and coping with such a migrant inux for 
many years, and indeed are looking over to us in astonishment at our some-
times-chaotic response. When I rst visited the Greek islands some four-
teen months ago, I was struck—as a former UN ocial who has worked in 
the Global South—by the extent to which processes that have been working 
at best haltingly in Europe would be operating smoothly if the facilities 
were somewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. We in Europe must acknowledge 
that others may be doing a better job, and that we can improve our own 
procedures through active listening. At the same time we must listen to the 
migrants themselves. Our weakness in this regard has a very clear impact 
on our knowledge of refugees’ experiences and thus our skills to deal with 
them appropriately. 
e third lesson is that we need to examine the reality of the current 
situation in surgical detail, in order to better respond to it. From the 
perspective of the Fundamental Rights Agency, this scrutiny predomi-
nantly regards the specic vulnerabilities of those arriving at our shores. 
Consider, for example, the reality for children: We have procedures 
in place for new arrivals and with little forethought we expect the solu-
tions for adults to be adequate to the needs of children. However, this is 
simply not the case. A dening concern of recent years has been a persis-
tent inability to deliver suitable, targeted child protection. 
MICHAEL O’FLAHERTY 
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   224 12.02.2018   15:59:50
225
Another such issue is the treatment of torture victims arriving on our 
shores. From our work we see that, for example, only one EU member state 
systematically records the arrival of torture victims in its rst reception 
facilities. at country is Greece, which is so oen maligned for its inad-
equate response to the migration situation. But Greece is generating good 
practice in this and a number of other areas. 
My fourth conclusion simply involves the word “facts.” We can do 
much more to generate and subsequently use data and factual evidence in 
order to formulate our responses to the situation. is is a large part of 
what the Fundamental Rights Agency and many of our partner organiza-
tions have committed to do: produce the evidence base that enables policy-
makers to deal with the realities we face more eectively. Take, for example, 
the extent to which we have allowed a narrative to develop that denes new 
arrivals as predominantly economic migrants. Yet the fact is that in 2015, 
three hs of the migrants who arrived in Europe in the context of the 
recent inux came from one of the ten countries worldwide that are most 
aected by conict. is clearly confounds the notion that these people are 
simply in search of the good life. 
ere is another myth that urgently needs to be dispelled: the theory 
that refugees and other migrants, particularly from the Middle East, have 
“imported” sexual violence to Europe. You may recall the malevolent 
rumor that appeared in the media in January 2016 following the sexual 
attacks in Cologne, when young migrant men attacked women as they cele-
brated New Year. Nobody denies the occurrence itself or its seriousness, 
but the narrative that somehow migrants were bringing sexual violence to 
Europe was a fatuous myth. Blaming migrants for violence against women 
does not only tar a large group of mostly law-abiding people with the same 
brush, but also ignores the fact that we have a serious and long-standing 
indigenous problem with sexual violence in Europe that we need to combat 
within our societies. 
My h conclusion relates to the term “frame.” It is crucial that we 
adequately frame our understanding, our presentation of and our engage-
ment with the migration situation. In this regard, I very much welcome 
the extent to which the conference discussed the importance of interna-
tional law to correctly frame the situation. We did not build up the inter-
national legal and human rights system aer the Second World War in 
order to ignore it in a crisis of the magnitude we are seeing today. On the 
contrary, in the EU we have a powerful and underused legal instrument 
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in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.1 is is the 
only international treaty in the human rights eld that explicitly guar-
antees asylum and contains a guarantee of non-refoulement, as well as a 
number of other directly related guarantees that create binding legal obli-
gations. Nevertheless, there are few references to this fact in public let alone 
in expert discourse on the migration situation. is needs to change.
In the context of the migration situation, it is also imperative that we 
ensure the crisis is framed in terms of values. is has nothing to do with 
the notion of European values, which can easily be misused to divide and 
subordinate, creating a hierarchy of values based on geography. e values 
that must create the bedrock on which responses to the migration crisis 
are formulated are shared, universal values that we, as Europeans, hold 
dear. We can thus speak of values that you and I share with our Libyan or 
Syrian brothers and sisters without imposing our beliefs on them. Against 
this background, there is one value into which we must inject far greater 
substance in the EU. is value is solidarity. 
My sixth conclusion is “context.” We cannot hope to solve the chal-
lenges thrown up by the migration situation without looking at the broader 
European context in which it is taking place. One important element of 
this context is the economy and the levels of inequality we are witnessing 
in many parts of European society. It is in great part due to the real and felt 
sense of inequality that there has been such hostility to refugees, and such 
a rush of support for populist groups. 
e EU’s emerging Pillar of Social Rights, which will focus on equal 
opportunities and access to labor market, fair working conditions, and 
social protection and inclusion give us an opportunity to do something 
meaningful about inequality right now in European policy making. Impor-
tantly, the principles enshrined in the European Pillar of Social Rights 
cover citizens of both EU and third countries who are legally residing in 
the EU, ensuring there is no hierarchy of rights holders in this area. Just 
recently, Eurodiaconia, a European network of 45 churches and Christian 
NGOs, made an important statement on the social pillar, saying that it was 
a positive opportunity to identify core social principles to be put in place 
across the EU. 
1 e Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union brings together the 
fundamental rights protected in the EU, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/
pdf/text_en.pdf, accessed August 28, 2017.
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e rule of law also must be mentioned in connection with the notion 
of context. Europe is currently facing a serious test to its stability, and we 
are no longer so condent of the solidity of the rule of law framework on 
which our societies are built. We have seen too many challenges to the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, to the free media and to respect for the rightful 
role of parliaments. ese threats must be taken very seriously, not only 
because of their implications for a proper response to the migration situa-
tion, but because of their potential impact on our democracies. 
e seventh of my conclusions involves the word “shame.” is term 
is of course many-faceted. Shame can be reected back on all of us: shame 
on us, as societies, for our lack of generosity. However, it also can be used 
in the sense that those who commit illegalities should be shamed. is can 
be framed as a legal issue, but also as one of values; let us therefore shame 
criminals where we see them. By the same token, there must be far more 
investigation into and prosecution of hate speech and hate crime in the EU, 
not only but certainly also in the context of the migration crisis. Across 
the fourteen countries covered by the Fundamental Rights Agency in its 
monthly migration overviews, the incidents of swastika grati, migrants 
being spat on in public, and even the destruction of places of worship are 
profoundly shocking and should galvanize us all into action. 
My eighth conclusion is the word “sell.” It is not sucient for us to 
have the right solution, to have an intelligent response, or even to develop 
appropriate policies. We also must be able to engage the people who can 
make a dierence, and persuade them. One means of doing so is by making 
the economic case for the reception of migrants. Receiving, welcoming, 
and assisting these newcomers, makes for more innovative and more pros-
perous societies. Einstein was a refugee─and he is just one in a long list. 
e other aspect of persuasion is the communication of our core 
message: that human rights are not a matter of being “nice” to others, but 
rather they lie at the heart of international law and are a core element of 
our democracies. In 2017, the phrase “we do not know how to commu-
nicate anymore” has been reiterated with alarming frequency. Instead of 
repeating this mantra we must concentrate on developing new means and 
modes of communication. is also will be a key issue for the Fundamental 
Rights Agency over the coming year. 
e ninth conclusion is that we must mobilize. We are not suciently 
activated. Faith communities must become more active, more visible, and 
more vocal, not just in speaking the truth to decision- and policymakers, 
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but in talking openly to communities to ensure that Europeans understand 
and appreciate what is at stake. 
e tenth conclusion is that we must persist. ere are two dimensions 
to the need for persistence in this current crisis. Firstly, we must be clear 
that our hard work is unlikely to be rewarded immediately. It is going to 
take time to bring about the changes we need, and we must be patient and 
tenacious. Secondly, we must recognize that migrant reception requires 
long-term approaches, from respectful reception at our frontiers to the 
integration of newcomers in society. 
e integration of migrants and their descendants needs more atten-
tion. Recent work by the Fundamental Rights Agency found that fewer 
than half of the EU’s member states have action plans or strategies that 
explicitly address youth with a migrant background, despite the impor-
tance of avoiding marginalization, alienation, and potentially also radical-
ization. At the same time, few countries provide language courses to resi-
dents with limited language prociency if they already are citizens of the 
country. is excludes many second or third generation migrants who may 
need such assistance in order to successfully enter the labor market.2 
My nal conclusion is that we need hope. It is imperative that we do 
not lose hope. I personally am optimistic. My hope is based on the good 
practices that I see across Europe. For example, guardianship of children 
was not working in many places in 2015. In 2017, we have seen immense 
improvement in some countries, such as Germany. ere are countless 
instances of innovative solutions aimed at alleviating suering and curbing 
human rights abuses. 
In addition, the fundamental goodwill that I see everywhere makes 
me hopeful. I have yet to meet a single individual—whether respon-
sible for registering new arrivals in reception facilities or for shaping EU 
policy─who wants to harm those in his or her care. Not once have I seen 
a will to hurt. I’ve found confusion, a lack of expertise, and occasionally a 
sense of being overwhelmed by the enormity of it all. But I always found 
goodwill. It is enough simply to recall the generosity of the people of Lesbos 
when the island was inundated with more new arrivals than the already 
struggling community could handle. 
2 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Together in the EU—Promoting 
the participation of migrants and their descendants, 2017, http://fra.europa.eu/en/
publication/2017/migrant-participation, accessed January 26, 2018.
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e ultimate basis for hope is the existence of the human rights system, 
the great achievement born of the atrocities of the Second World War. I 
believe that we will never nd ourselves back in the 1930s or 1940s; I believe 
that the human rights system we have built is resilient, that it will survive 
and give us the answers we need. I am glad to say that in making this claim I 
am in the excellent company of Pope Saint John Paul II. In his speech to the 
UN General Assembly in October 1979, he made no less than 21 references 
to human rights, one of which was to describe them as “in keeping with the 
substance of the dignity of the human being, understood in his entirety, 
not as reduced to one dimension only.”3 Eventually, I am certain that this 
will show us the way out of our current predicament, thus ensuring that 
we learn from the past in order to shape our own present, and the future of 
our children. 
3 Pope John Paul II. Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the 34th General Assembly 
of the United Nations, October 2, 1979, https://holyseemission.org/contents/state-
ments/address-of-his-holiness-john-paul-ii-1979.php, accessed August 28, 2017.
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IHRA Delegates and Moderators
Ambassador Thomas Michael Baier received his Doctor of Laws from 
Vienna University in 1975 and then joined the Austrian Foreign Service 
where he served in Vienna, Rome, Baghdad, Soa and at Austria’s Perma-
nent Mission to the UN in Geneva. He was Austrian Ambassador in Addis 
Ababa (1996–2001), Algiers (2001–2006) and Skopje (2011–2015). In 2010 
Dr. Baier led the Austrian Delegation to the Revision Conference for the 
International Criminal Court in Kampala. From 2009–2011 he was Head 
of Austrian Delegation to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alli-
ance where he chaired the Legal Draing Group. In 2015 Ambassador 
Baier was appointed Austrian Special Envoy for the IHRA, where, in 2016, 
he chaired the Evaluation Reference Group.
Ambassador Mihnea Constantinescu was the Chair of the Interna-
tional Holocaust Remembrance Alliance in 2016. Mihnea Constantinescu 
is Ambassador at large, Special representative for Economic Diplomacy and 
Energy Security in the Ministry of Foreign Aairs (MFA). Previously, he 
served for six Governments as Director of the Prime Minister’s Oce, State 
Counselor and Diplomatic Counselor to the Prime Minister, spokesman of 
the Government. As a diplomat in the MFA he was State Secretary Coor-
dinator, General Director for political aairs, Special representative, Head 
of Policy Planning, and director of the minister’s oce. Before joining the 
diplomatic service he was a faculty member at the Polytechnic University 
in Bucharest in Nuclear Power Engineering eld.
Wolf Kaiser, Dr., has been a member of the German delegation to the 
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance since 2001. He was former 
Director of Education at the House of the Wannsee Conference, worked as 
a high school teacher and for 24 years as a historian and educator at the 
Memorial and Educational Site House of the Wannsee Conference in Berlin.
Steven T. Katz, Prof., was the Advisor to the International Holocaust 
Remembrance Alliance from 2010–2017 and holds the Slater Chair in 
Jewish and Holocaust Studies at Boston University. He received his Ph. D. 
from the University of Cambridge in 1972 and he is the former Director 
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of the Elie Wiesel Center for Jewish Studies. Prof. Katz is a member and 
former co-chair of the Academic Committee of the United States Holo-
caust Memorial Museum, and Chair of the Holocaust Commission of the 
Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture. Steven Katz has also published 
numerous works on the Holocaust and Jewish philosophy and over 120 
articles in the elds of Jewish Studies, Holocaust studies, philosophy of reli-
gion, and comparative mysticism and has lectured at universities around 
the world including India, China, and recently Iran. 
Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke, Dr., is Head of the Danish Delega-
tion to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. Dr. Stokholm 
Banke is a Senior Researcher for Foreign Policy at the Danish Institute of 
International Studies, where she specializes in topics including European 
history and society, including nationalism and multiculturalism, political 
and social change, the politics of memory in Europe since 1945 and refugee 
policy in Europe before and during the Second World War.
Veerle Vanden Daelen, Dr., has been a member of the Belgian Delega-
tion to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance since 2012. She 
is Deputy General Director, Curator and Head Collections & Research at 
Kazerne Dossin and holds a PhD in History from the University of Antwerp. 
Her dissertation examined the return and reconstruction of Jewish life in 
Antwerp aer the Second World War (1944–1960). She has held fellow-
ships at the Frankel Institute for Advanced Judaic Studies (University of 
Michi gan) and the Herbert D. Katz Center for Advanced Judaic Studies 
(University of Pennsylvania). In addition to numerous articles, she has 
authored two books, Vrouwbeelden in het Vlaams Blok (Ghent, 2002) and 
Laten we hun lied verder zingen. De heropbouw van de joodse gemeenschap 
in Antwerpen na de Tweede Wereldoorlog (1944–1960) (Amsterdam, 2008).
Juliane Wetzel, Dr., has been a member of the German Delegation to the 
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance since 2002 and sits on 
the IHRA’s Academic Working Group – a group which she chaired from 
2003–2005. Currently she is chairing IHRA’s Committee on Killing Sites. 
Dr. Wetzel is a member of the Independent Expert Board on Antisemitism 
of the German Bundestag. Since 1991 she has worked at the Centre for 
Research on Antisemitism, Technical University, Berlin, as a senior sta 
member she researches and publishes on topics including displaced persons 
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in Germany, the emigration of the Jews during the Nazi era and contempo-
rary antisemitism. Dr. Wetzel received her Ph. D. from the Ludwig Maxi-
milian University in Munich. 
Robert J. Williams, Dr., is a member of the United States Delegation to 
the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, where he chairs the 
committee on Archival Access, is US delegate to the Academic Working 
Group, and will soon chair the Committee on Holocaust Denial and Anti-
semitism. Working as Deputy Director, International Aairs, United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, he previously served as director of 
special research programs in the Museum’s academic center. His doctoral 
research focused on German political culture, US and Soviet Foreign Rela-
tions, and contemporary antisemitism, and he is completing a book on the 
role played by the media in development of political culture in East and 
West Germany. 
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Prof. Carl Bon Tempo, State University of NY at Albany, teaches courses 
in 20th century American political history, public policy history, immi-
gration history, and the history of American foreign policy. Bon Tempo’s 
current research focuses on human rights politics and policies in the U. S. 
from the 1970s to the present. He is the author of Americans at the Gate: 
e United States and Refugees during the Cold War (Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2008), which explores how and why the U. S. admitted over four 
million refugees between 1945 and 2000.
Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher was appointed as Secretary for 
Relations with States within the Holy See’s Secretariat of State on November 
8, 2014. He was ordained a priest for the Archdiocese of Liverpool on July 
31, 1977. Having gained a doctorate in Canon Law, he entered the diplomatic 
service of the Holy See on May 1, 1984, serving in the Apostolic Nunciatures 
in Tanzania (1984–1988), Uruguay (1988–1991), the Philippines (1991–1995) 
and subsequently as an ocial of the Section for Relations with States of the 
Secretariat of State (1995–2000). On July 15, 2000, he was appointed Special 
Envoy and Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the Council of Europe 
at Strasburg. On January 22, 2004, he was appointed titular Archbishop of 
Hodelm and Apostolic Nuncio to Burundi, succeeding Archbishop Michael 
Aidan Courtney, who had been assassinated in an ambush on December 
29, 2003. On March 13, 2004, he was ordained a bishop. Aer ve years 
of service as Apostolic Nuncio in Burundi, he was appointed Apostolic 
Nuncio to Guatemala on February 19, 2009. On December 11, 2012, he was 
appointed Apostolic Nuncio to Australia.
Susanne Heim, Dr., Institute of Contemporary History Munich–Berlin, is 
a German political scientist and historian of National Socialism, the Holo-
caust and international refugee policy. Since 2005 she has been project 
coordinator of the editorial project “Judenverfolgung 1933–1945.” Her 
publications include Architects of Annihilation, with Goetz Aly (2003) and 
Fluchtpunkt Karibik. Juedische Emigranten in der Dominikanischen Repu-
blik, with Hans-Ulrich Dillmann (2009). 
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Johan Ickx, Dr., Holy See, studied religious sciences, theology and philos-
ophy at the Catholic University of Leuven and got his doctorate in church 
history at the Ponticia Università Gregoriana. He worked as academic 
assistant of the Archivum Historiae Ponticiae, ocial of the Congrega-
tion for the Doctrine of the Faith and ocial and archivist of the Tribunal 
of the Apostolic Penitentiary. Currently he is head of the Historical 
Archive, Section for Relations with States of the Secretariat of State. He 
has published on several subjects related to the history of the Church in the 
Middle Ages and in the 19th–20th centuries.
Stephane Jaquemet was appointed Regional Representative for Southern 
Europe of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
as of April 2016. Mr. Jaquemet has been working with UNHCR for 24 years, 
starting in 1992 in Croatia as Head of Operations. He continued his career in 
Togo serving as Head of Emergency Operations and then as Senior Protec-
tion Ocer. From 1997 to 2002, he held a number of senior positions in the 
Division of International Protection at UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva. He 
successfully served as UNHCR Representative in Lebanon, Nepal, Burkina 
Faso and Colombia. Mr. Jaquemet is a Swiss national and studied law at 
Lausanne University and was called to the Swiss Bar in 1981. He then success-
fully completed his master’s degree in criminology at the University of Paris.
Mukesh Kapila, Dr., CBE, Refugee Crisis Group, University of Manchester, 
is Professor of Global Health and Humanitarian Aairs. He is also Chair of 
Nonviolent Peaceforce, Chair of Manchester Global Foundation, Adjunct 
Professor at the International Centre for Humanitarian Aairs Nairobi, 
Associate Fellow of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Special Repre-
sentative of the Aegis Trust for the prevention of crimes against humanity, 
and Special Adviser to Syria Relief. He was Special Adviser to the rst-ever 
World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in May 2016. His memoir Against 
a Tide of Evil, published in 2013, was nominated for the Best Nonction Book 
of that year. He is the curator of a popular blog series Flesh and Blood.
Stefan Lehne is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where 
he researches the post-Lisbon Treaty development of the European 
Union’s foreign policy with a specic focus on relations between the EU 
and member states. From 2009–2011, Lehne served as director general for 
political aairs at the Austrian Ministry for European and International 
Aairs. Lehne’s work on issues of European foreign and security policy has 
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been widely published in a number of academic journals, including Inte-
gration, the Austrian Journal of Political Science, and Europa Archiv. In 
addition, he has authored a number of monographs on the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Michael O’Flaherty, Prof., has been Director of the EU Agency for Funda-
mental Rights since 2015. Previously, he was Professor of Human Rights Law 
and Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National University 
of Ireland, Galway. He has served as Chief Commissioner of the Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission. In addition, he has held a number of 
senior UN posts in the eld, supported UN headquarters in various human 
rights programmes, been a Vice-Chairperson of the UN Human Rights 
Committee and has sat on the advisory boards of numerous human rights 
groups and journals internationally. His recent publications include volumes 
on the law and practice of human rights eld operations, the professionaliza-
tion of human rights eld work and human rights diplomacy.
Avinoam Patt, Prof., is the Philip D. Feltman Professor of Modern Jewish 
History at the Maurice Greenberg Center for Judaic Studies at the Univer-
sity of Hartford, where he is also director of the Museum of Jewish Civi-
lization. His rst book, Finding Home and Homeland: Jewish Youth and 
Zionism in the Aermath of the Holocaust (published by Wayne State 
University Press, May 2009), examines the appeal of Zionism for young 
survivors in Europe in the aermath of the Holocaust and their role in 
the creation of the state of Israel. He is also the co-editor (with Michael 
Berkowitz) of a collected volume on Jewish Displaced Persons, titled We are 
Here: New Approaches to the Study of Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar 
Germany (Wayne State University Press, February 2010). 
Msgr. Giovanni Pietro Dal Toso, Holy See, studied classical studies and 
later attended the major seminary of Bressanone/Brixen, completing his 
studies in philosophy and theology at the Higher Institute of Philosophy 
and eology of Brixen, earning the title Magister eologiae at the faculty 
of theology at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, and, in December 1997, 
obtaining his Doctorate in Philosophy at the Pontical Gregorian Univer-
sity. Msgr. Giovanni Pietro Dal Toso was the Secretary of the Pontical 
Council “Cor unum” following his appointment by Pope Benedict XVI on 
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22 June 2010 until December 31, 2016. He is now Delegated Secretary in the 
newly created Dicastery for the Promotion of Integral Human Development.
Dan Plesch, Dr., is the Director of the Centre for International Studies and 
Diplomacy at SOAS University of London. His publications include Human 
Rights Aer Hitler, America, Hitler and the UN and with Prof. omas G. 
Weiss, Wartime History and the Future UN. Previously, he was the founding 
Director in Washington DC of the British American Security Information 
Council and Senior Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.
Mgr. Silvano Maria Tomasi is a Roman Catholic archbishop and currently 
serves as the secretary of the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human 
Development. Tomasi previously served as permanent observer to the 
Oce of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies in Geneva for over 
ten years. Before this, he had been named the archbishop and nuncio to 
Ethiopia and Eritrea aer serving as nuncio to Djibouti. Until his appoint-
ment to these posts, Tomasi served as secretary of the Pontical Council 
for Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant Peoples. Additionally, he 
co-founded the Center for Migration Studies. Tomasi obtained his Ph. D. 
in sociology from Fordham University.
Kristina Touzenis, Head of the International Migration Law Unit at the 
International Organization for Migration, is responsible for the activities 
related to international and regional law issues. She has an LLB and LLM 
from the University of Copenhagen. She worked in Italy for nine years 
before joining IOM Geneva, including ve years for IOM Rome, and has 
taught both post and undergraduates at the Universities of Trieste and 
Pisa. Her research focuses on the human rights of women and children 
and she has published on both international human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law issues. She is currently researching issues related 
to criminal law and human rights.
INVITED SPEAKERS AND MODERATORS
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   238 12.02.2018   15:59:50
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   239 12.02.2018   15:59:50
ihra_4_fahnen.indd   240 12.02.2018   15:59:50
